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Abstract 
This thesis applies the theory developed by Manual Castells in his three-volume book, The Infor-
mation Age, to the African National Congress' (ANC) policies for post-apartheid South Africa. An 
overview of major theories of nationalism provides the context for Castells' own views. There fol-
lows a brief summary of the ideas Castells proposes on the transition from industrial capitalism to 
informational capitalism, expressed in the emergence of the ideal type of the network society, and 
his theory on identity and nationalism. Turning to ANC policy, an analysis of ANC and government 
documents demonstrates that the ANC intends creating a new South African nation; an exposition 
of the characteristics of this new nation is given. This thesis also shows that the economic policy 
of the ANC-in-govemment, shifting from the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme to 
the 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy, deliberately joined South Africa to the 
global economy. After examining the contemporary state of nationalist sentiment in South Africa, 
the significant extent to which South Africa tends towards the network society pattern is determined, 
following which Castells' conceptions of the network society and identity are applied to present-day 
South Africa in order to project the path of nationalism in the country. 
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Abstrak 
Hierdie tesis pas die teorie wat Manuel Castells in sy drie-volume boek, The Information Age, ont-
wikkel het toe op ANC beleid vir Suid Afrika. 'n Oorsig van die belangrikste teoriee oor nasionalisme 
word ter agtergrond gegee. Daama volg 'n kort opsomming van Castells se idee van die oorgang van 
industriele kapitalisme na informasie-gebaseerde kapitalisme. Dit word onder meer vervat in die 
konsep van die "network society" en sy teorie van identiteit en nasionalisme. 'n Analise van ANC 
en regerings dokumente toon dat die ANC dit ten doel het om 'n nuwe Suid Afrikaanse nasie te 
bou. Vervolgens word die kenmerke van die nuwe nasie uiteengesit. Die tesis wys ook hoe die ANC 
regering in 1996 doelbewus sy ekonomiese beleid verander het om Suid-Afrika deel te maak van 
die wereld-ekonomie. Na bestudering van hedendaagse sentiment jeens nasionalisme in Suid-Afrika, 
is dit moontlik om te bepaal in watter mate die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing ooreenstem met die 
"network society" model. Hiema word Castells se konsepte van "network society" en identiteit in 
hedendaagse Suid-Afrika toegepas om projeksies oor die pad vorentoe vir nasionalisme in die land te 
maak. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Outwardly we [South Africans] are a people of many colours, races, cultures, languages 
and ancient origins. Yet we are tied to one another by a million visible and invisible 
threads. (Mbeki, 2001 b) 
)\s South Africans prepared for the 1994 election, the first in which non-whites would be voting · 
iiongside whites, the country was tense, with an uncertain future - some predicted that South Africa 
~ould tear itself apart in civil war. Twelve years and three national election victories for the African 
National Congress (ANC) later, South Africa is lauded as the "miracle" nation and held up to the 
rest of the world as an example of a country that was able to transcend its history of centuries of 
racial division. Politicians hailed triumphal moments such as the country's victory in the 1995 Rugby 
"' World Cup and the winning bid for hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup as expressions of national 
unity. By the end of 2005, the South African economy had recorded the longest period of expansion 
in its history (Mboweni, 2005), and the black middle class was reported to be exhibiting "stunning 
growth" 1 (Business Day, 19 July 2005). 
Nonetheless, commentators from across the political spectrum agree with the ruling party's assess-
ment that South African society remains divided. This thesis sets out to examine the prospects for 
the ANC government's stated ambitions of uniting South Africa into one nation, using the theory 
contained in Manuel Castells' The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, which is a three-
volume analysis of the world situation at the end of the twentieth century. To put it differently, this 
thesis seeks to answer a question posed as follows: taking Castells' theory as postulate, what are the 
anticipated results of the ANC's nationalistic endeavours? 
The country is divided, but so is the ruling party. Jacob Zuma's attempt to succeed Thabo Mbeki 
as president of South Africa (a question unresolved at the time of writing) has exposed - to much 
comment in the media - the distance between factions in the ANC. Both of the ANC's partners in 
the Tripartite Alliance, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African 
1 Lawrence Schlemmer (2005) took a more nuanced view, suggesting that the reality was "far more complex than 
the media hype allows for"; in particular, the rate of growth of the black middle class had dropped off since 2002 as 
"employment for Africans in the public service reached a point of saturation." 
1 
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Communist Party, publicly announced that they were considering quitting the Alliance in frustration 
at their inability to influence government policy. A significant cause of these tensions is the fact that, 
twelve years into democratic rule, despite the ANC's slogan promising "a better life for all", poverty 
and unemployment remain rife, especially amongst Africans, a verity that leads left-wing critics to 
charge that the government acts in the interests of the wealthy elite rather than the masses. Economic 
policy is at the heart of the struggle for the soul of the ANC, to paraphrase the title of a recent book 
chronicling the ascendancy of Thabo Mbeki to the presidency of both the ANC and the country. 
Why Castellls? 
"Castells might be right." (Soludo, 2001 :53) 
The scope of Manuel Castells' The Information Age, dealing at length with the world-wide economic, 
political and cultural consequences of what he identifies as the shift from industrial capitalism to in-
formational capitalism and the associated emergence of a new kind of society, the network society, 
is s.urely relevant to post-apartheid South Africa. The three.volumes of his book emerged in the few 
ydfrs after South Africa's first democr~tic election, and can be considered to provide one view c;>f 
the'international political and econ~mic. order that the new ANC government had to negotiat~ in it~ 
attempts to improve the material circumstance of the black African majority of South African citi-
zens, on behalf of whom the ANC now ruled the country. The constraints imposed by the ANC's 
accommodation with this international order - an order in which finance capital is perceived as dom-
in.~nt - can be taken as explaining the .AN C's abandonment of its policy of nationalisation and its ·. "·. 
adqption of the free-market policies contained in the 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) economic blueprint (see Section 5.1). The pertinence of Castells' theory to South Africa has 
been recognised by President Mbeki (2001b), who appointed him as a member of the Presidential 
International Advisory Council on Information Society and Development in 2001. 
Organiisatiion of tllniis thesiis 
This thesis pursues the conjectural implications of the theory proposed by Manuel Castells in The 
Information Age for state-sponsored nationalism in South Africa. The schema followed is outlined 
below. 
Chapter 2, the literature survey, discusses theories of nationalism. Since the literature on nationalism 
is overwhelmingly large, this chapter is necessarily extremely focused. First, a typology of the major 
theories of nationalism is presented. Second, the answers to two key questions are sought by turning 
to several of the theories falling in the modernisation school of thought; this school is the orthodox 
view in the field, although it is by no means universally supported. This section examines whether 
nations are foremost political or cultural entities and the relationship between the nation and .the 
state, looking at causality in particular. Third, the concept, proposed by Mahmood Mamdani, of the 
2 
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bifurcated state as the mechanism by which imperial powers administered their colonies in Africa 
is presented. Fourth, the notion of South African exceptionalism - to what extent South African 
society differs from other post-colonial African societies - is briefly consid~red. And fifth, the waning 
mystique of nationalism since the fading of the Cold War is reviewed. 
Chapter 3 is a summary of the relevant arguments from the core theoretical text of this thesis, The 
Information Age by Manuel Castells2, focusing on the economic and cultural links engendered by 
the ascendancy of the network society as a pattern according to which whole societies are formed 
and the related developments in the significance of collective identity. In turn, the chapter describes: 
the genesis and character of the network society pattern; the importance of collective identity in 
a world of network societies; Castells' conception of nations and nationalism; the decline of state 
power; and Castells' commentary on post-colonial Africa and South Africa at the end of the twentieth 
century. This chapter provides the theoretical frameworks according to which the policies of the ANC 
government will be analysed. 
Chapter 4 investigates the ANC's policies in regard to nationalism and nation-building in South Africa 
by consolidating the policy statements made in publicly available ANC and government documents. 
Th,e chapter proposes that the ANC has indeed embarked on .an attempt to foster a South African 
narional identity. The chapter demonstrates that the ANC views South Africa as currently 'being, in 
effect, two nations. The characteristics of the new and united nation that the ANC desires are pre-
sented. Finally, the chapter shows that the ANC intends for itself and the governmt!nt it controls 
to be the leading force in creating the new South African nation, as the ANC shifts towards devel-
opmental state-type policies, pushes for black economic empowerment and "transformation" of the 
civil service, attempts to set the national "vision" and endeavours to inculcate patriotism through r .-
stale pageantry, the education system and media (especially the national broadcaster). The chapter 
concludes by analysing the syncretistic nature of ANC policy on nationalism. 
Chapter 5 scans, in broad sweep, the economic policies implemented by the ANC government since 
assuming power in 1994. The chapter shows that the overall intention and effect, subsequent to the 
1996 introduction of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, has been the inte-
gration of South Africa into the world economic system, with South Africa's apartheid-era isolation 
giving way to openness to trade and capital flows. The ANC's recent embrace of policies emulating 
the Asian developmental states is seen as acknowledging the disappointing results of this policy in re-
ducing poverty. The chapter investigates the actual effects of ANC economic policy on South Africa's 
economic links with the rest of the world by examining the trends in trade and capital movements since 
1994. Further, the governments efforts at reforming the multilateral institutions of global governance 
and the attempts to secure Africa's economic and political development through the New Economic 
Partnership for Africa's Development are studied - both initiatives can be taken as responses to the 
global situation. 
The analysis in Chapter 6 brings the elements of the three previous chapters together to construct the 
main arguments of this thesis, which revolve around the interplay between the effects of economic 
2See Muller (2000:65) for an example of an application of Castells' ideas to South Africa. 
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policy, in tenns of Castells' theory, and the government's attempts to forge a united South African 
nation. The chapter begins by assessing the government's progress, after twelve years in office, in 
creating a "broader South Africanism." The chapter then investigates the degree to which the eco-
nomic, social and political aspects of democratic South Africa resemble the archetype of the network 
society as defined by Castells; this section evaluates the integration of post-apartheid South Africa 
into the world economy and identity-based reactions to this integration. Finally, the chapter appraises 
the prospects for a South African nationalism in tenns of the theoretical frameworks provided by 
Castells and condensed in Chapter 3. 
The overall plan of this thesis, then, is to describe Castells' theory of the network society, shared 
identity and nationalism; to distill the elements of the AN C's programme for South African nation-
alism; to demonstrate that the new ANC government has deliberately integrated South Africa into 
the world economy; to show that this policy of economic integration set the country on the course to 
becoming a network society, a process which was well under way by the mid-2000s; and to draw out 
the consequences for South African nationalism of becoming a network society. 
4 
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Chapter 2 
Theories of Nationalism 
2.li Theories of IlllatnonalHsm 
The literature on nationalism is both vast and contentious - the "study of nations and nationalisms 
is;f~ent by deep schisms" (Smith, 1998:225). Even attempting to provide. a summary of each of the 
nf~jor theories on the subject would exceed the ambit of this thesis. This chapter therefore approaches 
the· topic by turning to some of the major recent works on nationalism in search of answers to two 
questions of paramount significance for state-sponsored nationalism in South Africa. First, is a nation 
essentially a political or a cultural entity? Second, what is the relationship between the nation and the 
state; specifically, do nations precede states, and can states create nations? 
Tfie chapter begins with a short account of the typology of theories of nationalism provided by Llobera 
( 1999) in Recent Theories of Nationalism, which serves as a brief overview of academic thinking on 
the topic. 
2.:B..1 An ovelt"view of lt"ecent tlhteolt"nes of nationalism 
Josep Llobera (1999), in his overview of theories of nationalism, divides writings on the subject 
into three broad categories according to the central assumption made about nations and nationalism: 
Essentialist views, of which primordialist and sociobiological theories form the two camps, hold that 
nationality is ultimately a birthright; instrumentalist views suppose that people assume nationality as 
a calculated strategy; and modernisation views propose that nations arise as a consequence of some 
combination of the social, economic and political changes wrought by the transition from traditional 
social order to modernity, the emphasised factor varying according to the author. 
2.1.]..1 Essentialist theories 
Primordialist theories Primordialist theories of nationalism are premised on group identity being 
formed around some essential characteristic that an individual possesses by virtue of being born into a 
5 
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particular society at a particular time (Isaacs, 1975); in Geertz's ( 1973, cited in Llobera, 1999) phrase, 
these are "ineffable yet coercive ties", such as blood, language, race, religion, or region. Ethnic 
groupings express and are bound by these ties - an ethnic group or nation is seen as an extension 
of the family, and the bonds that hold the group together are analogous with the natural, primordial 
bonds within a family 1, as proposed by Shils (1957, cited in Llobera, 1999). Geertz (1973) suggests 
that primordial identities, in addition to being natural and ineffable, are primarily based on sentiment 
or affection. 
A nation is formed because of the affective ties between a particular group of people who share 
common descent and culture. The inability to provide an account of the origin of nations is one of 
the key criticisms of primordialist theories (Llobera, 1999). Primordial identities are rigid and the 
boundaries demarcated by them inflexible - another major criticism of primordialist theories is that 
they cannot explain changes in or the dissolution of ethnic groups (Llobera, 1999). 
Sociobioiogical theories Sociobiology attempts to explain human social behaviour with reference 
to evolutionary biology. Sociobiological theories of nationalism draw on the mechanisms of kin 
selection (i.e. nepotism), reciprocity and coercion (Llobera, I 999). At root, sociobiologi~al theories 
ar6'premised on the significance of biological relatedness for human behaviour, as expressed in the 
concept of inclusive fitness2. Van den Berghe (1981) contends that, other factors being equal, people 
will tend to cooperate or fight depending on how closely related they are. This is echoed in The 
Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism (Reynolds, 1983), in which "Genetic distance was put forward as the 
key factor accounting for amity and enmity. Linguistic and cultural markers make sure that people 
are easily classified either as insiders (potential collaborators) or outsiders (potential foes)" (Llobera, 
1999). Shaw and Wong (1989:109-110) provide a comprehensive model, centred on a psychological 
mechanism for group identification: 
"individuals have identified with groups larger than their nucleus ethnic group due to 
balance-of-power considerations. They have done so voluntarily or through coercion (that 
is, defeat and forced amalgamation with conqueror) ... To belong to and fight for a larger 
group, priorities of inclusive fitness maximisation and related biases in mental develop-
ment must be linked with priorities and choices in the cultural environment... Cognition 
and emotion work simultaneously to produce powerful group alliances ... The identifica-
tion mechanism operates best to identify preferred-group membership when groups are 
naturally cohesive. Natural cohesion arises when five recognition markers are in con-
gruence and intensity of emotion concerning these recognition markers is strong. The 
recognition markers are common phenotypes, descent, language, homeland and religion." 
1The practice of likening the nation to a family is widespread in nationalist rhetoric. The ANC - which characterised 
itself as a revolutionary national organisation - had a struggle-era slogan exclaiming the "ANC is your mother and your 
father" (Suttner, 2005). · 
2 Inclusive fitness is an evolutionary concept which holds that the behaviour of individual organisms tends to maximise 
the overall reproductive success of the species; the idea is used to provide a genetic explanation for seemingly self-
defeating behaviour such as altruism. Inclusive fitness is most famously explained by Richard Dawkins (1989). 
6 
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It is important to note that most sociobiologists do not claim that nationalism can be purely explained 
by genetic causes without regard for culture and history, but that nationalism rests on innate human 
tendencies to treat people differently according to the how closely related they are (Llobera, 1999). 
For sociobiologists, nations are associations of people who share a larger proportion of genes than 
average, in other words who have common descent - nations that do not satisfy this condition will 
be fragile and easily fissured (Shaw and Wong, 1989: 110). Nations are bound together by a common 
identity, people having an innate mechanism for producing identification with a group. This identity 
will be strongest when Shaw and Wong's (1989:109-110) five markers are in agreement - i.e. the 
group shares physical features, language, descent, homeland and religion. 
As with primordialist explanations for nationalism, sociobiological theories typically fail to explain 
the formation of nations (Llobera, 1999). Drawing on Shaw and Wong ( 1989), however, we can allow 
for political and cultural processes forming nations, the durability of which are then determined by 
the strength of the identification of the individual members with the group. 
2.1.1.2 Instrumentalist theories of nationalism 
Instrumentalist theories generally refer to ethnic groups but are often generalised to account for na-
tioris too (Llobera, 1999). The basic claim of instrumentalist theories is that ethnic identity is "flexible 
and variable ... both the content and boundaries of an ethnic group change according to circumstance" 
(Llobera, 1999). Ethnic identification is caused by economic, political and social processes and is not 
permanent - individuals can potentially move from one group to another. 
B<i:ith ( 1969) defined ethnicity as a fom1 of social organisation, that is as a cultural artefact. Maintain-
ing the boundary between groups (distinguishable by cultural differences) is then an essential task. 
For Barth, ethnic collectives are formed and mobilised largely by ethnic entrepreneurs or leaders 
(Llobera, 1999). 
Competition theories (see, for example, Nagel and Olzak (1986)) assume that competition between 
distinct groups for scarce resources provides the conditions for the emergence of ethnic identity as a 
basis for collective action (Llobera, 1999). 
Rational choice theory - expounded by, among others, Banton (1983) and Hechter (1988) - emphasises 
the role that individual preferences play in ethnic affiliations (Llobera, 1999). Rational choice theory 
assumes that individuals select their ethnic affiliation, to the extent that circumstances permit, in order 
to gain the most benefit (calculated as wealth, security or prestige). 
Instrumentalist theories of ethnicity and nationalism emphasise the role of individual agency in form-
ing nations and these theories are thus criticised for ignoring the role of the state (Llobera, 1999). 
2.1.1.3 Modernisation theories of nationalism 
Many theories of nationalism assert that nationalism is. a phenomenon associated with modernity 
and turn to elements of modernity to explain the emergence of nationalism (Llobera, 1999) - this 
7 
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viewpoint can be taken as orthodox. Some authors propose that nations are an ancient phenomenon 
but that nationalism is peculiar to modem societies (Llobera, 1999). 
In general, "modernization theories maintain that nationalism emerges as a result of the process of 
transition from traditional to modern society; some of these theories focus more specifically on the 
spread of industrialization3, and on the socio-economic, political and cultural conditions functionally 
associated with it, as the main cause of nationalism" (Llobera, 1999). 
Social communication theories Social communication theories emphasise the importance of com-
munication in the formation of national groups (Llobera, 1999). 
Deutsch (1953), specifically addressing the advent of nationalism in the transition from traditional to 
modem societies, defines a nation as a collective who communicate more effectively and intensely 
with one another than with people outside the group (Llobera, 1999). Deutsch pointed to large-scale 
social organisation as increasing the importance of language and culture and hence of nationalism, 
with the implication that modem nation-states are likely to absorb any ethnic minorities they might 
incorporate. In fact, the reverse has proved true - minority cultures continue to assert their distinctive-
ness and demand more autonomy (Llobera, 1999). 
ii. 
Rustow (1969:30, quoted in Llobera, 1999) asserts that "the essential link between modernization and 
nationhood consists of course in the need for an intensive division of labour." Equality is an important 
feature of nations. While allowing the possibility that some traditional societies were nations, Rustow 
argues that modernisation and nationhood are closely related, with the nation-state being the most ap-
propriate political structure for achieving advanced modernisation and with modernisation providing 
" th~ most suitable social conditions for the fostering and maintenance of national identity (Llobera, 
1999). 
Rokkan (1983), analysing Western European nation-states, proposes a model in which some important 
elements of their emergence occur in medieval and early-modem periods (Llobera, 1999). He explains 
the proliferation of nation-states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through the interaction of 
economic, territorial and cultural factors. 
Benedict Anderson's influential Imagined Communities (1983) highlights the role of social commu-
nication in nation-building. He (1983:15) defines a nation as "an imagined political community ... 
imagined as both limited and sovereign." He argues for the crucial role of print capitalism in the 
early-modern period in the genesis of nations: widespread printing in vernacular languages created in 
each case a standardised language4 which in tum fostered communication within a population. Ander-
son explains the emergence of nationalism as an anti-colonial force by suggesting that the colonised 
groups were politically and culturally excluded and were able to imagine their own communities 
which allowed them to overthrow their colonial rulers. 
3 Application of modernisation theories to Third World countries should take into account that industrialisation is often 
absent in these countries (Llobera, 1999). 
4 Alexander (2002:93-94), drawing on Anderson, argues that the standardisation of the written forms of the indigenous 
South African languages is essential for their preservation. 
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Economistic theories Economistic theories of nationalism assume that nations are created to serve 
a particular group's economic interests and that nationalist discourse obscures these economic inter-
ests - i.e. it "can be used to justify or hide economic exploitation" (Llobera, 1999). 
For Llobera (1999), Marxist theories "posit a more or less explicit causal connection between the 
development of capitalism and the appearance of nationalism." The 1970s saw several modifications 
of Marxist theories arise. First, the theory of internal colonialism (see Hechter, 1975) noted that 
states tended to show internal inequalities on the basis of ethnicity (in the USA, for example) or 
region (in Europe), and that these inequalities gave rise to ethnic movements within states; the idea 
of a national culture was deprecated in favour of a conceptualisation suggesting a dominant national 
culture that subordinates other cultures within the state by monopolising prestigious social positions. 
Second, Nairn (1977) attributed nationalism to the negative effects of uneven development; states in 
the periphery could defend themselves by fostering nationalism, an inter-class alliance that asserted 
its independence of the dominant, alien state by expressing its cultural uniqueness. Third, Wallerstein 
(1987:381) suggests that nations derive from the political system of the modern world economy, that 
is from states; for Wallerstein, nations are equivalent to states (Llobera, 1999). 
Ernest Gellner insists that nationalism, while it is itself a cultural phenomenon, is "the unavoidable 
outcome of an industrial society which requires a spatially ductile workforce" (Llobera, 1999) - "the 
specific roots of nationalism are found in the distinctive structural requirements of industrial society" 
(Gellner, 1983:31). Gellner (1964) maintains that nationalism can only be explained through the ef-
fects of industrialisation, competition between classes and the integrating effects of language and ed-
ucation. Industrialisation, in undermining traditional social order, made culture extremely significant 
in that it became the source of identity. The state was important because it provided a standardised 
education system and official language. For Gellner, nations are invented units. 
Anthony D. Smith (1986), who clearly asserts the link between modernity and nationalism, also 
recognises that "we find in pre-modern eras, even in the ancient world, striking parallels to the 'mod-
ern' idea of national identity ... and we find movements that appear to resemble modern nationalism" 
(Smith, 1986:11). 
Politico-ideological theories Theories that account for nationalism by recourse to politics and ide-
ology insist on modern nationalism as being primarily political in nature. 
While Breuilly (1985) allows that nations existed in medieval Europe, he delimits nationalism to the 
modern era; nationalism results from the development of the modern state and the international state 
system - nationalism is a political phenomenon and the state is central in fostering nationalism. 
Giddens (1981:190-191) defines nationalism as "the existence of symbols and beliefs which are ei-
ther propagated by elite groups, or held by many of the members of regional, ethnic, or linguistic 
categories of a population and which imply a community between them." Although Giddens consid-
ers nationalism as a modern phenomenon, it is not a deterministic product of nation-states which are 
themselves not simply products of capitalism, but which developed in tandem (Llobera, 1999). Gid-
dens insists that European nationalism cannot be generalised to other regions. Giddens (1985:220) 
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makes provision for the "origins of oppositional nationalism" being strongly influenced by uneven 
capitalist development. 
Brass (1991) maintains that ethnicity and nationalism are modem phenomena. Further, they are 
constructed by elites aiming to use culture to entrench their own political or economic advantage. 
The following two sections consider only theories that fall under the modernisation school of thought. 
2.:n..2 Aire nations JP:trimariny ponitican or cuUuiran units? 
This section focuses on conceptions of the nation; is this social unit, which has assumed such meaning 
in the last two centuries - as Benedict Anderson (1983: 132) puts it "Dying for one's country ... assumes 
a moral grandeur which dying for the Labour Party, the American Medical Association, or perhaps 
even Amnesty International can not rival" - essentially political or cultural? 
All the authors surveyed - and they can be classed in the modernisation category of Llobera's schema 
- agree that nations and nationalism are both political and cultural phenomena, although there are 
certainly disagreements in other respects. Deutsch (1953:61,70,75,78) defines a "nationality" as "a 
pe'dple striving to equip itself with power", where a people is a group of people linked by economic 
. ~ .. . . 
intercourse and the ability to communicate effectively with each other. A nationality becomes a nation 
when it achieves the ability to compel allegiance, and a nation becomes a nation-state when it captures 
or forms a state and attains sovereignty (Deutsch, 1953:78-79). 
The cultural and political aspects of nationhood are explicit in Benedict Anderson's (1983: 15) defi-
nition of a nation as "an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and 
.t,} 
so%ereign." Anderson (1983:14) points directly to the paradox that nationalist ideologies can assert 
potent political force despite their philosophical "poverty and even incoherence." 
Ernest Gellner emphasises the cultural aspects of nationality and ethnicity; for Gellner (1964:168), 
nationalism is a political movement that seeks power - "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations 
to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist - but it does need some pre-existing 
differentiating marks to work on" - it is a political principle that asserts "the conviction that the ethnic 
[national] boundary ought also to be a political one" (Gellner, 1994:35). Gellner (1983), in Nations 
and Nationalism, stresses the "role of mass public education systems in sustaining 'high' cultures in 
modem, industrial societies" (Smith, 1998:29). 
Anthony D. Smith (1991: 15) holds that "National identity and the nation are complex constructs 
composed of a number of interrelated components - ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-
political." In his definition, a nation shares, amongst other attributes, "a mass public culture" and 
"common legal rights and duties for all members" (Smith, 1991:14). Smith (1991:91) gives more 
weight to cultural aspects: "More than a style and doctrine of politics, nationalism is a form of culture 
- an ideology, a language, mythology, symbolism and consciousness" (emphasis in original) - it is 
this cultural aspect that provides the "deep historical grounds for the sense of immemoriality and 
continuity which underpins the profound attachments of so many people to their ethnies and nations" 
(Smith, 1998:226). 
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Breuilly (1985:36) takes a view with the opposite emphasis to Smith - "Nationalism is a fonn of 
politics." Yet, nationalism "clearly builds upon some sense of cultural identity, even if it is the ma-
jor creator of that sense" (Breuilly, I 985:35); national identity is constructed somewhat arbitrarily, 
drawing on culture and history with an "emphasis on cultural distinctiveness" (Breuilly, 1985:349). 
Giddens views the nation-state as a "'conceptual community' founded on common language and 
common symbolic history" (Smith, 1998:73). The institution of the state is paramount - "Giddens 
insists ... that nationalism, and the nation, are really only significant insofar as they are linked to the 
state, that is, to attaining and maintaining state power, and further that the nation has no independent 
conceptual status outside of its link with the state" (Smith, 1998:74-75). The nation is inherently 
political and cultural in this view. 
2.L3 1llhte irellatnmnslhtip between mnHonn amll state 
This section presents a survey of the selected scholars' views on the relationship between nation and 
state, paying attention to the question of causality - do nations precede states or vice versa? 
Dehtsch (1953:78-79) presents a model where nationalities that achieve a kind of coercive power over 
. th~ir members become nations and nations become nation-states when and if they achieve sovereignty, 
i.e·:~ they capture or create a state. Nations, then, come before states, and statehood is the ultimate 
objective of nationalism (Deutsch, 1953:78). 
Anderson (1983:55) devotes considerable attention to the "ways in which administrative units cre-
ate meaning" (see Anderson, 1983:54-61); it is clear that he considers it possible for states to cre-
atinations, a trajectory that he (1983:80-103) identifies in the cases of what Seton-Watson (1977) 
called "official nationalisms", conscious attempts by the European dynastic empires of the late nine-
teenth century to embrace nationalism (in imitation of the recently emerged popular "linguistic-
nationalisms") as a legitimating principle . Anderson also discusses the largely state-led national-
ism (Anderson's (1983:104) "Last Wave") of post-colonial countries, in which administrative units 
inherited from the fonner colonialists attempted to forge new nations: 
"so often in the 'nation-building' policies of the new states one sees both a genuine, pop-
ular nationalist enthusiasm and a systemic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist 
ideology through the mass media, the educational system, administrative regulations, and 
so forth... One can thus think of many of these nations as projects the achievement of 
which is still in progress" (Anderson, 1983: 104-105). 
Gellner (1964:168) considers nations to be the creations of nationalism. He points to the importance 
of mass, public education systems in inculcating a common culture, created by elites, and it is this 
function of education that provides the opportunity for states to create nations - the "public, mass 
education system binds state and culture together" (Smith, 1998:32). Gellner, however, emphasises 
the role of ethnicity - the essence of nationalism is that it seeks the congruence of ethnic and political 
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boundaries (Gellner, 1994:35) - which would suggest that a degree of ethnic homogeneity is necessary 
for the nation to be plausible. 
For Anthony D. Smith (1991:15,39,175; 1998:45) too, ethnicity as a differentiating marker is a major 
ingredient of nationalism, which again suggests that nations cannot be created from arbitrary cultural 
materials. While Smith ( 1991 :39) suggests that "a state's ethnic core often shapes the character and 
boundaries of the nation" because "it is very often on the basis of such a core that states coalesce 
to form nations", he (1991 :40) does "note the possibility of forming nations without immediate and 
antecedent ethnie." Nation-building in post-colonial states tends to be an elite, rather than popu-
lar, project - it is intellectuals who propose and elaborate nationalistic cultures (Smith 1991 :41,93; 
1998:56). The state, then, can direct its resources to nation-building through cultural means. 
Breuilly (1985:374) denies the existence of nations as anything other than political concepts - nation-
alisms are not "true". For Breuilly ( 1985 :365), the goal of nationalism is the achievement of political 
sovereignty - i.e. each nationalism pursues its own state. Nationalism is only possible in a world of 
states; the "development of the political concept of the nation was related to the ways in which the 
absolutist or would-be absolutist state in early modem Europe shaped political thought and action" 
(Breuilly, 1985:353) - the "process which created the modem idea of the state in its earliest form 
al{o gave rise to the political concept of the nation" (Breuilly, 1985:353). Indeed, in Breuilly's view, 
a nationalism ceases to exist as such when its proponents have attained their own state - "In so far 
as rationalism is successful it appears to be true" (Breuilly, 1985:343), although states may attempt 
to harness nationalistic ideology in order to "determine the features of the cultural group [i.e. the 
nation]" from which the state claims legitimacy, in which case the nationalism in question becomes 
"arbitrary" (Breuilly, 1985:380). In fact, for Breuilly (1985:380), modem nationalism has been re-
,' ~ d~ced to "an arbitrary combination of emotion and pragmatism"; it is a tool that can be wielded by 
the state. 
Giddens takes the opposite view to Deutsch - nations arise out of the "processes of state centralisation 
and administrative expansion which, through the reflexive ordering of the state system, fixed the 
borders of a plurality of nations" (Smith, 1998:72). For Giddens, the nation is the state, or at least its 
citizens. Giddens considers nationalism, when espoused by the state, as a means of maintaining state 
power (Smith, 1998:74-75). 
2.2 The bifurcated Afrkan colloimiaJI state 
It is commonplace to note that the borders of colonial states in Africa were arbitrary, drawn up 
at the convenience of imperial powers without regard for the ethnic constitution of the countries 
thus enclosed (Alexander, 2002:89; Slovo, 1988; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2003:454; Nolutshungu, 
1993:616) (in terms of Anthony D. Smith's ideas referred to above, this meant that such states fre-
quently did not contain a core ethnic group). Mamdani makes the crucial point that the governments 
put in place by the colonialists commonly ruled the indigenous population through the mediation of 
the institutions of traditional leadership. 
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2.2.1 Mamdani and the bifurcated colonial state in Africa 
Mahmood Mamdani (1996: 16-23) identifies a particular form of rule adopted by imperial powers in 
Africa as an "inexpensive but efficient mode of control over natives" (Mamdani, 1996:63), namely 
"indirect rule". Indirect rule basically meant that the colonialist state exerted administrative control 
over the rural indigenous population through traditional authorities rather than directly. 
"indirect rule came to be the mode of domination over a 'free' peasantry. Here, land re-
mained a communal - 'customary' - possession. The market was restricted to the products 
of labor, only marginally incorporating labor or land itself. Peasant communities were re-
produced within the context of a spatial and institutional autonomy. The tribal leadership 
was either selectively reconstituted as the hierarchy of the local state or freshly imposed 
where none had existed, as in 'stateless societies.' Here political inequality went along-
side civil inequality. Both were grounded in a legal dualism. Alongside received law was 
implemented a customary law that regulated nonmarket relations, in land, in personal 
(family), and in community affairs. For the subject population of natives, indirect rule 
l signified a mediated - decentralized - despotism." (Mamdani, 1996: 17) 
· .i! · "the colonial s_tate was a double-sided affair. Its one side, the state that governed a racially 
defined citizenry, was bounded by the rule of law and an associated regime of rights. Its 
other side, the state that ruled over subjects, was a regime of extra-economic coercion 
and administratively-driven justice." (Mamdani, 1996: 19) 
Ttius, the colonial state never fully dismantled the traditional authorities, preferring to use them to 
administer the rural areas of their colonial territories without committing large amounts of settler 
manpower. This "bifurcated" form of government was the legacy of colonialism bequeathed to the 
newly-independent African states, and the inability of the new governments to overcome this legacy 
explains the weakness of national governments and the continued significance of ethnicity in post-
colonial Africa. As Jean and John Comaroff (2003:454) put it, 
"Born of long histories of colonisation, these [post-colonial] polities typically entered the 
new world order with legacies of ethnic diversity invented or exacerbated in the cause of 
imperial governance. Colonial regimes, intent on the management of racial capitalism, 
never constituted nations in the Euromodemist sense of the term, even where they gave 
their 'possessions' many of the ceremonial trappings of nationhood." 
2.2.2 Is South Africa exceptional? 
Mamdani (1998) describes South African exceptionalism thus: "At its core, South African exception-
alism is the contention that the South African experience is so totally and irrevocably shaped by the 
initiative of the settler, that South Africa is no longer, in any meaningful sense, part of Africa, native 
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Africa." Mamdani (1996:27) opposes this view, suggesting instead that "South Africa has been an 
African country with specific differences ... It is only from an economistic perspective - one that high-
lights levels of industrialization and proletarianization one-sidedly - that South African materialism 
makes sense." The commonality "lies not in the political economy but in the form of the state: the 
bifurcated state" (1996:28). Mamdani (1996:28) concedes that the "sheer numerical weight of white 
settler presence in South Africa sets it apart from settler minorities elsewhere in colonial Africa." 
Butler (2004: 140) disagrees, claiming that South African politics is not "a typical product of colonial 
rule": 
"Nineteenth-century wars of dispossession, mass population displacement, and enforced 
changes in social organization undermined the communal land control Mamdani identi-
fies as crucial to indirect rule ... South Africa's rebellion against apartheid was not in any 
way confined to a war against institutions equivalent to 'direct rule', even if these institu-
tions did indeed bear the brunt of direct protest. Opposition to apartheid was also often 
self-consciously anti-ethnic, political, urban, unionized, and ideological." 
For Alexander (2002:2), 
"there is no difference between what happened in other settler-colonial countries of the 
'Old Colonial Empire', such as Canada, the United States of America, Australia and New 
Zealand, and South Africa [except that] in South Africa, with the exception of most of 
the Khoisan-speaking communities, the colonists failed to exterminate the indigenous 
African peoples." 
South Africa has inherited a "unique combination" of "a modem industrial state characterised by a 
first-class infrastructure in specific economic and social sectors and inhabited, as it were, for the most 
part by people of European descent" coexisting with "a set of Third World and eventually Fourth 
World conditions" (Alexander, 2002: 138). These elements are joined by "the system of internally 
maintained migrant labour" into "complementary, interdependent parts of a larger social system" 
(Alexander, 2002: 139). For Alexander (2002: 140), while Mamdani might be correct in asserting that 
"South African society" is not "totally different from the rest of Africa", South Africa does have a 
"peculiar social formation." In particular, "the fact of a large population of European descent, most 
of whom had come to identify themselves, objectively if not consciously, with the African continent, 
does make all the difference [for] what happens in South Africa" (emphasis in original). 
2.3 Developments in the late twentieth century 
Following a similar line of reasoning to Castells (see Section 3.3), Zygmunt Bauman (2001:97-98) 
contends that the "uneven development of economy, politics and culture (once coordinated in the 
framework of the nation-state)" characteristic of the contemporary phenomenon of "globalization" 
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leads to the "separation of power from politics: power, as embodied in the worldwide circulation of 
capital and information, becomes extraterritorial, while the extant political institutions stay, as before, 
local. This leads inevitably to the progressive disempowerment of the nation-state." The state is forced 
to abandon "normative regulation" of "economic and cultural processes", which in tum "renders the 
cultural/ideological mobilization of the subject population, once the modem state's principal strategy, 
and the evocation of nationhood and patriotic duty, once its main legitimation, redundant" (Bauman, 
2001:98). 
The consequence of this is a loss of "natural belonging" as citizens come to identify less and less with 
the nation-state and begin individual journeys to defining their own identities; in this situation, col-
lective identities promise security and belonging (Bauman, 2001 :98-100); Bauman (200I:100-101) 
refers to the "potency of community" to explain the pull of collective identity on "the overwhelming 
majority of the population orphaned by the nation-state." 
Vinen (2002:611) concurs, pointing to the decreasing relevance of the state as a meaningful institution 
able to inspire its citizens, for Europeans at least, in the decade following the fall of the Berlin Wall: 
·1 "States had always justified their existence in terms that went beyond the purely utilitar-
S ian. The state was a focus for patriotic loyalty and, in extreme cases, it had the right to ask 
its citizens to die for it. In the 1990s, its mystique was challenged. Europeans transferred 
their loyalties to other entities, including nations that did not correspond to the frontiers 
of any existing state. The key mystical power of the state - its ability to shed the blood of 
its citizens - seemed irrelevant to most Europeans, or at least to most western Europeans, 
at a time when a major war seemed unimaginable." 
2.4 Summary 
Academic studies of nationalism have produced a variety of theories, with little agreement over even 
fundamental points such as the definition of a nation. Essentialist theories of nationalism suppose 
members of a nation to be bound by some intrinsic characteristic. For primordialists, such as Geertz, 
nations are bound by birth or blood ties - ethnic groups and nations are extensions of the family or 
clan. Sociobiologists draw on evolutionary biology, especially kin selection, to explain nationalism. 
Van den Berghe argues that the degree of relatedness between groups tends to determine whether 
they cooperate or fight. Shaw and Wong propose a genetically-determined psychological mechanism 
for group identification, which naturally tends to form bonds based on shared phenotypes, descent, 
language, homeland and religion. 
Instrumentalist theories of nationalism emphasise individual agency in selecting national affiliation. 
Competition theorists suggest that ethnic identity is amenable to serving as a tool in contests over 
scarce resources, while rational choice theorists such as Barton and Hechter claim that individuals 
choose their ethnic identity, as far as possible, out of calculated self-interest. 
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Overwhelmingly, however, scholars of nationalism hold that it is a phenomenon unique to the modern 
period. Social communication theorists, like Deutsch, Rustow and Anderson, emphasise the impor-
tance of communication within a group for the emergence of collective identity. Anderson highlights 
the importance of early print capitalism in standardising vernacular languages, thereby fostering com-
munication and a feeling of national unity. Economistic theories of nationalism hold the economic 
order of modern industrial society to be the cause of nationalism. Marxists saw nationalism as a con-
sequence of capitalism, and Gellner insists that nationalism is the "unavoidable outcome" of industrial 
society. Smith, however, also stresses the importance of ethnicity in nation-formation. Theorists like 
Giddens, Breuilly and Brass maintain that nationalism, while a modern phenomenon, is principally 
political or ideological in nature. These scholars emphasise the role of elites (in the case of Giddens 
and Brass) and the state (in the case of Breuilly) in fostering national identity. 
Within the modernisation camp, the scholars surveyed allowed that nations were both political and 
cultural units, although Deutsch, Breuilly and Giddens emphasised the political dimension, whereas 
Smith emphasised the cultural dimension and Anderson and Gellner emphasised both. 
Turning to the question of whether nations created states or states created nations, the views of the 
scholars surveyed disagreed. Deutsch proposed that nationhood led to statehood, whereas Anderson, 
Gellner and Giddens claimed that the state produced the nation, although Gellner emphasised the 
importance of ethnicity. Smith (again emphasising the significance of ethnicity) and Breuilly allowed 
for either trajectory. 
Mamdani contends that colonial powers in Africa were able to rule cheaply by co-opting the insti-
tutions of traditional leadership to rule the indigenous populations. This indirect rule produced a 
"bifurcated" state, where the indigenous populations were legally and politically distinct from the 
colonial citizens. The traditional authorities thus remained largely in place, especially in rural areas, 
leaving a fragmented polity as the inheritance of newly independent African states. 
Mamdani regards South African exceptionalism - the view that South African society is sufficiently 
different from other African societies as to warrant entirely separate consideration - as mistaken; But-
ler and Neville Alexander, however, consider Mamdani to have ignored the factors in South Africa's 
peculiar history, in particular the level of industrial development and the large number of white citi-
zens, which set South Africa apart from the other societies on the continent. 
In an historical irony, Bauman notes the declining significance of national identity in the developed 
world at the end of the twentieth century. He suggests that economic globalisation separates power 
. from politics, as power - in the form of a "worldwide circulation of capital and information" - escapes 
the local, territorial domain of political authority. The consequent loss of capacity of the nation-state 
makes its usual role of inculcating national identity redundant, as ordinary people tend to identify less 
with nations and more with other communal identities. 
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Chapter 3 
Castells' The Information Age 
Manuel Castells (1997; 2000a; 2000b), in his three-volume book The Information Age: Economy, So-
ciety and Culture, attempts to describe the global social situation at the end of the twentieth century 
and presents theoretical frameworks for making sense of the state of the world. Castells himself dis-
cerns two primary themes, highlighted by the titles of his first two volumes: increasing international 
:, linkages within what he calls the "network society" and the related intensification of the significance 
· of "identity." Broadly speaking, the first theme describes processes of global (although not uniformly 
: distributed) economic and cultural integration and the second theme describes defensive and creative 
reactions against the threats to economic or cultural autonomy perceived as consequent of this world-
wide integration. 
This chapter summarises Castells' positions on three key topics: first, the genesis and characteristics 
of the network society; second, collective identity and the nature and origins of nations and nation-
alism; third, the declining ability of nominally sovereign states to control their own economic and 
political destinies. This selection is made on the basis of our interest in using the theoretical frames 
provided by Castells to analyse the attempted fostering of nationalism in South Africa by the African 
National Congress (ANC)1• Castells' comments on post-colonial Africa, and South Africa specifi-
cally, are also summarised. 
3.Jl. Tllle Jrnetwoirlk society 
3.1.JI. The shift to the 111etwoirk society 
The primary role of economic rearrangements in inducing the network society can be gauged by the 
space Castells devotes to consideration of these changes: in The Rise of the Network Society, fully 
1 The three volumes of The Information Age have also received attention from the ANC and the South African Commu-
nist Party (SACP): the SACP programme adopted at its 2002 Congress acknowledges Castells as influencing the party's 
conceptualisation of globalisation (SACP, 2002). Castells serves on the South African government's Presidential Inter-
national Advisory Council on Information Society and Development, announced by President Mbeki (2001 b) in his State 
of the Nation address in 2001. See Kraak (2000) for an account of a seminar featuring Castells and Martin Carnoy of 
Stanford held in Gauteng in June 2000 in which a number of prominent ANC members participated. 
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four out of seven chapters (over 300 pages out of 500) are devoted to economic matters, analysing in 
turn the prominence of information processing and communication technology as a source of produc-
tivity and competitiveness, the emergence of an interdependent global economy, the organisation of 
businesses into network forms and a marked shift towards flexible employment practices. Changes 
in economic institutions, practices and technologies can be regarded as generating the shift to the 
network society. 
Castells (2000b:77,165) locates the beginnings of the shift in the early to mid 1970s - a useful marker 
might be the collapse of the ' Woods fixed exchange rate mechanism in 1973 (Hill, 2001 :307). By 
this time, trade barriers had declined substantially since the establishment of the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1947, while world trade had grown steadily since the early 1950s 
(Hill, 2001:9). 
Castells traces the origins of the network society to the interactions between several mutually inter-
acting processes. Starting in the mid- l 970s, businesses adopted new, more flexible, organisational 
forms and practices to cope with rising levels of uncertainty as individual firms faced more rapidly 
changing environments (Castells, 2000b: 165). Businesses in developed countries, beginning in the 
United States in the mid-l 970s but subsequently in Europe and Asia also, sought competitiveness and 
!\-profitability by exporting to new markets and moving production to cheaper locations overseas; the 
"" -~ .. resulting intensification of competition forced other firms to follow suit (Castells, 2000b:l35,165). 
'' These strategies were made possible by improvements in information and communication technolo-
.' gies and management practices (Castells, 2000b:90,94-97, 164 ). This accelerating international ex-
pansion of firms and movement of capital was made possible by governments removing regulatory 
' . 
. :'restrictions on trade and financial flows (Castells, 2000b: 135). Government policies favouring dereg-· 
,•i· ulation, trade liberalisation and privatisation were promoted by international institutions such as the 
· International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation - by the 1990s, these 
policies were dominant throughout the world, circumscribing the policy options available to individ-
ual governments (Castells, 2000b: 137,142). 
3.1.2 ClhtaJradeJristks of tlhle netwoJrlk society 
The Rise of the Network Society describes the principal characteristics of the network society as each 
conforming to a networking logic. These characteristics manifest in the various cultures throughout 
the world, but are most clearly discernible in the developed economies - "major societies" (Castells, 
2000b:20) - of North America, Europe and Asia. The Rise of the Network Society is thus the story of 
"the emergence of a new social structure" (Castells, 2000b: 14). 
While pointing to the network society as an underlying pattern - the "common fundamental features" 
of "socio-technical systems" - visible in various societies, Castells (2000b:20, 188-189) makes it clear 
that individual societies structure their institutions according to their own values - institutions re-
flect the societies they inhabit. "Each society tends to generate its own organizational arrangements" 
(Castells, 2000b: 188). Looking specifically at commerce in East Asia, "patterns of business orga-
nization ... are produced by the interplay of culture, history, and institutions" (Castells, 2000b: 189), 
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while looking at employment, there is "historical variation in employment patterns according to spe-
cific institutions, culture, and political environments" (Castells, 2000b:217). So "the new society 
emerging from this process of [technological] change is both capitalist and informational, while pre-
senting considerable historical variations in different countries, according to their history, culture, 
institutions" (Castells, 2000b: 13). The "new social structure" of the network society is "manifested in 
various forms, depending on the diversity of cultures and institutions throughout the planet" (Castells, 
2000b:l4). 
3.1.2.1 Informational capitalism 
Castells (2000b:13,15) argues that, after the collapse of Soviet statism, the global economy is now 
capitalist - that is, the social distribution of economic consumption and surplus happens according 
to the rules of the capitalist mode of production2. Further, Castells (2000b: 17 ,99) argues that the 
economic "mode of development" has altered from industrialism to informationalism - technologies 
for processing and communicating information and creating knowledge are now the principal sources 
of productivity. He labels the "new techno-economic system" as "informational capitalism" (Castells, 
~2000b: J 8). Information and communication technologies have become pervasive. 
3.1.2.2 Global economy 
In addition to its informational character, Castells (2000b:77, 132) maintains that the contemporary 
: _world economy is global and networked - by which he means that the world economy as a unit 
·/spans the entire globe and business networks are significant elements determining productivity and 
·competitiveness - and operates in real-time. The major industries are massively globalised, linking 
local economies together - while the bulk of production and employment is still local and regional, 
"the core activities of production [and] consumption ... are organised on a global scale" and it is these 
core activities which determine the success or otherwise of local and regional firms and economies 
(Castells, 2000b:77,97, 101). 
While the global economy is linked together by markets for capital, goods and services, the global 
movement of labour is severely constrained (Castells, 2000b: 102, 106, 131,250). 
The global economy has a networked spatial form that does not cover the earth uniformly, as it con-
nects to useful locations and regions and does not connect to "everything, and everyone, which does 
not have value, according to what is valued in the networks" (Castells, 2000b: 134 ). 
2Castells (2000b: 14-17) makes the distinction between "modes of development" and "modes of production." This 
analysis is based on the "socially complex" production process, examining the ways in which the "product of the produc-
tion process is socially used" in the forms of "consumption and surplus" (Castells, 2000b: 15). Modes of development are 
"the technological arrangements through which labour works on matter to generate the product, ultimately determining the 
level and quality of surplus" (Castells, 2000b: 16). Modes of production are the "rules" which determine "the appropria-
tion, distribution, and uses of the surplus"; modes of production "define social relationships of production, determining the 
existence of social classes that become constituted as such classes through their historical practice" (Castells, 2000b: 16). 
Characterising modes of production by the "structural principle under which surplus is appropriated and controlled", 
Castells (2000b: 16) suggests that two major modes of production existed during the twentieth century, namely capitalism 
and statism. 
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3.1.2.3 Flexible enterprises 
Businesses, in pursuit of the flexibility to adapt to continually changing environments, adopted network-
like organisational forms, largely in the shape of transnational production networks linking up col-
lections of firms, with coordination enabled by advanced information and communication technology 
(Castells, 2000b: 177, 180). Importantly, companies also adjusted their labour practices away from 
salaried, long-term employment in favour of short-term contract employment, again in pursuit of flex-
ibility (Castells, 2000b:282). The "prevailing model for labor in the new, information-based economy 
is that of a core labor force ... and a disposable labor force", with firms obtaining flexibility in their 
treatment of the latter (Castells, 2000b:295, emphasis in original). Castells (2000b:216,251) claims 
that these new labour practices are "the main lever by which the informational paradigm and the pro-
cess of globalization affect society at large" as state-bound workers increasingly feel the effects of 
global competition and economic conditions. 
3.1.2.4 Increasing polarisation of Ialbour 
The intertwined processes through which firms adjust to the global economy of informational capi-
~ . 
t~lism by pursuing adaptability through flexible labour practices and outsourcing and upgrading the 
;:,. 
technology of their production systems have consequences for the organisation of work, and "there-
f()re employment and occupational structure" are being redefined (Castells, 2000b:255-267). Castells 
(2000b:266-267) observes that the effects of these changes are that while "a substantial number of 
jobs are being upgraded in skills", "a large number of [low-skilled, repetitive] jobs are being phased 
out by automation in both manufacturing and services", the net result of which is a "bifurcation of 
l 
work patterns and polarization of labour", with the workforce segregated by level of education into 
professional and multi-skilled clerical workers in one category and "low-skill, low-paid" labourers in 
the other. While informational capitalism does restructure the workforce, Castells (2000b:280) adds 
that "there is no systematic structural relationship between the diffusion of information technologies 
and the evolution of employment levels in the economy as a whole" (emphasis in original). 
Castells (2000b:299), in identifying the consequences of the labour force adjustments, points to the 
American example of "income inequality and declining real wages" as especially significant since 
America represents the "flexible labor market model at which most European nations, and certainly 
European firms, are aiming." However, the "new vulnerability of labor under conditions of unre-
strained flexibility does not concern only the unskilled labor force" - professionals find that permanent 
employment is available for shorter periods than previously the case (Castells, 2000b:299). 
3.1.2.5 The space of flows 
Castells (2000b:442) introduces the concept of the "space of flows" as existing separately from ordi-
nary, physical space, removing the necessity of physical contiguity for simultaneous social practices. 
The space of flows is the "material support" for the flows of capital, information, images, sounds, 
symbols and goods which are the "expression of processes dominating our economic, political, and 
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symbolic life" (Castells, 2000b:442). This space comprises three layers: the circuits of electronic 
exchanges and high-speed transportation through which goods and information move; the physical 
places ("nodes and hubs") these circuits attach to; and the spatial organisation of the "dominant, man-
agerial elites"3 (Castells, 2000b:442-445). A map of airline routes is an apt visual representation of 
one of the components of the first layer, with dense connections in the countries of North America, 
Europe and parts of Asia, and sparse connections in the rest of the world. 
Castells (2000b:411) notes that while urban centers joined by the physical and conceptual links of the 
space of flows become increasingly interdependent, they become at the same time decoupled from 
their surrounding territories. Castells (2000b:446-448) identifies a "cosmopolitan" culture shared 
by the elites connected through the space of flows, with the "major trend of cultural distinctiveness 
of the elites" being the "unifying" of "the symbolic environment of the elite around the world"4 -
the elite culture is increasingly separate from local cultures. There exists "an international culture 
whose identity is not linked to any specific society but to membership of the managerial circles of the 
informational economy across a global cultural spectrum"5 (Castells, 2000b:44 7). 
3:2 Identity, imations aimd imatfioimalllsm 
The second volume of The Information Age (Castells, 1997) is dedicated to discussion of (group) 
identity and its various interactions with the pressures of an increasingly interlinked world described 
in the first volume. 
3.2.:ll. 1I'ltne constirllllctfon of identity 
Identity, in Castells' formulation (1997:6), is what people use to ascribe meaning - symbolic signif-
icance - to their actions and experiences; more specifically, shared or group identity is the "process 
of construction of meaning" using cultural materials and this identity becomes important when it is 
"given priority over other sources of meaning"6 . A particular individual may well have several iden-
tities, with one being primary (Castells, 1997:6). Identity is then, in this formulation, a constructed 
phenomenon, built with cultural artefacts from history, geography, biology, religion, etc. Further, a 
constructed identity implies a constructor, a social agent, which selects and arranges the content of 
the identity to suit its own purposes (Castells, 1997:7). 
3Stalder (1998) formulates the three layers as technology, places, people. 
4The cosmopolitan elites communicate easily with each other, a situation strongly reminiscent of Deutsch's (1953:60-
79) idea of "social communication", which he applied to nationalism - nationalities consist of groups of people who 
communicate easily and effectively with one another and far less easily with other groups and who are joined together by 
strong economic links. 
5Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2000) coined the tenn "cosmocrats" to describe this international elite. 
6Tomlinson (2003:271) points out that anthropologists and media and cultural critics have recently suggested that the 
conception of identity-formation as "a universal feature of human experience" is in fact an ethnocentric assumption; rather, 
the adoption of specific, individual and collective identities is only necessary for those operating in societies structured by 
modem institutions - identity is "a specifically modem cultural imagination." 
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Castells ( 1997 :8-10) distinguishes three categories of collective identity according to their relationship 
to dominant social relations and institutions. First, "legitimising identity" is propagated by dominant 
social institutions and justifies their domination; legitimising identity "generates a civil society"7 . 
Second, "resistance identity" is propagated by groups that are excluded by the dominant groups in 
a society; resistance identity forms "communities"8. Third, "project identity" is formed when social 
actors attempt the transformation of their society; project identity forms "subjects", collective social 
actors9 . 
Castells does not make the point himself, but implicit in his argument about the waning relevance 
of legitimising identity - identity that supports the legitimacy of the state - is that the mystique the 
nation-state assumed as a result of widely-held legitimising identities has vanished. The state is left 
as a provider of services and transfer payments - Castells (1997:252-254) alludes to this trend in his 
claim that transfer payments (i.e. the welfare state) are now the main source of state legitimacy in 
modern (major) countries. Starkly put, the state has little symbolic importance for its citizens, who 
draw their meaning from other identities (see Section 2.3). 
Castells (1997: 11) holds that the network society makes it difficult for most individuals and groups 
(excluding the dominant elites) to build coherent identities because of the "systemic disjunction be-
tw~en the local and global." This separation between power - which increasingly lies in global net-
works - and local association and representation causes civil societies to contract, thereby encouraging 
people to form defensive communities around resistance identities 10 - resistance identities are thus the 
dialectic consequence of integrated global flows 11 (Castells, 1997: 11 ). 
3.2.2 Tlhe making of nations 
Nations are "cultural communes constructed in people's minds and collective memory by the shar-
ing of history and political projects" (Castells, 1997:51). They exist independently of statehood -
nationality is distinct from citizenship (Castells, 1997:51). 
Granted that nations are constructed, the important questions are who makes them and from what 
materials? Castells (1997:31-32) cites De Ventos' theory which explains the production of national 
7 Castells (1997:8-9), following Gramsci, proposes that civil society consists of"' apparatuses,' such as the Church( es), 
unions, parties, cooperatives, civic associations and so on, which, on the one hand, prolong the dynamics of the state, 
but, on the other hand, are deeply rooted among people." This conception of civil society is by no means canonical -
Habib (2003:228), writing about civil society in South Africa, defines civil society as "the organised expression of various 
interests and values operating in the triangular space between the family, state, and the market", a definition which allows 
for collaborative and antagonistic relations between civil society and the state. 
8For Castells (1997:9), these communities are "forms of collective resistance against otherwise unbearable oppres-
sion", usually formed "on the basis of identities that were, apparently, clearly defined by history, geography, or biology, 
making it easier to essentialize the boundaries of resistance." 
9Castells (1997:10) suggests that movements such as those attempting to remove patriarchal domination or the reli-
gious conversion of entire societies are examples of project identities; Stalder (1998) suggests feminism and environmen-
talism. 
10Peter Alexander (2006:63) argues in this regard that Castells "surely overstates his case ... There is a real sense in 
which a global recognition of place is emerging, and that sense is at least as strong in South Africa as South Carolina." 
11 Tomlinson (2003:271) specifically takes issue with Castells' characterisation of globalisation and identity as oppos-
ing forces, suggesting that Castells has missed the link between "globalization and the institutionalized construction of 
identities": "globalization is really the globalization of modernity, and modernity is the harbinger of identity." 
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identity through the interaction between four sets of factors: primary factors, including ethnicity, 
territory, language and religion; generative factors, including communications and technology, cities, 
armies and monarchies; induced factors, such as the codification of languages, the emergence of 
bureaucracies and standardised national education; and reactive factors, in particular, the defence of 
oppressed identities. In Castells' view (1997:29,52), common ethnicity, religion or language alone 
are not sufficient raw materials from which to build a nation. The crucial, binding, elements, both 
of which are necessary, are shared experience and language12 (Castells, 1997:29,52). A common 
language is especially important for nations without states - Castells (1997:52) hypothesises that 
language provides the means for people to recognise each other as belonging to the same nation and, 
through its function as the medium of cultural expression, demarcates resistance against the threat of 
cultural homogenisation. 
Of particular interest to the South African situation is Castells' ( 1997 :53-59) assertion that race is now 
not viable as a primary cultural building block for shared identity; his claim is based on the splitting 
up of African-Americans into differing social classes, as evident in the last three decades. Castells 
argues that "Race matters, but it hardly constructs meaning any longer" - racial identity in the network 
society is subsumed "under broader principles of cultural self-definition, such as religion, nation or 
:gender." 
... Castells (1997:29) suggests that nations are given life through "cultural constructs and political projects." 
)'et, governments alone cannot create a nation 13 - Castells (1997:39) gives the example of the USSR 14 , 
where "one of the most powerful states in the history of humankind was not able, after 74 years, to 
create a new national identity 15 ." The state, however, can play an important role in creating and .rein-
Jorcing national identity, in particular by funding cultural activities that promote the nation - Castells 
'\ti 
. ·(1997:48) cites the example of the Catalan state government paying for language tuition to integrate 
non-Catalans culturally. Castells (1997:30-31) allows that both cultural elites and the masses partici-
pate in constructing nations, rather than the creation of a nation being solely a project of self-serving 
elites 16 - "in fact, nationalism nowadays is more often than not a reaction against the global elites." As 
for the nation-state itself, Castells (1997:270) argues that this was, in the "Modem Age", a creation 
12 Pointing to Benedict Anderson's (1983: 123-126) arguments - specifically his suggestion of Switzerland of an instance 
of a nation without "linguistic uniformity" - Alexander (2002:86-88) specifically rejects this assertion by Castells, because, 
"in the post-colonial African context, the state, generally speaking, creates the conditions in which meaning 
(identity, and also identities) is created ... the crucial issue is the capacity of the citizens to communicate 
with one another effortlessly, regardless of the language in which they do so." 
In simple terms, Castells argues for a common language as a means of recognition, while Alexander claims that commu-
nication is enough. 
13 Alexander (2002:88) again differs from Castells here: 
"in the post-war African context, the word 'nation' is, and should continue to be, used in order to denote 
the population that resides within a given independent state ... in the post-colonial African context, the state, 
generally speaking, creates the conditions in which meaning (identity, and also identities) is created." 
14Anthony D. Smith (1991:148-149) makes the same point, "ethnic ties and nationalist aspirations have proved more 
durable than Marxist ideologies and parties." 
15 Alexander (2000:21) considers use of the instance of the USSR as an over-generalisation. 
16This stands in contrast with the position of other theorists of nationalism, like Anthony D. Smith, Ernest Gellner, 
Nairn and Breuilly who emphasise the role of intellectual elites in fomenting national feeling. 
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of the state and not the nation. 
3.2.3 Nations ancll nationalism in tllle network society 
Paradoxically, the increased economic and cultural integration of the late twentieth century has re-
sulted in rising, rather than falling, national sentiment throughout the world (Castells, 1997:27). 
Castells (1997:31) argues that contemporary nationalism is usually a form of collective resistance 
mobilised by the fear of cultural or economic subjugation, this resistance tending to take cultural 
rather than political forms. Indeed, Castells (1997:30,51) notes the development of nations that do 
not necessarily pursue full-blown statehood but which extract some measure of sovereignty from their 
parent state instead. Consequently, pluri-national states that attempt to maintain full sovereignty or to 
deny their several national components face disintegration (Castells, 1997:51). 
3.2.4 'ferritoriall icllentities 
.<;:astells (1997:60) proposes that "urban movements" pursue three kinds of goals, combined in par-
ficular movements to varying degrees: "urban demands on living conditions and collective consump-
:tions", ·"the affirmation of local cultural identity", and "the conquest of local political autonomy and 
-citizen participation." Castells (1997:61) argues that, despite the "usually brief" lifespan of these 
movements, they become significant - they create meaning - "not only for the movement's partici-
pants, but for the community at large", as the movement becomes embedded in the "collective mem-
:ory of the locality." But the identities formed by such collective action are "in most cases.:. defensive 
·reactions against the impositions of global disorder and uncontrollable, fast-paced change" (Castells, 
1997:64). These identities are, in other words, resistance identities (Castells, 1997:66). 
3.2.5 Sodall movements 
Observing that "people all over the world resent loss of control over their lives, over their environment, 
over their jobs, over their economies, over their governments, over their countries, and, ultimately, 
over the fate of the Earth", Castells (1997:68-69) places the primary locus of reaction against "domi-
nation" as residing in "social movements", "defensive movements built around the trenches of specific 
identities." For Castells (1997:72,105), these social movements, each crystallised around "a specific 
principle of identity", are the way in which "historically specific societies take their revenge against 
their domination by global flows." As such, they are "primarily identity-based mobilizations in re-
action to a clearly identified adversary. They are reactive, and defensive, rather than purveyors of a 
societal project" (Castells, 1997:106). Social movements achieve much of their impact by exploiting 
the media and "their effective use of information technology" (Castells, 1997: 106-107). 
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3.3 Declining state power in the network society 
Castells (1997:305) observes that, despite the differences between the institutional, pluralist and in-
strumentalist theories of the state, these theories all agree that the state is "the expression of social 
actors pursuing their interests and achieving domination." States frequently maintain legitimacy by 
"the territorial differentiation of state institutions"; the associated articulation of power structures 
into various levels which are able to represent the interests of subordinate "social groups" produces a 
"complex geometry ... in the relationship between the state, social classes, social groups, and identities 
present in civil society" (Castells, 1997:270-271). In this way the state is able to bear the burden of 
representing competing interests while retaining legitimacy. 
The general pattern emerging from Castells' analysis is that individual states are losing their capacity 
to make decisions and implement them 17 . Power, formerly vested in nation-states, now diffuses 18 to 
global networks of capital, production, crime, supra-national institutions, non-governmental organi-
sations, religions and public opinion movements and, within states, to communities, tribes and gangs 
organised around common identities. 
Growing globalisation of criminal activity subverts state authority and reduces governments' capacity 
to maintain law and order within their territories, and, in extreme cases, penetrates government itself, 
compromising the functioning of the state (Castells, 1997:259) . 
. 
National governments also find their monopoly on policy-making contracting under pressure from 
international and local social forces. Expanding global linkages, particularly economic, mean that in-
dividual states find themselves increasingly interdependent, with the scope for setting policy limited 
¥ccordingly (Castells, 1997:262). In this context, the supra-national institutions of "global go~er­
nance" become forums for negotiating economic, security, development and environmental decisions 
- nation-states trade sovereignty in exchange for continued existence (Castells, 1997:267-268). Fur-
ther, public opinion, expressed and mobilised through international single-issue movements, con-
fronts the global problems that states are ineffective in resolving (Castells, 1997:268). 
The loss of government influence over national economic policy is particularly acute. First, the mech-
anism of floating exchange rates forces states to coordinate their monetary policy to maintain ex-
change rate stability, removing control of a fundamental element of economic policy from state hands 
(Castells, 1997:245). Second, the increasingly transnational character of production means that gov-
ernments are less able to keep productive, revenue-generating activity within their own territories, 
leading to a fiscal crisis for individual states. This results from the "increasing contradiction between 
the internationalization of investment, production, and consumption, on the one hand, and the na-
tional basis of taxation systems, on the other" (Castells, 1997:246). In particular, the fiscal crisis of 
17Stephen Gelb contest Castells on this point, maintaining that states still have "infrastructural power" and retain the 
ability to lead the "productive classes" (Kraak, 2000). However, Joel Netshitenzhe has suggested that "South Africa's 
re-entry into the global economy has also weakened the new state primarily because of the power of financial markets" 
(Kraak, 2000). Castells himself admits that the state still has important functions, such as providing education (Kraak, 
2000). 
18 Bauman (1998:57-58) trenchantly describes the "withering away" of state authority: "no one seems now to be in 
control" (emphasis in original). 
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the advanced economies and the associated increase in government debt leaves these governments 
increasingly reliant on global capital markets (Castells, 1997:247). 
The ability of governments of the industrialised countries to provide the benefits of a welfare state 
to their citizens, in Castells' (1997:252-253) estimation "probably the main building block" of state 
legitimacy in these countries, is undermined by the same tendency to international migration of capital 
and production. Again, firms experience large differences in costs associated with social benefits 
and small differences in labour productivity and production quality as contradictory, producing a 
"downward spiral of social costs competition" (Castells, 1997:253). 
State power is also squeezed from within. The modern nation-states comprising the set of developed 
countries are founded on a traditional identity, constructed to suit the interests of the dominant groups 
at the origin of the state and established over time as shared history induced social and cultural bonds 
within a particular nation (Castells, 1997:270). Yet, states contain multiple territories and identities 
and these are unevenly represented in governing institutions and so these marginalised, "territorially 
differentiated", identities are increasingly claiming power from their respective national governments 
(1997:270). The network society sees an "increasing diversification" and "plurality of identities" 
making demands on nation-states, potentially leading to national governments losing legitimacy in 
tfie eyes of some of their citizens (Castells, 1997:271). States respond to these demands by devolving 
power to local and regional political structures, thus witnessing an erosion of their sovereignty from 
below. But ceding power downwards may not be enough; since only selected identities can be insti-
tutionalised in a given state, not all the identities contained within a particular national territory can 
necessarily be accommodated in government structures (Castells, 1997:270-276). 
The simultaneous wearing away of state sovereignty is best summarised by Castells (1997:308) him-
self: 
"Thus, the more states emphasize communalism, the less effective they become as co-
agents of a global system of shared power. The more they triumph on the planetary 
scene, the less they represent their national constituencies. End of millenium politics, 
almost everywhere in the world, is dominated by this fundamental contradiction." 
3Ai JPost-colonnal Africa 
3.4.:B. Selective integration in the gllobaH economy 
Castells (2000a:83) begins his commentary on developments in post-colonial Africa by noting that, 
in the final twenty years of the twentieth century, sub-Saharan Africa exhibited the worst relative 
economic performance of any region in the world, with exports and per-capita GDP actually dropping 
between 1980 and 1995. African exports remained heavily dependent on primary commodities and 
industrial production all but collapsed - most countries became dependent on foreign aid (Castells, 
2000a:83-88). 
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Castells (2000a:90-91) points out that, while most of Africa is marginalised and ignored by the world 
economy 19, minerals and oil are still extracted and exported, with local elites consuming expensive 
imported goods - Africa's inclusion in the world economy is "fragmented" (Castells, 2000a:91). 
3.4.2 Predatory states 
Castells (2000a:95- l 05) points to the destructive influence of "predatory" states "on their economies 
and societies", attributed to the abuse of power for personal benefit by elites and the "individualization 
of ruling classes", whereby dictatorial leaders captured state power. In these situations, "access to 
state power is equivalent to accessing wealth" (Castells, 2000a:98). 
3.4.3 Ethirnic ideirntity amll mntioirnallnsm 
Turning to ethnicity, Castells (2000a: 105-110) observes that "the ethnic differences that are at the 
forefront of Africa's political scene today are politically constructed, rather than culturally rooted" 
- ethnic groups were classified by E~ropean colonialists according to their view of Africa~ tribal 
s6ciety and to make the administration of their territories more amenable20. Castells (2000a: 106) 
cites Mamdani's concept of the "bifurcated state" in which Europeans controlled the state as a legal 
er,itity, while co-opting traditional leaders for administrative purposes, thus dividing the indigenous 
population into formal ethnic groups. 
On attaining independence, "Africa's nationalist elites simply occupied the same structures of the 
legal/modem state which, therefore, were de-racialized. Yet, they kept in place the fragmented; ethni-
cfaed customary state" (Castells, 2000a: 107). When competition arose for scarce resources, ethnicity 
determined access to resources controlled by the state - "it was the state, and its elites, that shaped 
and reshaped ethnic identity and allegiance, not the other way around" (Castells, 2000a: 110). 
In contrast to the success of the Asian developmental states, and despite the crucial role of nationalist 
movements in achieving independence, newly sovereign African states failed to transcend ethnic divi-
sions to create actual nations, due to "the weakness of the nation in the African nation-state" (Castells, 
2000a: 110). This weakness was in several ways inherited from colonialism: nationalist sentiment was 
largely confined to the "educated elite" and the "small urban business class", and the various ethnic 
groups within arbitrarily-drawn state borders fought with each other (Castells, 2000a: 111). The new 
African nation-states had shallow social foundations: 
"The lack of a national basis for these new African nation-states, a basis that in other lat-
itudes was usually made up of shared geography, history and culture ... is a fundamental 
19Soludo (2001 :55-58) takes exception to Castells' pessimistic outlook for Africa's future, noting that Castells assumes 
matters will remain the same, "Castells ignores the current momentum for reforms - political and economic - taking place 
in the region"; further, "while the phenomenon of globalisation is inevitable, perhaps unstoppable, its form and character 
are subject to change ... the form can be tamed by 'purposive human action."' 
2
°Castells (2000a: 107-109) gives the case of Rwanda, in which first the German and then Belgian colonial administra-
tions formalised the previously vague distinction between Hutus and Tsutsis and institutionalised political "cleavages", 
with tragic consequences at the end of the twentieth century. 
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difference between Africa and the Asian Pacific, with the exception of Indonesia, in the 
differential fate of their developmental processes ... The crucial difference was the ability 
of Asian Pacific countries to mobilize their nations, under authoritarian rule, around a de-
velopmental goal, on the basis of strong national/cultural identity" (Castells, 2000a: 111). 
Castells (2000a:l12-114) also ascribes Africa's present state to the interplay between economic fail-
ure and ethnic political rivalries. The cohort of states granted independence in the 1960s found them-
selves already in poor economic shape as a result of their economic development being retarded under 
colonial rule, and the policies of preference for agricultural exports and industrial autarchy only man-
aged to achieve the destruction of the livelihoods of local peasants. The 1970s, marked by "world 
capitalism's crisis and restructuring" saw little progress in Africa, where economies were hampered 
by "technological backwardness", inefficiency and worsening terms of trade, so that African states 
had to tum to foreign lenders for survival by the end of the decade (Castells, 2000a: 112-113). The 
debt thus incurred, and structural adjustment programs undertaken in order to obtain new loans, led 
to widespread political and economic collapse during the 1980s. By the 1990s, most of Africa was, 
economically speaking, irrelevant to the rest of the world, with the exception of the natural resources 
sector. The major consequences of this economic disaster were: the adjustment of states to "the 
p~litical economy of begging", the flourishing of "large-scale illicit trade", and the entrenchment 
of ethnicity as the factor determining access to state resources, in tum triggering inter-ethnic strug-
gles (Castells, 2000a:l13-I 14). "In the end, by the mid-1990s, not only was Africa increasingly 
marginalized from the global/informational economy, but in much of the continent nation-states were 
disintegrating" (Castells, 2000a: 114 ). 
3.5 South Afrlica 
Importantly, South Africa is a "state without a nation" - as distinct from a state containing many 
nations - in Castells' schema (1997:51). 
For Castells (2000a: 121 ), "South Africa is clearly different from the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa." The 
country is more industrialised, its economy is more diverse, and its economy - while neither a "low-
wage dependent" nor a "high-skilled, competitive emerging" one - is more tightly, and increasingly, 
linked into the world economy. 
South Africa has high unemployment, "extremely unequal income distribution" - divided largely 
along racial lines - and poverty is correspondingly prevalent, with poverty especially concentrated in 
the African and coloured population( Castells, 2000a: 123-124 ). 
South Africa serves in the world economy as a nodal point for the "entire Southern Africa region", 
and most of the region's states are economically dependent on South Africa (Castells, 2000a: 125). 
Castells' (2000a: 126) outlook for South Africa takes notice of the obvious challenges: its social and 
economic problems compel it to focus on the needs of its own population, thereby possibly reducing 
employment opportunities for economic migrants from neighbouring countries; while opening its 
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economy to the world, South Africa faces "harsh competition" which threatens to destroy much of 
the country's industry. Castells' suggests that it is "utterly unrealistic" to expect South Africa, through 
its integration with the world economy, to fertilise development in the rest of the region. 
"If the political fate of South Africa is indeed linked to its African identity, its devel-
opmental path continues to diverge from its ravaged neighbours - unless the end of the 
gold rush, a lagging technological capability, and increasing social and ethnic tensions 
push South Africa toward the abyss of social exclusion from which the African National 
Congress fought so bravely to escape" (Castells, 2000a: 126). 
3.6 SlUlmmary 
The first volume of Castells' The Information Age describes the manifestation of a social pattern that 
he calls the network society, a process beginning in the mid- l 970s and most evident in the devel-
oped societies. The emergence of this pattern was facilitated by the interaction between advances 
in~information processing and communication technologies and the pursuit by businesses of com- · 
petitiveness through flexibility, growth through expansion into international markets and profitability 
th~ough the siting of production in cheaper locales. The concomitant legislative changes promoted 
deregulation, trade liberalisation and privatisation. The network society pattern applies to countries 
across the planet. 
The key features of the network society are: informational, as opposed to industrial, capitalism; an 
integrated global economy; flexible enterprises, especially in the form of transnational production 
networks; an increasing polarisation of the workforce between the highly-skilled and the less-skilled; 
and what Castells terms the "space of flows", the technology, places and people constituting the global 
circuits through which goods, capital and information move - the elites in each country, joined through 
the space of flows, form a unified world-wide culture. 
Identity is the source of symbolic significance for social action. Collective identities are social con-
structs, built from cultural artefacts. Castells names three categories of identity: legitimising identity, 
which generates civil societies; resistance identity, which generates communities of solidarity; and 
project identity, which generates "subjects" aiming to fundamentally transform society. The network 
society leads to the increasing separation between territorially-bound political representation and the 
global networks of capital and production, such that the latter's power expands at the expense of the 
former. This development reduces the importance of legitimising identity, causing the decline of civil 
societies. 
Nations are "cultural communes constructed in people's minds'', bound together primarily by shared 
experience and a common language. Nationality and citizenship are distinct concepts - the nation 
is not the state. Race alone is not a viable element for forming a nation. While governments cannot 
create nations by edict, the state can play a significant role in creating and reinforcing national identity. 
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The paradoxical resurgence of nationalism in the late twentieth century is explained by these in-
stances of nationalism being expressions of cultural and economic defensiveness in the face of global 
integration - they are dialectical reactions against the globalisation advocated by elites. 
Territorial identities are defensive urban movements, that usually have short lifespans but remain 
significant through preservation in the "collective memory of the locality." On a larger scale, social 
movements are, in each case, reactions against the loss of localised power; these movements are 
organised around specific identities. 
State power is in decline, as governments cede some authority to supra-national governance mech-
anisms, find their scope for policy-making limited by economic interdependence, have increasingly 
weak positions in relation to transnational production networks, are less able to afford comprehensive 
welfare states (for Castells, the primary component of political legitimacy) and are forced to yield 
increasing autonomy to local government levels in the face of demands from regional identities. 
Turning to Africa, Castells notes the selective integration of the continent into the world economy, 
with vast areas being disconnected. While ethnic groupings were politically constructed during the 
colonial era, ethnicity has come to determine access to state resources following decolonisation. The 
new, post-colonial states had no national basis, containing as they did multiple ethnic groups, a situa-
tion that allowed the easy exploitation of ethnic rivalries. 
Wi.th regards to South Africa, Castells claims that the country is not a nation. It is, however, different 
from the rest of Africa, being more industrialised and more tightly linked into the world economy 
- South Africa is the nodal point for the rest of Africa in the schema of the space of flows. The 
primary danger facing the country is the potential for the political exploitation of ethnic divisions, an 
octurrence which would see it emulate much of the rest of the continent. 
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Chapter 4 
''The national question''~ ANC policy 0111 
fostering nationalism in South Africa 
This chapter presents a synopsis of African National Congress policy on promoting nationalism in 
post-apartheid South Africa. The chapter aims to identify the various elements of the ANC pro-
gra'hime for creating a united ·nation in South Africa by distilling documentation published by the 
AN.C and the ANC-controlled post-apartheid government1, many of the elements occurring repeat-
edly in documents spanning more than a decade. 
Sources 
The policies summarised below were extracted from ANC documents published since 1990 and from 
post-apartheid South African government policy documents. The ANC's policies on nation-building 
have remained remarkably consistent in this period, although this may also be a result of the policies 
themselves being expressed only vaguely -the ANC's recipe for South African nationalism is rather 
bland and occasionally contradictory (see Section 4.4). However, the rhetorical tone has shifted be-
tween the Mandela and Mbeki presidencies, with the former (1996; 1997; 1998; 1999) emphasising 
reconciliation and a "New Patriotism" and the latter asserting Africanism (Alexander, 2002:41,141; 
Butler, 2004:32; Habib et al., 2003:3-5), although Mbeki's flavour of Africanism tends to be inclusive 
rather than racially defined (Ryklief, 2002: 114 ), as epitomised in his ( 1996) famous "I am an African" 
speech2. 
1 This chapter involves analysing documents from both the ANC and the ANC-led government of the Republic of South 
Africa, which raises the question, particularly in regard to legislation regulating immigration, of whether government 
policies may be attributed to the ANC. The ANC itself declares that it is necessary for "the ANC to provide political 
direction to the institutions of governance ... there is only one ANC irrespective of areas of operation" (ANC, 1997c). 
However, the ANC also noted in 1997 that the "point of gravity as regards policy development appears to have shifted to 
government and away from ANC constitutional structures" (ANC, 1997c), an assertion reinforced by the extraordinary 
accusations by Cosatu that the Mbeki presidency was becoming dictatorial (See Appendix A). 
2The annual Nelson Mandela Memorial Lecture that President Mbeki (2006a) delivered in July 2006 might be a 
telling indicator of Mbeki 's intellectual reference points: while he starts off by mentioning "ubuntu", he then quotes from 
or mentions the Bible (he quotes from the Book of Proverbs several times), Shakespeare, Goethe, Adam Smith, R.H. 
Tawney, Karl Polanyi, Joseph Stiglitz, George Soros, Friederich Engels, Karl Marx, Charles Darwin, Vladimir Lenin, 
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Constraints on ANC policy since assuming power 
ANC policy is constrained by its membership of the Tripartite Alliance with the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) - although the latter 
two complain of lack of influence - and by its largely African3 and poor electoral base, bearing in 
mind that several commentators have pointed out that the ANC appears to act in the interests of the 
new African capitalists. 
ANC policy is also dictated by the particular South African political-economic situation in which most 
of the land, skills and wealth are owned by white citizens, by the history of South African economic 
development in which minerals extraction was long dominant, by commitments made during the 
negotiations of the early 1990s leading up to the 1994 elections and, the next chapter will argue, by 
international forces (Gelb, 2005:368; Koelble, 2003: 152; Southall, 2003:55). 
The ANC also has a notable legacy of support for the principle of non-racialism, as set out in the 1955 
Freedom Charter,4 which is still a touchstone5 for the ANC. In government, the ANC is also bound 
by the 1996 Constitution which emphasises human rights. 
T~e "national question" within the ANC 
The ANC discusses the topic of nationhood and national identity in South Africa under the rubric of 
"the national question." One measure of the importance that the ANC itself places on the national 
question is that the matter was chosen as one of the four themes for the ANC's National General 
Council in 2005 - the associated discussion document (ANC, 2005d) highlights the national question 
a~1 nothing less than "the central political question of our time" - it is a question that dare not be 
ignored. Indeed, the national question as a theme - "an area of intense debate within the ranks of 
the ANC" (ANC, 1997b) - runs consistently through many of the ANC documents published since 
19906 (nation-building was one of the six "basic principles" of the Reconstruction and Development 
Rene Descartes (in Latin and French) and William Butler Yeats, all in support of his prayer that "the new South Africa 
that is being born will be a good, a moral, a humane and a caring South Africa which as it matures will progressively 
guarantee the happiness of all its citizens." 
3Despite the abolition of apartheid, the topic of race is unavoidable in discussing South African society. The ANC 
recognises the racial categories of whites and blacks, with the blacks comprising Africans, coloureds and Indians (see 
Section 4.2.1 ). The aggregation of the latter three races as black is an historical residue of the theory of "Colonialism of 
a Special Type" (see Appendix A), which divided South Africa into the white oppressors and the black oppressed. The 
terms favoured by the ANC will be used in this thesis, with "black" referring to African, Indian and coloured people. 
4The Freedom Charter was drawn up in 1955 by the Congress of the People and adopted by the ANC the following 
year (Suttner, 2005). The Freedom Charter's guarantee of equal status for all racial groups led the Africanist wing of the 
ANC to split off in 1959, forming the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), claiming "white communists had manipulated the 
Congress of the People behind the scenes" (Sparks, 2003:353; Butler, 2004:108); "Africanists forces" claimed that the 
Charter "ignored the superior claim of indigenous Africans to the country" (Burnham, 2005: 13). 
5Nelson Mandela, just before release from imprisonment, insisted that the Freedom Charter demands for nationalisa-
tion were "the policy of the ANC", although this policy was soon reversed (Bond, 2005: 15). In 2001, the AN C's (2001a) 
online journal ANC Today noted that the Freedom Charter "remains the basic guiding document of the liberation move-
ment in South Africa." The ANC (2005e, cited in Hemson and O'Donovan, 2006:11) was still affirming the Freedom 
Charter in 2005: "We must base our vision, programmes and actions on that historic manifesto of the people of South 
Africa, the Freedom Charter." 
6For Filatova, (1997:47) the ANC's nation-building doctrine, as set out in Nation-Formation and Nation Building, 
"lays an ideological foundation for the policy of the party in every possible sphere from economy to education and defines 
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Programme (RDP) (ANC, 1994)), as well as featuring prominently and regularly in speeches by 
senior ANC politicians. The Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services organ of the Presidency 
released a major analysis of progress towards a South African nation, entitled A Nation in the Making 
in mid-2006. 
4.1 The ANC on the origill1l andl nature of nations 
4.:ll..1 Wlllat constibdes a nation? 
The ANC does not clearly articulate a detailed theory of nationhood. This naturally has some ad-
vantages - leaving the term slightly fuzzy avoids contention over precise definitions while allowing 
agreement between parties who would find themselves disagreeing if they discussed the topic in de-
tail. This proteanism also allows flexibility in rhetorical use of the term "nation" - nationhood can be 
conferred on one group or denied to another as deemed politically expedient, even if such usage is 
theoretically incoherent. In other words, an exact definition of nationhood would limit ANC policy 
arid rhetoric while increasing the possibility of dissent among its constituent elements. Despite the 
lack of such clarity, this section teases out from ANC documents the characteristics the organisation 
attributes to nations. 
4.] .1.l A nation is a political entity 
As Bornman (2006:388) puts it, "it is not clear what the new South African government understands 
under the concept 'nation' in its emphasis on nation-building"; the "concept of 'nation' and its deriva-
tives have never had a straightforward use by the opponents of apartheid" (Nolutshungu, 1993:608). 
The clearest definition of what nationalism means to the ANC is that the "national question" is essen-
tially a "continuous search for equality by various communities which have historically merged into 
a single nation-state" (ANC, 1997b). The term "communities" is not defined. Taken to its extreme, 
the national question becomes the "struggle for self-determination and even secession by commu-
nities within such states" (ANC, 1997b). The ANC does not provide a coherent explanation of the 
difference between "community" and "nation"; the reader is left to presume that "nation" simply cor-
responds to the state - the difference being one of political status. This implies that a community can 
become a nation simply by attaining statehood, i.e. by a political change. For the ANC, then, nations 
seem to be primarily political rather than cultural entities. 
In contrast with the divide-and-rule tactics of the apartheid government, African unity has been the 
policy of the ANC since inception in 1912 (see Appendix A), so the movement consistently rejects 
the possibility that the tribal groups of South Africa are nations and also rejects the possibility of 
Afrikaner secession into a volksstaat (1997b; 2005d). No explanation of why these groups are denied 
its attitude towards the role and place of individuals and groups (both cultural and social) in the present and future South 
Africa." For Vale (2003:33), the "course of national re/discovery - including the search for a 'national interest' to support 
the trope of a 'rainbow nation' - has been pivotal in determining policy (and its outcomes) in post-apartheid South Africa." 
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the potential for nationhood is given, although defining them as not being national groups has obvious 
political advantages 7. 
4.1.1.2 Unity and equality 
The ANC maintains that nations need certain shared elements to exist. A nation must have citizens 
with equal rights, a common territory, a common economy, a "sense of community", patriotic feeling, 
"loyalty to the constitution and the democratic state" and a common culture (ANC, 2005d). 
Despite having many common elements, nations are not classless societies - the ANC (1997b) explic-
itly states that nations contain several classes. 
41.1.1.3 Shared identity 
The ANC (1997b; 1997c; 1997d) places special emphasis on the significance of group identity in 
nation building - while allowing for multiple identities, a national identity should be nothing less than 
the primary identity for citizens. 
The importance of identity leads the ANC (2005d) to stress again that "tribalism, racialism or any 
other form of ethnic chauvinism" is contrary to the national interest. The ANC (1997b; 2005d) 
consistently calls for a common South African identity, going so far as to describe the popular image 
of the "rainbow nation" as "nebulous" because it implies division. 
The stress on identity also leads to the importance assigned to national feeling as a "social psycholog-
ical", "superstructural" matter, finding expression through language, culture and religion. The ANC 
( 1997b} suggests that these factors can be used as tools to promote nation formation. 
4.1.2 Natiolllls are sodalllly collllstirudedl 
The ANC (1997b; 2005d) holds that nations, rather than being natural phenomena, are socially con-
structed entities, being contingent on "politics, history, and social and economic processes", with the 
"process of nation formation" being an "historical evolution", and, as such, nations are continually 
in flux, as opposed to being "static and unchanging." The ANC's position, in its emphasis on the 
leading role of the state in fostering nationalism, makes it clear that the social construction the ANC 
has in mind is an active construction, pursued by social agents, rather than merely being the result of 
social structures and abstract forces, although the latter are also involved in the sense that they limit 
the possible avenues for intentional action. 
7 Section 4.2.1 briefly recounts historical theories of nationhood within the ANC, noting the influence of the theory 
of "Colonialism of a Special Type" (see Appendix A) which held that the black people constitute one nation. Afrikaner 
nationalism had collapsed even before the end of apartheid (O'Meara, 1997). 
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4.2 The new South African "nation in the making" 
The previous section presented a distillation of the ANC's conception of what constitutes a nation and 
how nations come into being. This section puts forward the notion that the ANC intends the creation 
of a South African nation and presents the characteristics of this "nation in the making." 
4.2.1 South Africa: a coull1try divided into "two natirnrns" 
The liberation movement has long debated the national question in South Africa (Nolutshungu, 
1993:607) (the apartheid government's stand was that the country contained about ten nations or 
quasi-nations, a view which was used to justify the Bantustan policy (Alexander, 2002:35)). The 
ANC Youth League, in its 1948 manifesto, proposed that "South Africa is a country of four chief 
nationalities, three of which (the European, Indian and Coloureds) are minorities, and three of which 
(the Africans, Coloureds and Indians) suffer national oppression" (quoted in Alexander, 2002:36). 
The Freedom Charter, adopted as ANC policy in 1956, also distinguished between the various na-
tional groups in South Africa. Proponents of the thesis of "Colonialism of a Special Type" (see 
A~pendix A) divided South Africa into two nations, the (colonised) black nation comprising the 
.,,, 
Africans, coloureds and Indians, and the (colonialist) white nation (Alexander, 2002:37). "For most 
of.the 40 years from 1960 to 2000, what we call 'African nationalism' in South Africa - including 
the short period at the beginning of the 1980s when the black nationalism of the BCM [black con-
sciousness movement] became dominant - was projected as being in conflict with racist Afrikaner 
nationalism" (Alexander, 2002:41). The stated policy of the ANC, however, is non-racialism8.' 
Th~ ANC does not consider contemporary South African society as constituting a single nation -
rather, the divisions of the apartheid era, an era defined as Colonialism of a Special Type9 , are readily 
discernible. Then deputy-president, Thabo Mbeki, (1998) described South Africa in 1998 as a "coun-
try of two nations" 10, one "white, relatively prosperous" with "ready access to a developed economic, 
physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure" and the other, "second and larger" 
nation being "black and poor, with the worst affected being women in the rural areas [and] the black 
rural population in general" and having a "grossly underdeveloped" infrastructure and having little 
ability to "exercise what in reality amounts to a theoretical right to equal opportunity"; he claimed 
that these nations were failing to become one nation. The ANC's National General Council observed 
the "current reality of 'Two Nations' in one country" in 2000 (ANC, 2000). In November 2003, 
President Mbeki (2003a) proposed that South Africa had, in effect, a "first economy" and a "second 
economy" existing in parallel, a theme repeated in subsequent 'State of the Nation' speeches (Mbeki, 
8 Adam (1995:460) notes that "compared with the global renaissance of ethnicity and nationalism, the new official 
emphasis on inclusiveness, reconciliation and even colour-blindness contradicts trends elsewhere." 
9Black South Africans were "the last colonized people on the African continent" (ANC, 2002e). 
10Tue idea of "two nations" in one country is not new: Disraeli used the phrase "two nations" to describe England in 
the nineteenth century and the 1968 Kerner Report on race riots in the USA described the United States as becoming "two 
societies, one black, one white, separate and unequal" (Watson, 2001 :386,525); the American academic Andrew Hacker 
took the phrase as the title of his 1992 book about race relations in the USA, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, 
Hostile, Unequal. 
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2004a,b, 2005a, 2006b) and taken up in a 2005 ANC (2005d) discussion document on the national 
question which described South Africa as "a country characterised by two economies" 11 and which 
reiterated the motif of division by claiming that the "majority of whites and the majority of blacks 
live in two different worlds" and which bemoaned the absence of a "sense of common patriotism." To 
put it simply, ANC rhetoric emphasises the divisions in South African society, which is construed as 
consisting of a collection of cultures or communities (Alexander, 2002: 81-82). 
4.2.2 The Natirnrnail Democratic Revollutioirn addresses the ll'D.atiollllaR question 
The ANC (1997d) regularly proclaims the necessity of creating a new and united nation in South 
Africa. The primary aim of the ANC's (1997b; 2005d) nation-building project is amelioration of 
the material conditions12 of the black citizens who suffered "national oppression" under apartheid. 
The ANC (1997c) considers the national question in South Africa as being a "complex of socio-
economic and political power relations" related to "material inequalities" in South African society. 
ANC (1997b) policy in this regard is founded on the theory of the "National Democratic Revolu-
tion"13 (see Appendix A), a "revolution" which is in itself "an act of addressing the national ques-
tion." The ANC's (2002e) 2002 National Conference in Stellenbosch noted that the "challenge of 
nation building remains the primary task of the ANC for the full realisation of the NDR." 
41.2.3 ANC objectives for tlhle South Afiricallll llllatiollll 
The ANC (1997b; 1997d; 2000; 2002d; 2005d) consistently asserts that its objectives are the creation 
of 'a South African society that is "united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic"14 - the special at-
tention paid to improving the economic situation of black citizens is an attempt to redress inequalities 
imposed by apartheid. 
11 This claim was made in a discussion document for the AN C's 2005 National General Council. The Council resolved 
that there was in fact only one economy, although it could be viewed as consisting of two economies, and that interventions 
should address the economy "as a whole" (ANC, 2005a). 
Devey et al. (2006:224) observe that "Arguments about dualism and the relationship between the mainstream of the 
economy and the periphery have characterised much of South African historiography." They (2006:226) argue that "con-
trary to the views of the President and the ANC, there are in fact fairly close linkages between the formal economy and 
the informal economy." Similarly, Webster (2005:66) notes that "the informal economy is largely dependent on the formal 
economy." 
12This emphasis on improving the material lot of the poor is resonant of the findings in Afrobarometer surveys that "for 
Africans democracy is intrinsically linked to delivery ... Africans are predisposed to judge the performance of democracy 
primarily in terms of its record in delivering improvements in the socioeconomic sphere" (February, 2005:56). 
13It should be noted that the ANC (1997b) proclaims that the National Democratic Revolution - despite being dubbed 
a "Revolution" - does not aim towards the "creation of a socialist or communist society." In fact, as Alexander (2002:46) 
puts it, "the ANC has never been a revolutionary organisation." The NDR is the basis for cooperation between the 
ANC and its partners in the tripartite alliance, although the eventual goals of the alliance members diverge, with the 
ANC satisfied with democratic rule and the SACP pursuing a socialist South Africa (see Appendix A). The ANC clearly 
favours revolutionary rhetoric, however - the 2005 National General Council recommended that the organisation "reaffirm 
the ideological orientation of the ANC as that of 'revolutionary African nationalism"' (ANC, 2005a). 
14These qualities can be traced back at least as far as the Freedom Charter (Suttner, 2005). 
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4.2.3.1 The removal of racial divisions in South African society 
The ANC (1997d) insists that the "de-racialisation of South African society" is "critical to nation-
building." Addressing the national question concerns "the attainment of fundamental human rights", 
"justice", "human dignity" and "freedom" (ANC, 1997d, 2005d). But it mainly means economic 
change: "improving the quality of life of the poor, the overwhelming majority of whom are defined 
by South African capitalism as blacks in general, and Africans in particular" - the "liberation" from 
economic as well as political subjugation of these groups, who form the bulk of the poor, is the 
principal goal of the National Democratic Revolution and the primary component of the national 
question (ANC, 1997b, 2005d). The effectiveness of the new government's progress in creating a 
new South African nation will be judged by "the extent and depth of the liberation of african [sic] 
people in particular - and blacks in general" - liberation being from economic deprivation15 (ANC, 
1997d, 2005d). Economic integration - bringing the poor, black people of South Africa into the 
economy - is thus central to the formation of the new nation (ANC, 2005d). Rumney (2005:405) 
traces the conceptual genesis of black economic empowerment (BEE) to the RDP. 
The ANC (1997b) recognises that the socio-economic changes envisaged by the National Democratic 
Re'volution imply the development of a "black bourgeoisie" and takes cognisance that the "race con-
sdousness" of this class will diminish with its increasing economic success. Despite disavowing the 
objective of creating a socialist state, the ANC (1997b; 1997c) describes the achievement of working 
class unity across racial lines as "key to creating the South African nation." 
4.2.3.2 JEqual rights for all 
The ANC (2005d) declares that all South African citizens should enjoy equal rights "political and 
otherwise" in practice as well as principle, an objective that can be traced back at least as far as 
the 1955 Freedom Charter16 (Congress of the People, 1958). The new Constitution, introduced in 
15Roberts (2005:486-496) notes 
"Living standards have been shown to be closely associated with race, with poor Africans accounting for 
the overwhelming majority of the poor ... the incidence of poverty in rural localities [is] significantly higher 
than for residents of secondary cities and the metropoles ... Substantial provincial disparities also exist, with 
those containing the former homelands bearing a disproportionately larger share of the poverty burden ... 
the disjuncture between increases in employment and the economically active population is especially 
pronounced for Africans as well as for women ... the historical racial divide is being supplanted by a class 
divide, since democratisation and the subsequent neo-liberal embrace has effectively only deracialised the 
apex of the class structure." 
Moleke (2006:204-205) asserts that the 
"inequalities and racial divisions of South African society are nowhere as evident as in the labour market"; 
the labour force "continues to be racially divided between skilled white workers and unskilled and/or semi-
skilled African workers ... whites are concentrated in high-level positions, top management and senior 
management, while Africans are concentrated in unskilled and semi-skilled occupations." 
16Bumham (2005:28) suggests that "the progressive bill of rights in the 1996 Constitution, with its injunction to gov-
ernment to act aggressively to redress inequalities, derives from the Freedom Charter." 
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1996, included "the achievement of equality" 17 as one of the primary values outlined in the Founding 
Provisions, equality was enshrined as non-derogable in the Bill of Rights and unfair discrimination 
on "one or more grounds, including race, gender18, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and 
birth" was prohibited (RSA, 1996). 
Despite the stated ambition of equal rights for all, the ANC government passed the Traditional Leader-
ship and Governance Framework Act in 2003 and the Communal Land Rights Bill in 2004, legislation 
which had the effect of granting "separate and different rights to rural and urban South Africans" as a 
consequence of the "denial of the right to elect one's leaders" for rural citizens19 (Ntsebeza, 2005:59). 
In this regard, Ntsebeza (2005:68-69) postulates that the government "seems to have succumbed to 
the pressure exerted by traditional authorities" who opposed "the notion of introducing new demo-
cratic structures", a policy shift20 that abandoned the RDP principle promising "Democratisation21 of 
South Africa" (ANC, 1994). Dladla (2000, cited in Ntsebeza, 2005:76) quotes Lodge as suggesting 
that the ANC's accommodation of traditional leaders was a political compromise, in favour of the 
Inkatha Freedom Party, to avoid potential conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. 
Yet Mamdani (1998) contends that citizenship is neither "common or equal" - "the 1994 compromise 
has brought South Africa in line with other equatorial African countries: while civic citizenship is 
deracialised, ethnic citizenship remains unreformed", with ethnic citizenship the "exclusive right" of 
the "'indigenous' citizens" and unavailable to "settlers defined as 'non-indigenous."' This formulation 
exactly matches the ANC position - hardly surprising given the idea of "Colonialism of a Special 
Type" and its corollary the National Democratic Revolution. 
The ANC: distinguishes between the "settler colonial community" and the "indigenous Africans" 
17 As Govender (2006: 103) puts it, "As much as apartheid was about inequality, the Final Constitution is about the 
attainment of substantive equality. . .. running through the fabric of the Bill of Rights is a commitment to an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom." 
18The "affirmation of gender equality" is critical to the NDR (ANC, 1997d). 
19The role of traditional leaders in post-colonial African states is a controversial question. Buur (2005:253) notes 
the "uneasy accommodation of cultural diversity and custom"; Cherry (1994:627) suggests that the concession to the 
Zulu king is one of the "interesting contradictions in the new constitutional dispensation which could provide a basis for 
increased ethnic conflict"; Jean and John Comaroff (2003:445) posit a "confrontation between the Constitution of South 
Africa and the Kingdom of Custom." 
According to Ntsebeza (2005:60-65), there are two principal schools of thought. Firstly, those who, following Mam-
dani's (1996:22-24) analysis, argue that the continued delegation of authority to traditional leaders by the state echoes 
"bifurcated" colonial and apartheid governance structures of "indirect rule", at least as far as local government is con-
cerned; accordingly, the active participation of traditional authorities in politics compromises democratic rule (Bank and 
Southall (1996), cited in Ntsebeza, 2005:61). Secondly, others argue against the "dramatic marginalisation" of traditional 
leaders, suggesting that there are aspects of governance where they can be useful; further, such schemes can lead to in-
creasing democratisation of traditional leadership institutions (Ismail (1999), cited in Ntsebeza, 2005:61). The ANC itself 
is "also not unanimous on the issue of the role of traditional authorities in a democracy. Historically, the ANC has been 
divided on this question between pro- and anti-chief factions" (Ntsebeza, 2005:77). 
20 rt should be noted, however, that the 1997 ANC National Conference in Mafikeng resolved that the "institution of 
traditional leaders ... has an important and integral role to play in the building of our new constitutional order ... Local 
government in rural areas will be restructured in order to achieve a clear definition of roles between elected councils and 
legitimate traditional leaders" (ANC, l 997c). By 2000, the National General Council observed the need to "reconcile the 
system of traditional leadership with democratic local government" (ANC (2000), emphasis added). 
21 Mamdani (1996:289) notes that, in the case of the "mainstream nationalists'', the "new state power sought to indige-
nize civil society institutions and to restructure relations between the independent state and the international economy and 
polity. In the absence of the detribalization of rural power, however, deracialization could not be joined to democracy." 
38 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
(ANC, 1997b,d) for whom South Africa is the "motherland" and the "ancestral lands" (Mbeki, 2003b); 
reserves rightful ownership of the land to "the indigenous people" (ANC, 1992), land that the "Dutch 
and British colonialists" sought to "usurp" (ANC, 1997d); distinguishes between the "indigenous" 
African languages and the foreign languages of English and Afrikaans (ANC, 1994, 2002e, 2005d); 
desires the promotion of "indigenous African cultures" (ANC, 2002e); and differentiates between 
"European high art" and "indigenous art" (ANC, 1992). The "'Coloured' community" is granted 
"indigenous" status (ANC, 1997b). 
4.2.3.3 A shared identity 
The ANC perceives the significance of identity for their nation-building project - ANC documents 
(1997b; 1997c; 1997d; 2005d) consistently call for the development of a "common South African 
identity." At the same time, however, the ANC recognises that South African citizens will hold 
multiple identities, based, for example, on ethnicity or religion; the ANC (1997b; 1997c; 1997d; 
2005d) allows for these multiple identities but maintains that the South African identity should be 
dominant. This shared identity should be expressed in South African cultural activity, cuisine, media, 
education, and ordinary social life (ANC, 1997b, 2005d). Nevertheless, the specific content of this 
South African identity is left undefined except in the vaguest terms. 
4.2.3.4 Unity 
Alert to the apartheid government's exploitation of tribal differences22 , the ANC (2000; 2005d; 
2005b) appeals for solidarity, rather than a society fractured along the ethnic lines of "tribalism" -
the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey showed the ANC's success in this regard, as over 
ninety percent of non-Zulu Africans and sixty percent of Zulu Africans expressed their support of the 
ANC, while only thirty-four percent of Zulu Africans supported the IFP23 (Naidu, 2006:44). How-
ever, the passage of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act and the Communal 
Land Rights Bill entrench tribalism since "tribalism is inherent in the recognition of separate chief-
tancies" (Ntsebeza, 2005:78). 
A nation should live in a common territory (ANC, 2005d). To this end, the ANC government has 
integrated the notionally independent Bantustans into South Africa - "democratization ... unified and 
strengthened the new polity" and "White and black secessionist forces were marginalized" (Adam, 
1995:458). This principle guides the rejection by the ANC (2005d) of the concept of a separate 
Volksstaat for Afrikaners. 
Historically, the ANC has considered the territorial bounds of the South African nation as restricted to 
the borders established with the Union of 1910 - indeed, the ANC was founded as the South African 
22 According to Gouws (2003:53), the "norms of the [apartheid] regime, however, strengthened group identities." See 
also Grossberg et al., 2006:54. 
23Gavin Davis (2004:297), however, notes that "those parties that invoke an exclusive 'us and them' message fare better 
than those that attempt an inclusive 'catch-all' strategy ... It is quite possible that, over time, South African political parties 
will 'learn' that the most successful means of mobilizing voters is to play on the fears and aspirations associated with their 
race, thus exacerbating racial tensions." 
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National Native Congress, the Freedom Charter was drawn up in the name of "the People of South 
Africa" (Congress of the People, 1958), and the ANC (1992) has never called the political boundaries 
of South Africa into question24 (Congress of the People, 1958; Gumede, 2005; Alexander, 2002:32; 
Mare, 2003:39). The political boundary of the South African state remains as it was in 1910 - having 
prevailed in the struggle to capture the state (Mare, 2003:25), the ANC's task is the creation of a 
nation within the existing borders of the country. 
The ANC government has successfully removed the legal foundation for separate schooling for dif-
ferent races25 - "If race separation was the defining feature of schools in the apartheid era, race 
integration became a defining feature in the post-apartheid era" (Chisholm, 2005:215). 
4.2.3.5 The flowering of Africanness 
South Africa is "an African nation", so the new South African identity - "our shared African na-
tionhood" (ANC, 2005b) - should be distinctively African26 (ANC, l997b,c,d, 2005d), although the 
actual constituent elements of this African identity are not specified at all (the ANC (2005d) does call 
for its cadres to "spare no effort to reject those of our traditional practices which are backward", again 
2~ln Vale's (2003:24-25) argument, the firmness of state boundaries - a notion that "seems to have a long and honourable 
li11eiige, which is legitimised through time and sanctioned through tradition" - has produced "deadly outcomes" for the 
region's inhabitants. He notes that 
"All efforts to both understand and engineer social relations in southern Africa turn on the notion that 
borders are fixed - permanent entities that both demarcate and determine the points of entry to, and exit 
from, what Larry Bowman first called the 'southern African state system' ... the permanence and continuity 
of the national - as opposed to the regional - are invariably below the surface of policy rhetoric" (Vale, 
2003:25,33). 
It is· also remarkable that the ANC simply assumed power after the 1994 elections in what Adam ( 1995:457) called a 
"negotiated revolution" and Emery (2005) called a "revolution without the revolution" - in other words, it took occupa-
tion of governmental structures, rather than abolishing them and instituting new ones; there was legal and administrative 
continuity between apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa, which are in fact the same entity under different polit-
ical masters (Mare, 2003:25), a condition which Vale (2003:31,37) calls "sovereign continuity" and which Alexander 
(2002:64) attributes to the "anti-revolutionary British jurisprudential tradition of continuity of sovereignty" (emphasis in 
original). 
25 While schools may have been desegregated in law, in practice "the large majority of schools in South Africa remain 
uni- or mono-racial"; schools effectively form a "two-tier system in which social class is a major factor in determining 
who is included and who is excluded" (Chisholm, 2005:216-217). 
26The ANC's penchant for vigorous Africanist oratory, together with the presence in South Africa of around 5 million 
people of European - i.e. non-African - descent, leads to some occasionally confusing rhetoric: the 50th National Confer-
ence resolved that South Africa should "appropriate its African identity" while at the same time propagating "an inclusive 
meaning to the term 'African' that embraces all those who have made this continent their home", proposing that "African" 
could have two meanings: 
"In the broad sense, 'African' applies to all those who have a sense of identity with this country and the 
African continent and are committed to the upliftment of the people of this country, especially the poor. 
However, the term 'African' as historically used in our movement to refer to the most oppressed under 
apartheid is also endorsed" (ANC, l 997c). 
Thabo Mbeki (1996), as deputy President, stated of the 1996 South African constitution that it "constitutes an unequivocal 
statement that we refuse to accept that our Africanness shall be defined by our race, colour, gender or historical origins", 
while not clarifying what "our Africanness" actually was defined by. A 2005 discussion document muses (without an-
swer): "Afrikaners ask the valid question: how many hundreds of years more do they need to live here before they can be 
called Africans?" (ANC, 2005d). In the words of Frederik van Zyl Slabbert ("In Need of a Road Map", Financial Mail, 
14 June 2006), "It is all as clear as mud." (See Section 4.4.) 
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without identifying which traditional practices are backward and which are to be retained). The ANC 
(1997b; 1997d) therefore calls for "a continuing battle to assert African hegemony27 in the context 
of a multi-cultural and non-racial society" while making the contradictory claim that "the affirmation 
of our Africanness as a nation has nothing to do with the domination of one culture or language by 
another." (What it means to be "African" is of course contested in a debate that "flares up periodically 
and ever more passionately" (Alexander, 2002:82).) 
Despite suggesting that the rainbow nation metaphor is potentially misleading or harmful, because 
it implies continued separation (1997b; 2005d), the ANC's (1997c; 2002e) and its leaders (Mbeki, 
2006b) own statements promoting "unity in our diversity" (Mandela, 1996) suggest an ideal that is 
very similar to the rainbow metaphor - the various "cultures" or "communities" are to exist side-by-
side, "united in their diversity" (Mbeki, 2005a), although there should be a "healthy osmosis" between 
the "various cultures" (ANC, 1997b). In President Mbeki's (1999) flowery prose, "all our cultures 
and languages occupy their rightful place within the rich tapestry that constitutes our diverse being as 
a people." 
41.2.41 llinmigratiollll poilicy: wlhto is amll wlhto isllll't Smntlht Africallll 
4~2.4.1 Africanist rhetoric, hostile policy, xenophobic citizenry 
Post-apartheid South Africa is awash with Pan-Africanist rhetoric - the preamble to contemporary 
South Africa's constitution (1996) declares that South Africa "belongs to all who live in it, united 
in our diversity", Thabo Mbeki (1996) famously declared that "I am an African", the "idea of an 
African Renaissance - and the vision outlined in the founding document of the New Partnership for 
Africa's Development (Nepad)- has been the defining concept of Mbeki's government" (Sachikonye, 
2005:570) and the 2005 National General Council referred to "our shared African nationhood and 
Pan-African solidarity" (ANC, 2005b). Nonetheless, immigration legislation remains harsh28 , per-
haps reflecting the widespread xenophobia among ordinary South Africans29 . 
Immigration has not been encouraged by the post-apartheid govemment30. The Immigration Act of 
2002 calls for the strengthening of border monitoring "to ensure that the borders of the Republic do 
27The concept of African hegemony extends to the top leadership structures of the ANC, under the name "African 
leadership" (ANC, 1997b). 
28 As Vale (2003:38) puts it, "especially telling has been the deepening paranoia around migration to [South Africa]", 
an example of "the many neo-apartheid policies of the 'new' South Africa." 
29Despite the wish expressed in the 2002 Immigration Act that "xenophobia is prevented and countered both within 
Government and civil society" (RSA, 2002), ordinary South Africans are notoriously xenophobic, being especially hostile 
towards immigrants from other African countries (Landau et al., 2005; Crush and McDonald, 2001; Sichone, 2003; 
Sparks, 2003; Butler, 2004; Daniel et al., 2006:36). Chidester et al. (2003b:314) regard this xenophobia as a "by-product 
of nation building." Mangcu (2001) notes that "Even though black South Africans long regarded themselves as Africans, 
this was always a limited, self-contained African consciousness. It was more a political product of the South African 
struggle than than a product of a continental identification." 
30Immigration policy in post-apartheid South Africa is "contested terrain" (Klotz, 1997; Crush and McDonald, 2001). 
The matter is complicated by the first Home Affairs minister being Dr Buthelezi of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), mak-
ing attribution of immigration policy to the ANC difficult - the ANC failed to explicitly state its position on immigration 
until 2001, when it announced support for an immigration policy based on skills (Crush and McDonald, 2001). Crush 
and McDonald (2001) suggest three hypotheses for the government's tardiness in updating immigration policy: the state 
believed it was dealing with a crisis and needed to keep immigrants at bay; the conservative immigration policy was the 
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not remain porous and illegal immigration through them may be effectively detected, reduced and de-
terred" and aims to ensure that "the contribution of foreigners in the South African labour market does 
not adversely impact on existing labour standards and the rights and expectations of South African 
workers" (RSA, 2002). Indeed, post-apartheid South Africa is a positively unwelcoming place to 
illegal immigrants: deportations of undocumented migrants increased by seventy-five percent in the 
first year that the ANC was in power (Crush and McDonald, 2001); 167,000 non-citizens, mostly 
Mozambicans and Zimbabweans, were deported in 2004 (Landau, 2005). Writing in 2001, Crush 
and McDonald (200 I) described immigration policy as reflecting apartheid policy; the 1995 Aliens 
Control Amendment Act and the 1995 South African Citizenship Act strengthened state powers in 
dealing with illegal immigrants, while the apartheid-era contract system of migrant labour remained 
in place (Klotz, 1997). The South African government demonstrated its hostility to immigration on 
two occasions when it "killed" proposed SADC protocols on freer movement of people within the 
region (Crush and McDonald, 200 l ). 
Several analysts explicitly tie lukewarm support for immigration to South African nationalism: Smith 
(2003) writes that "There was a whole new project of 'nation-building' and immigrants from the 
North did not fit in well with this project"; Crush and McDonald (2001) suggest that 
"The declared task of the state was to redistribute the cake to newly enfranchised citizens, 
not allow others in to take an undeserved slice. Decision makers showed minimal support 
for immigration, a view widely endorsed at the grassroots ... There is little evidence that 
the ruling African National Congress (ANC) saw any role for immigration in its social 
and economic transformation plans ... By and large, immigration and migration have been 
viewed to date as antithetical (or at best irrelevant) to the post-apartheid project of nation-
building and social transformation." 
Erasmus (2005 :18) notes that 
"like all processes of nation-building, post-apartheid South Africa's nation-building project 
is by definition exclusionary. In light of its history of divisions, post-apartheid South 
African nationalism focuses particularly on building a united South African national iden-
tity." 
4.2.4.2 Amnesties 
While the post-apartheid state has, in general, treated illegal immigrants harshly, and was slow to 
implement South Africa's responsibilities as a signatory to UN and OAU conventions on refugees -
the Refugee Act was only passed in 1998 - there have been three amnesties granted to specific groups 
of refugees: contract miners who'd worked in South Africa for more than ten years were offered 
result of a political deal between the ANC and the IFP; or the ANC and the IFP share similar views on immigration and 
both parties emphasized nation-building. 
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permanent residence in 1995; SADC citizens who could prove (legal or illegal) residence in South 
Africa for at least five years were offered citizenship in 1996, as a result of which over 124,000 people 
were naturalized as South Africans; and the government announced in 1997, but only implemented 
in 2000, an amnesty in which Mozambican refugees who had fled to South Africa before 1992 and 
remained in the country were offered permanent residence (Crush and McDonald, 2001). 
4.3 The AN C ancll government role in shaping the new South 
A1frka111 nation 
ANC documentation (1997b; 2005d) makes it clear that the organisation does not intend to merely 
articulate the kind of nation the new South Africa should become, but that the ANC and the ANC-led 
government should be the primary agents in the making of this nation - the ANC and its government 
"have a critical role to play in facilitating the emergence of a new nation" as their "duty to South 
Africa and its future generations." This intention is in keeping with the ANC's (2005d) portrayal of 
itself as being the authentic voice of the South African people and the "motive force" of their destiny. 
4.3.1 'flhte ANC as prime mover 
The ANC portrays itself as the leading agent in removing black South Africans from political and 
economic oppression - it is the "leading force for social transformation" (ANC, 2002e). In the organ-
. isation's own words, 
"History has bequeathed on it [the ANC] the mission to lead South African society as 
a whole in the quest for a truly non-racial, non-sexist and democratic nation"31 (ANC, 
1997d). 
The ANC (1997d) is thus "the vanguard32 of all these motive forces of the NDR, the leader33 of the 
broad movement for transformation." The ANC (2002a) is "a ruling party, a mass-based movement, 
the leading formation in a dynamic Alliance and at the head of all progressive forces for change, for 
transformation and for nation-building." 
4.3.2 Gover.nmeJrnt's forcefu.Il role iJrn creating tlhte .new Soutltn African nation 
The ANC's National General Council in 2000 resolved that laws passed by the government should 
"contribute to nation building and the forging of a common national consciousness" (ANC, 2000). 
31 Struggle-era slogans included the "ANC is the nation" and the "ANC is your mother and your father" (Suttner, 2005). 
32
"Mbeki and his followers in the ANC leadership, most of whom are former exiles... were trained in the radical 
Leninist school of thought that gives primacy to the role of the vanguard party and revolutionary intellectuals" (Johnson, 
2002:222). 
33The General Secretary of the South African Communist Party, Joe Slovo (1988), acknowledged that the "main core 
of the whole democratic struggle illegal and legal is the ANC which stands at the head of the liberation alliance." 
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This section outlines the ways in which the government is actively attempting to nurture South African 
nationalism. 
4.3.2.1 Towards a developmental state 
ANC policy on government involvement in the economic transformation of South African society has 
shifted somewhat. Immediately after assuming power in 1994, the ANC (1994) adopted the Cosatu-
inspired34 Reconstruction and Development Programme, which called for a strong role for the state 
and demanded significant government spending on poverty alleviation. Several ANC documents 
(1997b; 1997c) explicitly link the eradication of material inequalities by implementation of the RDP 
with the national question. 
In 1996, however, a coterie35 in the ANC, led by then deputy-president Thabo Mbeki, forced the adop-
tion36 of the "neo-liberal" (Alexander, 2002:49) Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
programme, which served up fiscal austerity instead of government largesse to the poor and dropped 
the emphasis on redistribution in favour of policies intended to stimulate economic growth and inspire 
financial market confidence in the new government (Gumede, 2005). 
,.. ANC rhetoric remained full of references to strong state with a "developmental role" (ANC, 1997c) 
- and indeed to the RDP as well - during the GEAR period, a situation which Patrick Bond (2004) 
neatly captured in the title of his book Talk Left, Walk Right. 
Most recently, ANC policies (see Section 5.1) rather than merely rhetoric show evidence of a tum 
towards the concept of a developmental state, modelled on Asian countries. The kind of state envis-
aged would be capable of effecting "fundamental transformation" and would, by virtue of being a 
developmental state, naturally need to be responsible for nation-building - such a state "Acts as the 
key force for social integration and nation-building" (ANC, 2004). 
4.3.2.2 Forcing economic transformation 
The "mission of the ANC" is nothing less than the "fundamental transformation of the South African 
economy in order to empower black people, especially Africans" (ANC, 1997c). So while the replace-
ment of the RDP with GEAR signaled the ANC leadership's acceptance of market-based economic 
policies, the ANC still introduced legislation intended to hasten the transfer of wealth to black South 
Africans, a process known as "black economic empowerment" (BEE), a term first used in the early 
34The first draft was drawn up by Jay Naidoo, the General Secretary of Cosatu (Sparks, 2003: 191). 
35 For Alexander (2002:49), the present ANC leadership is "moderate"; for Bond (2004:21-22), "Mbeki and his top 
political aides" have implemented "neoliberal" policies in South Africa while attempting to reform multilateral institutions 
along ""Post-Washington Consensus" lines, these reforms yielding no signs of "obvious progress"; GEAR is "neoliberal 
orthodoxy" (Bond, 2005: 17) foisted on South Africa by "ANC elites" (Bond, 2005:52) who were co-opted by South 
African business (Bond, 2005:53-85). 
36GEAR was drawn up in secret, and promulgated by the ANC government without "due consultation with its allies or 
even with the rank and file membership of the ANC" (Alexander, 2002: 148). As Gelb (2005:372) puts it, ANC leaders 
ignored Cosatu "when formulating the GEAR policy." Sparks (2003:194-195) maintains that the ANC adopted GEAR 
"without even a debate in its National Executive Committee." 
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1990s (Gumede, 2005). The Black Economic Empowerment Commission, appointed in 1997 under 
chairmanship of Cyril Ramaphosa, presented its report to President Mbeki in April 2001, recom-
mending "the adoption of a wide-ranging, state-driven programme" (Southall, 2005:464). The ANC's 
National General Council in 2000 called for "greater emphasis" on "black economic empowerment" 
(ANC, 2000), while the 51st National Conference in 2002 resolved that "Black Economic Empower-
ment (BEE) is a moral, political, social and economic requirement of this country's collective future", 
to use "government's instruments such as licensing, procurement, state asset restructuring and provi-
sion of finance, to target BEE" and to "ensure government designs an enabling regulatory framework 
including operational guidelines to promote certainty in the implementation and regulation of BEE" 
(ANC, 2002e). The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (RSA, 2003) was passed in 
2003, and the Department of Trade and Industry published a draft code of good practice for broad-
based black economic empowerment in December 2004 (Southall, 2006a:l86) and South Africa's 
Economic Transformation: A Strategy for Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (DTI, 2005) 
in 2005. 
Key aspects of the ANC's approach to black economic empowerment include the transfer of finan-
cial capital in the form of shares in companies37 , the preferential employment and advancement of 
.,;. blacks (affirmative action), and the preferential procurement by businesses and the state of goods 
;-· and services from black-owned businesses (Southall, 2005:463); these policies aimed at increasing 
"black ownership and control"38 of the economy (Southall, 2006a: 185). The government intended 
· that privatisation would contribute towards black economic empowerment (Gumede, 2005; Rumney, 
2005). The ANC-in-government's interventions in support of BEE "have moved from being largely 
: persuasive to becoming more assertive and regulatory" (Southall, 2005:458, italics in original). 
r The black economic empowerment phase of the National Democratic Revolution would create a black 
bourgeoisie (ANC, 1997b; Southall, 2004). This class was not to be left to its own devices, however, 
but should be guided by the ANC (1997b; 1997c) to contribute to nation-building in "South Africa's 
true interests." In fact, the entire capitalist class, regardless of race, should be influenced by the ANC 
(1997b; 1997d) in this regard. 
4.3.2.3 Changing the civil service 
The civil service, too, is being changed in line with ANC policy. The ANC (1997b) considered the 
apartheid government as "colonial in character", with the establishment of the Republic in 1960 sim-
ply marking the transfer of power from the "British conquerors" to the "settler colonial community" 
who continued exploiting the "indigenous Africans." The necessity of the change is clearly spelled 
37 Southall (2006a: 178) cites figures suggesting direct black control of the JSE was no more than four percent at the end 
of2004. 
38 Southall (2006a:l91) argues that black businessman are becoming more and more influential in the South African 
economy; for example, he points to a 2003 survey by the Financial Mail which listed nine black men among the twenty 
most influential business people in South Africa. Yet, despite talk of the growth of the black middle class, the "mass of 
the black population" seems to have derived "little benefit" from BEE (Southall, 2006a: 196). 
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out39 : "It is a dictum of all revolutions that, having laid its hands on the state machinery - at local, 
provincial and national levels - the democratic movement cannot wish this machinery to serve the 
purpose of social transformation" - the state machinery must be changed to perform its new tasks 
(ANC, 2004). The government and civil service40 would naturally be increasingly staffed with ANC 
members, who were expected to "fulfil the mandate of the organisation" (ANC, 1997d). One of the 
major changes was the breaking down of the "administrative framework of separate development" 
and the assembly of a "single public service" (Naidoo, 2005: 117). The "fundamental transformation" 
of the state was to be considered a "priority objective of the NDR" (ANC, 1997c). "Transformation of 
the state is paramount if we are to address the needs and aspirations of all our people" (ANC, 2000). 
Cloete (1995:115, cited in Naidoo, 2005:115) shows that, around the time the ANC assumed power, 
blacks comprised almost eighty percent of the population but not even forty percent of the public 
service as a whole, and were negligibly represented in management positions, which were almost 
exclusively filled by whites. By 2000, at least fifty percent of senior management posts were held 
by blacks, who comprised seventy-three percent of the civil service by 200341 (DPSA (2000); PSC 
(2004), cited in Naidoo, 2005: 118-119) so that by 2005 the ANC (2005d) could declare that "the pub-
lic service and the organs of the state are becoming more and more representative of the population." 
. 4.3.2.4 Setting the national "vision" 
The ANC (2002c) positions itself as "the main communicators of the South African vision", influ-
encing the "attitudes and values of the broader society." The mass media should be changed to use 
all the official languages (ANC, 1997c). The means of the state were also to be used to promote the 
,;.indigenous African languages; a 2005 discussion document complained that these "African languages 
still receive insufficient state resources" (ANC, 2005d), echoing the lamentations at the 2002 National 
Conference that "Indigenous languages ... are poorly catered for" (ANC, 2002e). 
4.3.2.5 Inculcating patriotism 
While removing the racial skew in the South African economy is the main component of the ANC's 
nation-building project, the party has stated that it should use its control of government to initiate 
cultural and educational programmes in support of its efforts to mould a new South African society. 
The ANC (1997b) has proposed a campaign encouraging a "New Patriotism" to "capture the national 
imagination." A programme encouraging national pride in school-children and intended to create 
39 ANC policy on transforming the civil service echos the pre-liberation National Party government: "the ANC was also 
committed to utilising the public sector as an instrument of black empowerment, just as its predecessor NP government 
had turned to the parastatals to promote Afrikaner empowerment during the 1950s and 1960s" (Southall, 2005:462; Butler, 
2004:39); "After a decade of NP rule, just as in the public service, the middle and upper echelons of the wide network of 
parastatal organizations were virtually monopolized by Afrikaners" (O'Meara, 1996:79, quoted in Southall, 2005:462). 
40Tue civil service is a significant employer in South Africa: in 2004, the public service had slightly more than a million 
employees (PSC (2004), cited in Naidoo, 2005: 118). In addition, some 336 parastatal entities employ around 250,000 
people (Southall, 2005:462). 
41 Mo I eke (2006:211) attributes most of the "progress with regard to racial representation and advancement of Africans" 
in the entire labour market to changes in government employment patterns. 
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"greater awareness of our unity in diversity and the need for common South African patriotism" 
based on the new South African flag and the Constitution was resolved upon at the 1997 National 
Conference (ANC, 1997c) and launched in 2005 to some discussion in the media ("All in a flap", 
Mail & Guardian, September 30 to October 6 2005). The government was supposed to "develop 
a programme around Heritage Day which celebrates diversity and unity, and promotes respect for 
cultural identities in a manner that contributes to welding a sense of nationhood among our people" 
(ANC, 1997c). 
The resolutions adopted at the 51st National Conference in 2002 expanded on the function of the 
state-owned broadcaster, the SABC, giving it the heavy burden of playing "a critical role in shap-
ing opinions and building societal values, including the moral fibre of our society, socio-economic 
transformation and the building of a united, patriotic nation"42 while at the same time reflecting "the 
unity and diversity of our people and the needs of the democratic society" (ANC, 2002e). The 2005 
National General Council called for more to be done "including implementation of programmes to 
better the lives of all, popularisation of national symbols, arts and culture, sporting and other activities 
that help to build a sense of shared South Africanness", suggesting that values should somehow "be 
used to promote social cohesion and nation building" (ANC, 2005a). 
Also, "educational43 and cultural institutions including public owned media must be actively encour-
aged the affirmation [sic] of an African reality. Conscious teaching of African history as part of the 
school curriculum should be introduced to instill a sense of patriotism and promote the ideals of non-
racial ism" (ANC, 2000). The White Paper on Education and Training (DoE (1995), cited in Gouws, 
2003:60) mentions civic education44 as being subsumed under the separate subject areas rather than 
being taught as a subject in its own right. The effectiveness of civic education45 is to be measured 
by specific and critical outcomes. Citing the Revised National Curriculum Statement Grades R~9 
42Barnett (2000:63) notes that "In a situation in which processes of economic integration are increasingly taking place 
at a trans-national scale, the state's ability to use communications and media as instruments of domestic political and 
cultural integration are significantly constrained." 
43 The use of a national education system to instill feelings of nationalism stretches back to at least before the First 
World War - "The French governments of the Third Republic consciously used schools to propagate national culture and 
the national language" (Vinen, 2002:28, emphasis added). In a telling observation, Vinen (2002:54) says that the western 
powers involved in the Great War "could rely on the discipline instilled in their populations by education and compulsory 
military service. It was the bourgeoisie of western Europe that behaved in the most irrational way during the First World 
War, continuing to obey orders even when such obedience was certain to bring their death. It was the 'primitive' peasant 
populations of eastern Europe who behaved most rationally - they deserted, allowed themselves to be taken prisoner or 
mutinied." 
44The specific content that should be taught as part of civic education is contentious: see Gouws (2003) pp 53-57 for a 
discussion. In agreement with Castells' formulation of legitimising identity, Brighouse (1998, cited in Gouws, 2003:56) 
points out that civic education involves the state teaching beliefs supporting its own legitimacy. 
45 Civic education is especially important in South Africa, since the previous regime's authoritarian character stunted 
the development of a democratic culture (Gouws, 2003:53). Yet, a study by Bratton et al. (1999, cited in Gouws, 2003:57) 
in Zambia in 1993 and 1996, which showed that individuals who had undergone civic education had higher levels of civic 
knowledge and values and were more likely to be active in civil society, qualified this observation by noting that the effects 
of civic education are "marginal rather than radical", civic education can have "unintended consequences that may not fit 
in with planned outcomes" and seemingly "higher levels of education were needed to understand the messages of civic 
education" (Gouws, 2003:57). Citing a 1994-1997 study by Finkel et al. (2000: 1853) in the Dominican Republic, Gouws 
(2003:58) states that "Those who were exposed to civic education had trust in fewer institutions than those in the control 
group", a reversal of the intended result of civic education which is assumed to lead to "greater institutional trust." This 
suggests that civic education might in fact teach citizens critical thinking skills which potentially undermine the state's 
attempt to bring about its own legitimacy (Gouws, 2003:59). 
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(Schools) (DoE, 2002:5), Gouws (2003:61) asserts that the curriculum's aims include healing "the 
divisions of the past", establishing "a society based on democratic values, social justice and funda-
mental human rights" and building "a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful 
place as a sovereign state in the family of nations." 
4.4 The syncretism of the AN C's South African nationalism 
Taken as a whole, the ANC's conception of nationalism, and South African nationalism in partic-
ular, appears syncretistic - that is to say, it seems to be the result of an inconsistent and contradic-
tory46 merging of various theories of nationalism. Documents and speeches are in places redolent of 
Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities'', are in places influenced by the old SACp47 ideas of 
Colonialism of a Special Type and National Democratic Revolution, are in places a reaction to the 
apartheid government's divide-and-rule stoking of ethnic rivalries, acknowledge in places the non-
racialist tradition within the ANC (Adam (1995:473) proposes that "Non-racialism is the antithesis 
of... nationalism"), affirm in places the exclusive position of Africans as the indigenous people of 
,:South Africa, and proclaims in still other places the need for African hegemony. 
·:'The definition48 of and commitment to the principle of non-racialism within the ANC has a contested 
history49 : 
"non-racial politics of the ANC today are the product of a long debate and struggle ... 
the ANC did not arrive at a full blown non-racial position with respect to the question. 
<> of membership of its own organisation until it had been in existence for some seventy 
years. The reservation of the three most senior positions in the organisation - president 
, the chairman and the treasurer - for Africans left the ANC short of the ideal, even if 
the adoption of full membership for non-Africans helped the ANC to claim maximal 
non-racial practices" (Ndebele, 2002: 144). 
"Even those who defined themselves as African nationalists treated well-disposed non-
Africans as future beneficiaries of the nationalist struggle if not an integral part of it. The 
Pan African Congress, though less concerned to cultivate an image of universal inclu-
siveness from a racial point of view, was, in reality, not all that different from the ANC, 
the Unity Movement, and the Black Consciousness Movement in this regard. It is true 
46For example, Filatova (1997:55) noted the contradictions between the African nationalist stance of Nation-Formation 
and Nation Building and the "melting pot of broad South Africanism" expressed by Building the Foundation for a Better 
Life, both documents released simultaneously by the ANC. 
47The ANC's understanding of nationalism clearly echoes Joe Slovo's (1988) assertions that nations are the "consoli-
dation or fragmentation of disparate ethnic groups" into "sovereign entities" and that "The struggle for national cohesion 
in multi-ethnic communities does not imply the imposition of cultural uniformity. Cultural diversity does not stand in 
contradiction to a national unity" and "one united nation, embracing all our ethnic communities, remains the virtually 
undisputed liberation objective" (Filatova, 1997:51). 
48The "AN C's conceptualisation of non-racialism has been hard to pin down" (Ndebele, 2002: 144). 
49 Mangcu (2003: 110) contends that the ANC is currently engaged in a "race debate"; "by 2000, the old battles between 
black nationalists and white liberals had resurfaced within the ANC, and in society more broadly" (Mangcu, 2003: 110). 
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that in defining Africans (for purposes of future South African citizenship) as not only 
the indigenous inhabitants of the continent but also all those who 'owed allegiance to 
Africa', it implied that some categories of people would have to pass a test of allegiance 
before they could be considered citizens or part of the nation. However, the criterion of 
'owing allegiance' to Africa was so vague that it could barely be regarded as a decisive 
one." (Nolutshungu, 1993:608) 
Burnham (2005: 13) observes that the Freedom Charter, with its emphasis on racial accommodation50, 
"proved to be a source of a bitter division within the liberation movement of the 1950s", as Africanist 
elements, especially in the ANC Youth League, called for "Africa for the Africans." Because of the 
continuing affective appeal of traditional customs51 among the ANC's mass support base, "the ANC 
has had to revise the 'post-ethnic' universalism to which most of its leadership was once fervently 
committed" (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2003:449). Halisi (1998) argues that the tension between 
African nationalism and non-racialism exists within the ANC. There "are those within the African 
National Congress who, impatient with the slow progress in the country's social and political trans-
formation, are pressing for a more robust Africanist approach to the 'national question"' (Pieterse, 
2002: 1-2). Sahra Ryklief (2002: 114) opines that "the Africanness he [Mbeki] refers to is regional 
rather than racial in character." 
One explanation for the self-contradictions of the ANC's outlook in this regard begins by noting that 
the ANC is a "broad church", originally uniting a disparity of groups - Africanists, non-racialists52, 
communists, religious groups - with the common goal of ending apartheid; in other words, the ANC 
didn't begin with a consistent theory of the South African nation, and the development of such a 
theory would necessarily have alienated one or more of its constituent groupings given the internal 
disagreements on points other than the necessity of ending apartheid. So the espousal of a bland, 
vague South African nationalism was probably the only course possible, since it allowed the unity of 
the movement to be preserved - this proved to be a "very successful tactic" (Filatova, 1997:55). The 
discourse of nationalism within the ANC slowly accumulated a variety of (contradictory) influences 
as various groups gained sway temporarily. 
Since taking office in 1994, the ANC has failed to make good on its promise to South Africans to 
"define for ourselves what we want to make of our shared destiny" (Mandela, 1994) - the organisation 
has still not clearly articulated a detailed and consistent concept of South Africa as a nation (Filatova, 
1997:55; Chidester et al., 2003b:296), a contention tacitly acknowledged by President Mbeki (2006b) 
in his 2006 State of the Nation speech, which reiterated Mandela's "call." Rhetoric and policy have 
remained vague53 and contradictory. This tendency can again be explained by invoking the variety of 
50Neville Alexander (2002:37,40) suggests that the position of the Freedom Charter is actually multiracialist rather 
than non-racialist; see also (Pieterse, 2002:3-4). 
51 Indeed, Comaroff and Comaroff (2003:450) comment on the AN C's recent, politically-motivated support for tradi-
tional authority by suggesting that "the ANC has conjured up a force that it is unable fully to control, a force that vitiates 
the very conception of nationhood on which the authority of the state rests." 
52The term "non-racialism" itself means different things to different groups (Adam, 1995:457). 
53 As Vale and Maseko (2002: 124-125) put it in their discussion of the concept of the African Renaissance, 
"while analysts and commentators have trawled the idea of the African Renaissance for policy content, 
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groups within the movement and the country, each group having different concerns and interests. 
In a sense, the ANC's scope for outlining a South African nationalism is even more limited now that 
the "movement" is running the country - the ANC's task is no longer just maintaining internal unity, 
difficult enough as that alone may be, but uniting the entire country - hence soothing statements like 
"Our neighbours, whether black or white, are as human as we all are and as South African as we all 
are" (Mbeki, 200la). Of course, the divisions within the ANC hinder the party in its aim of national 
unity. The ANC cannot abandon its rhetorical commitment to Africanism54 without losing much 
support (Africanism is the centrepiece of the Mbeki administration so such an abandonment seems 
hardly likely), yet too strident an Africanism distances those within the ANC who seek a non-racialist 
future for the country. 
The language of Africanism, despite occasional reassurances that Africanism has nothing to do with 
race or history, obviously estranges those citizens who are denied the possibility of being African55 by 
virtue of being descended from the "erstwhile oppressors" of "colonial domination"(ANC, 1997d). 
The ANC dare not tilt too far towards Africanism - although white South Africans provide negligible 
electoral support for the ANC (only two percent of whites support the ANC, constituting less than 
one percent of ANC supporters, ninety-four percent of whom are African and five percent of who are 
coloured (Naidu, 2006:43-44)), whites still hold most of the wealth and largely run the economy56 -
the ANC (2005d) described the situation as "Economic apartheid is well and alive" - and can have 
a strong negative57 (although presumably not positive, given the dearth of FDI since 1994) influence 
on potential foreign investors58 . In other words, the ANC cannot risk severely upsetting white South 
Africans by entirely abandoning the language of reconciliation. 
In, short, in the words of Filatova (l 997 :54 ), the "new definition of nationhood is a wonderful political 
there seems to be very little of substance to anchor an obviously fine idea... South Africa's idea of an 
African Renaissance is abstruse, puzzling, even perhaps mysterious; more promise than policy ... its essen-
tial features remain deliberately vague; it is high on sentiment, low on substance." 
54Adam (1995:472) noted that the "temptation simmers to use populist racial rhetoric" to assuage the population in the 
face of disappointed expectations - "Exhorting racial redistribution and racial vigilance serves to cover the privileges and 
mistakes of the new elite." 
55 Peter Alexander (2006:39) makes an observation that is particularly germane given the historical use of the term 
"black" to include coloureds: "black Africans often describe themselves as 'black', but it is rare indeed to hear coloureds 
and Indians define themselves in this way." 
56Tuere is a mild irony in the view of commentators like Ryklief (2002: 114-116), for whom the discourse of the 
African Renaissance and NEPAD legitimises the expansion of (largely white-owned) South African capital into Africa -
"it is resoundingly clear that Mbeki's African Renaissance is the best thing that has ever happened to South Africa's (still 
overwhelmingly white) capital in a long time." But see Vale and Maseko (2002:128-130) for an alternative "Africanist 
interpretation" of the African Renaissance idea to Ryklief's economistic or utilitarian view; seen from this Africanist 
perspective, the African Renaissance is primarily an initiative expressing the fundamental social and cultural ambitions 
of "Africanists [who] eschew the modernising tendency represented by Africa's encounter with Europe" who wish to 
construct a uniquely African identity - in this light, the African Renaissance is an instance of Castells' project identity. 
Peter Alexander (2006:42) notes ofthis latter interpretation, "African Renaissance is linked with a move to define national 
identity as something associated with black Africanness, which ... might be less of inclusive of whites, Indians and possibly 
coloureds." 
57 Presidents Mandela and Mbeki (2002) both regularly complained about pessimistic comments by white South 
Africans - the "prophets of doom" (Mandela, 1998), the "merchants of cynicism and despair" who engage in the "pes-
simism of arm-chair whining" (Mandela, 1999), the "traditional doomsayers" (Mbeki, 2003c). 
58Steven Friedman (2005:759) states the challenge for the government as "retaining enough white confidence to prevent 
severe economic disruption." 
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tool for consolidating the support [sic] and mobilising the electorate behind the ANC leadership." 
4.5 Conc.llusion 
While the Mandela and Mbeki presidencies have seen a shift in rhetorical temperature, with the 
warm, reconciliatory tone of Mandela being supplanted by the cold, occasionally antagonistic mood 
of Mbeki and his Two Nations, it is clear that the ANC has embarked on a project to develop a shared 
national identity in South Africa. The "national question", long a preoccupation of the liberation 
movement, is still a matter of priority for the ANC-in-government, and the need for nation-building 
is frequently invoked to justify government policies. 
ANC discourse on the national question is seemingly not hampered by the lack of a clear definition of 
nationhood - the protean character of this concept is possibly an advantage, given the disparate nature 
of the ANC's constituent elements, who can be pulled together in the name of abstract but desirable-
sounding notions like nation-building. Nonetheless, some conclusions can be made about the ANC's 
implicit theory of the nation. First, in the case of South Africa anyway, the nation corresponds to the 
state - citizenship equates to nationality. The ANC seems to perceive nations to be primarily political 
entities, rather than having their foundation in easily-essentialised cultural attributes like language or 
common descent - ·the latter view would of course generate a pessismistic view for nation-building 
in a country like South Africa with its array of language and ethnic groups (one of the side-effects 
of apartheid was the strengthening of ethnic identities). An important corollary of this is that the 
ANC has never questioned the borders of South Africa despite their historically arbitrary nature. 
Another consequence of this view is that tribal groups are not nations in their own right (the AN C's· 
tradition of appealing to African unity dates from its inception). Second, a nation has several common 
elements: citizenship, economy, culture, territory, patriotism. Third, identity is crucial; in particular, 
the members of a nation should share a superordinate national identity. And fourth, nations are seen 
as social constructions. 
With regard to contemporary South Africa, ANC rhetoric and policy emphasises the division of the 
country into two nations and two economies, segregated between poor blacks and wealthy whites. 
The National Democratic Revolution demands the creation of a united nation, implying the material 
upliftment of the black majority so that they may enjoy participation as full citizens. 
The ANC holds out an ideal of the South African nation which has remained consistent since the 
party assumed power in 1994 - this ideal draws inspiration from the Freedom Charter. The major 
characteristics of the desired new South Africa are easily discerned. The nation should be non-racial, 
in that race should not determine opportunity (although the ANC-in-government's persistent obses-
sion with racial categorisation tends to belie the non-racialist oratory). Citizens should enjoy equal 
rights (although the ANC proved willing to compromise the rights of some rural citizens in the face of 
demands from traditional leaders). The members of the nation should be bound together by a shared 
culture and identity. Furthermore, this identity and culture should be African, although the features 
of this African identity and culture are left vague. The nation should be united; in particular, tribal 
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identities should not be used to divide South Africans between various ethnic groups. The boundaries 
of the nation are set at the current borders of the South African state. 
Despite a profusion of pan-Africanist rhetoric, immigration policy remains unwelcoming, and or-
dinary citizens are remarkably xenophobic, reserving especial hostility for African immigrants, a 
situation usually attributed to worries over economic competition. 
The ANC perceives itself as fulfilling an historic mission on behalf of the people of South Africa. 
The party - or movement as it styles itself - thus, unsurprisingly, advocates the state assuming the 
leading role in building the new South African nation. The ANC therefore has a natural affinity with 
the model of the developmental state, an affinity which is increasingly reflected in government policy 
and discourse. The firm hand of the state is also applied in changing the racial composition of the 
economy, through policies of black economic empowerment and the civil service. The ANC intends 
that government should influence South African cultural life and media, in particular through the state 
broadcaster. The government also assumes the task of instilling patriotism amongst the population, 
through cultural events, media and the education system. 
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Chapter 5 
ANC economic policy: Opening South Africa 
up to the world 
As noted earlier, Manuel Castells emphasises the role of economic factors in inducing the network 
society. According to Castells' theoretical framework, countries that are fully connected to the global 
ecc:inomy can be expected to tend towards the ideal type of the network society, whereas those coun-
tries that are largely isolated from the world economy should not display this tendency. Thus, whether 
or not South Africa joined the global economy following the dismantling of apartheid would be de-
cisive in economic and social developments in the country. This chapter therefore examines ANC 
policy on South Africa's relationship to the global economy, specifically the extent to which the ANC 
government has opened South Africa up to economic contact with the rest of the world. 
SJ.. Post-apairtlhteid economic polky 
5.1.1 Overview: from poverty-ailileviatfto1rn to export-Red growtlln ~mdl back 
5.1.1.1 1994 to 1996: the RDP emphasises poverty-alleviation 
In 1990, when the ANC was unbanned, the Freedom Charter was the only economic policy the or-
ganisation had (Sparks, 2003: 176). Gelb (2005:369) describes the subsequent overarching accommo-
dation or "implicit bargain ... between white big business and the ANC" whereby the ANC, during 
the negotiations preceding the 1994 elections, committed itself to macroeconomic stability and open-
ness to the international economy while business agreed to "capital reform", that is to modifying 
the racial composition of asset ownership through what would become known as "black economic 
empowerment." According to Gelb (2005:368-370), the basic accord was in place by the end of 
1990, and the subsequent debates about economic policy, namely whether policy would be oriented 
towards meeting basic needs or towards export-led growth, took place "within the framework of this 
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accommodation." 1 This "bargain" between the economic and political elites set the parameters for 
post-apartheid South Africa's economic policy. One telling instance of the ANC upholding its end of 
this bargain is the process whereby the the Reconstruction and Development Programme was drafted: 
the original RDP was drawn up by Cosatu2, but the ANC adopted a version that contained elements 
of the Cosatu document but which was revised to be more acceptable to business interests, the fi-
nal version of the RDP being approved by the so-called Brenthurst Group of businessmen (Gumede, 
2005:76-79; Sparks, 2003: 174). Thus, "Aspects of the visionary declarations of the Freedom Charter 
were, with significant modifications, carried over into the celebrated RDP" (Hemson and O'Donovan, 
2006: 12, emphasis added). 
5.1.1.2 1996 to 2001: GEAR replaces the RDJP with a focus Oil] growth through exports 
Bond (2005: 1) devoted an entire book, Elite Transition, to describing "the transition [of the ANC] 
from a popular-nationalist anti-apartheid project to official neoliberalism", an ideological shift which 
Gelb (2005:368-370) interprets as a consequence of the bargain between the business elite and the 
ANC3 and which reflects what Alexander (2002:48) calls "the complete pragmatism of the ANC 
leaders in matters economic." This shift to economic neo-liberalism was sufficiently comprehensive, 
at least among those who influenced policy, that it was noted that "the ANC government, first and 
foremost, serves the interest of the capitalist class" (Alexander, 2002:49). The SACP found its sway 
on policy to be negligible (Alexander, 2002:48). 
Government economic policy shifted from the populist RDP of 1994 to a "fairly orthodox neo-liberal4 
macroeconomic policy package" (Roberts, 2005:481), the Growth, Employment And Redistribution 
(GEAR) strategy of 1996, which made financial stability the priority5 (Hemson and O'Donovan, 
2006:12; Blumenfeld, 2006:428). In the case of nationalization, the change was nothing short of a 
"somersault" (Alexander, 2002:48) or an "astonishing about-tum" (Sparks, 2003: 170). Nelson Man-
dela's first speech on release from imprisonment had affirmed that "nationalization of the mines, 
banks, and monopoly industry is the policy of the ANC, and a change or modification of our views 
in this regard is inconceivable" (quoted in Gumede, 2005:68). Yet, by late 1992, Mandela proposed 
1 Writing in 1993, Adam and Moodley (1993:346) noted that the "most rational and also the most likely scenario 
for South Africa is a social-democratic pact between business, labour, and key state bureaucracies" and predicted that 
"many a Utopian dream will be disappointed, particularly on the Left" as the free-market economic system prevailed - the 
"socialists will have to sacrifice most of their dream because they have the least real power, despite the mass sympathy 
for radical restructuring" (Adam and Moodley, 1993:348). 
2The first draft was drawn up by Jay Naidoo, the General Secretary of Cosatu (Sparks, 2003: 191). 
3This view is supported by Vale (2005:96). 
4The South African government was not alone in reaching an economic policy accommodation with "nee-liberalism" 
- Brazil (under the "[r]adical ex-socialist" Lula da Silva (Taylor, 2005:3)) and India have followed similar trajectories 
(Taylor, 2005) by seeking to "derive optimum benefits from the globalisation process" (IBSA, 2003). Alden and Vieira 
(2005: 1091), discussing trilateral diplomatic relations between India, Brazil and South Africa, note that "the notion of 
autonomous development has been replaced by market-orientation among the leading countries of the South" (emphasis 
added). Referring to the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Soederberg (2005:357) suggests 
that "One only has to look at Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and even Mexico to learn where Africa is headed, should it 
embrace this blueprint for economic renewal." 
5 As Sparks (2003: 193) puts it, the "government has insisted ever since that GEAR did not replace the RDP, that, in 
Erwin's words, 'the RDP is embedded in GEAR' ... But in fact the RDP disappeared as a political slogan which had 
acquired talismanic importance to the alliance partners." 
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that the ANC should abandon nationalisation, and the version of nationalisation adopted in the 1992 
policy document, Ready To Govern, and endorsed in the RDP was substantially vitiated6 (Gumede, 
2005 :71; ANC, 1992, 1994 ). Far from implementing nationalisation, the release of GEAR in 1996 
saw official government economic policy support the privatisation 7 of "non-strategic [state] assets" 
under the euphemism8 of "the public sector asset restructuring programme" (DoF, 1996:5; Alexan-
der, 2002:65). The about-turn was pronounced enough that the resolutions adopted at the ANC's 
51 st National Conference observed of the "restructuring of state-owned assets and enterprises" that 
"the transfer of assets to the private sector strengthens our developmental agenda" (ANC, 2002e). As 
Rumney (2005:404) puts it, "the South African government has shown no great taste for nationalisa-
tion." 
The adoption of GEAR and the deprecation of the RDP signified the acceptance, by those wielding 
power within the ANC, of orthodox neo-liberal economic policies favouring a market economy. The 
SACP's Jeremy Cronin described the early 1990s as a time when "the triumph of neo-liberalism was 
at its zenith" (quoted in Gumede, 2005:76). Bond (2005: 156) notes that the World Bank and the 
IMF were hugely influential in setting economic policy in South Africa - indeed, two World Bank 
economists were part of the technical team contributing to GEAR9 (DoF, 1996); the World Bank and 
IMF were influential in determining policy on welfare, housing, infrastructure, water, land reform and 
health care as well (Bond, 2005:183; Gumede, 2005:77-78). 
5.1.1.3 2001 onwards: Government moves towards the developmental state model to assist the 
poor 
From around 2001, the ANC government began to examine the failures of its economic policy, par-
ticularly the lack of progress in eradicating poverty and creating jobs, and slowly expanded state 
involvement in the economy; by 2004, the government budget included a "large-scale" public works 
programme and a significant increase in social and welfare spending(Daniel et al., 2005:xxiii). How-
ever, the government did not raise taxation levels, preferring to fund the increased spending by letting 
the budget deficit grow 10, an indication that the government's policy hasn't swung sharply towards so-
cial democracy, which would imply high taxation to fund large, equalising transfer payments (Daniel 
6 Although the 2002 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act nationalised what the Freedom Charter called 
"the mineral wealth beneath the soil"(Rumney, 2005:404). 
7Friedman has suggested that the ANC government's partial acceptance of privatisation was made with the explicit 
provision that BEE - in place of nationalisation - would be used to achieve greater equality (cited in Rumney, 2005:404). 
The only major privatisation, that of Telkom, failed to achieve much by way of BEE (Rumney, 2005:407). 
Bsparks (2003: 183) recites an anecdote that reveals the significance of language within the alliance: during the drafting 
of the economic policy section of the ANC's 1992 policy statement, Ready To Govern, 
"as [Trevor] Manuel explains, Mandela in his inimitable style drew them aside saying: 'Come, boys, I need 
to talk to you. Look, there's Joe Slovo (the Communist Party leader). He can handle the concept but the 
word privatization is going to be very difficult for him.' So while the word was struck out, the concept 
remained clear enough" (emphasis added). 
9This influence was in continuity with IMF intellectual influence in apartheid South Africa - for example, the Value 
Added Tax adopted by South Africa in 1991 was designed by IMF officials (Bond, 2005: 159). 
10some analysts have interpreted the increased expenditure announced in 2004 as an election-year tactic (Daniel et al., 
2005:xxvii). 
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et al., 2005:xxvii). All the same, the emphasis of government policy has switched back to poverty 
alleviation (Devey et al., 2006:225). 
Daniel et al. (2005:xxviii) propose, cautiously, that the ANC government under Mbeki draws inspi-
ration 
"far less from socialism than from the idea of an Asian-style (capitalist) 'developmental 
state' 11 . Most particularly, it would appear to borrow from the experience of Malaysia, 
which has been particularly influential in shaping the ANC's ideas about how to combine 
growth with racial redistribution." 
Southall (2006b:xviii-xxi) notes the "growing boldness with which the government and the ANC have 
latterly come to openly espouse the 'developmental state."' In support, he cites President Mbeki's 
(2005a) 'State of the Nation' speech for 2005, the governments "major investment and efficiency pro-
gramme" for the state-owned enterprises (Erwin, 2005); President Mbeki's (2005b) assertion that de-
velopment "requires an effective state, one that plays a catalytic, facilitating role"; President Mbeki's 
(2005b) description of the government as a "developmental state"; and the ANC (2005c) discussion 
document, Development and underdevelopment, which, in Southall's terms, "leaves little doubt that 
its principal inspiration is that of the east Asian developmental model." Southall (2006b:xxi) con-
cludes that "the ANC and the government's latest thinking asserts the necessity of a developmental 
state that is 'strong' in the sense of having the intellectual resources to plan, monitor and stimulate 
high growth (notably through revitalised SOEs), 'strong' in the sense of having legislative and admin-
istrative capacity to share [sic] and direct policy, and 'strong' in the sense of being able to mobilise 
and deploy capital into sectors where private industry will not venture." 
This view is reinforced, for example, by the the call, in the 2005 ANC National General Council's 
Consolidated Report on the Strategic Context of the National Democratic Revolution and the State of 
the Organisation, for a "more confident assertion of the role and character of the developmental state" 
(ANC, 2005b) and the statement in the ANC's (2006) online journal, ANC Today, that the movement 
was working to "ensure that government is properly equipped to fulfil the requirements of a develop-
mental state, capable of playing a leading and active role in the reconstruction and development of 
South Africa." 
5.1.2 Ecrnrnomic pollky aimecll at iltlltegiratil!llg Sou.nth Africa i1rnto One globall ecmn-
omy 
5.1.2.1 Export-biased trade and investment policy 
Whereas the RDP made "attacking poverty and deprivation" its "first priority", to be achieved by 
recasting the economy to meet the "basic needs" of South Africa's citizens (ANC, 1994), GEAR 
11 Castells (2000a:212-337) devotes 125 pages to analysing the developmental states of the Asian Pacific, in particular 
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Crucially, he observes that the success of these developmental 
projects was contingent on the geo-political situation during their early stages, i.e. the Cold War; specifically, they 
benefited significantly from economic support from America and Great Britain (Castells, 2000a:280). 
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changed the emphasis to growth, necessitating "a transformation towards a competitive outward-
oriented economy" (DoF, 1996: 1, emphasis added). 
This meant "deep-rooted reforms": among other elements, the abandonment of high levels of so-
cial spending in favour of fiscal discipline; monetary policy aimed at reducing inflation; the gradual 
liberalization of foreign exchange; the continued reduction of import tariffs (the tariff regime had al-
ready been lowered as part of South Africa's GATT obligations); tax reforms; and trade and industrial 
policies that "aim to promote an outward-oriented industrial economy, integrated into the regional and 
global environment, and fully responsive to market trends and opportunities" (DoF, 1996:3-7). GEAR 
specifically included measures to make it easier for foreign investors to borrow money in South Africa 
(DoF, 1996:12). 
GEAR noted that "Increased openness to international trade and capital flows is one of the hallmarks 
of the more rapidly growing developing economies world-wide. Foreign direct investment plays 
an important role in encouraging growth" and accordingly suggested that foreign direct investment, 
especially in "export-oriented manufacturing" was necessary for faster growth and consequently that 
the South African economy should be made more attractive to foreign investors (DoF, 1996:Appendix 
12). 
As part of the government's commitment to attracting foreign investment, President Mbeki estab-
lished an International Investment Council in 2000 (originally announced in 1999 (Mbeki, 1999)) and 
an International Marketing Council in August 2000 to promote "brand South Africa" abroad and "En-
courage patriotism and national pride" (see webpage at http://www.imc.org.za/content/view/1/3/) - the 
government's embrace of the language of corporate branding extended to appointing a well-known 
.Bollywood actor as "global brand ambassador" for South Africa (Mbeki, 2006b). 
5.1.2.2 Tariff reduction 
In an offer to GATT, effective from January 1995, South Africa replaced "all quantitative import tariffs 
on agricultural and industrial products with ad valorem tariffs" and proposed "a phased reduction of 
tariffs over periods varying between 5 and 8 years" (DoF, 1996:Appendix 10; Blumenfeld, 2006:435-
437). 
Tariff reduction has, in accordance with an emphasis on trade, been substantial - in addition to the 
removal of non-tariff barriers, the average (unweighted) tariff rate fell from 22% in 1988 to 11 % in 
2003 (IMF, 2003b:27) - although Blumenfeld (2006:437) questions the actual extent of the reforms, 
suggesting that the "tariff regime has remained relatively complex and cumbersome." 
The IMF awarded South Africa a rating of 5 in the Fund's trade restrictiveness index in 2003, a 
rating which compares "reasonably well" with other emerging market economies; by 2003, non-tariff 
barriers were primarily related to textile imports (IMF, 2003b:27). 
Bond (2005: 199) attributes hundreds of thousands of job losses to tariff reduction as cheaper imports 
squeezed local producers out. 
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5.1.2.3 Debt repayment 
The ANC government agreed to repay the foreign debt incurred by the apartheid government, which 
exceeded $20 billion (Bond, 2005:200), as a "market confidence-boosting measure" (Gumede, 2005:78). 
5.1.2.4 Participation in multilateral and bilateral agreements 
In the 1990s, the South African government also began to participate in international economic insti-
tutions such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and its successor, the World Trade Or-
ganisation. The ANC signed an $850 million loan from the IMF 12 in 1993, a condition of which was 
that South Africa would sign the GATT, which duly occurred in December 1993 (Bond, 2005:199; 
Gumede, 2005:77). South Africa's commitments on trade liberalization were agreed during 1994 
(Gelb, 2005:369). South Africa also entered into several bilateral free trade agreements: amongst 
others, the Interim Co-operation Agreement with the EU was in place shortly after the 1994 elections, 
with the final EU-South Africa Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement being signed in 
2000 (Blumenfeld, 2006:443-444). 
5.1.2.5 Capitall controls 
. South Africa has gradually relaxed constraints on capital flows since 1994 but restrictions remain 
for citizens and South African companies - the restrictions are mainly on capital outflows (IMF, 
2004b:42). Citizens' ability to invest abroad or borrow foreign currency is still strictly limited, and 
corporate and institutional investors are permitted to make foreign portfolio or fixed investments only 
within prescribed limits (IMF, 2003b:l9). Firms must repatriate funds involved in foreign exchange 
transactions within a specified time. 
5o2 The effect of postaapairtheidl ecrnrnomic ponllcy rnrn tn.·ade alllld 
capibd fftlows 
The previous section shows that the ANC government shifted the focus of economic policy from 
poverty-alleviation to export-led growth with the adoption of GEAR in 1996, an outcome Gelb 
(2005:397) suggests was determined by "powerful political and economic imperatives." The over-
all effect of the conservative - "prudent and frugal" as the IMF puts it - macroeconomic policies has 
been to shape a more robust economy, as reflected in steadily rising sovereign credit ratings 13 and the 
12The letter of intent was drafted by none other than Alec Erwin and Trevor Manuel, "the ANC's two key economic 
specialists" (Sparks, 2003:184). 
13Standard & Poor's rating of South Africa's foreign currency debt is shown in the table below (IMF, IMF, 2003b:38, 
IMF, 2004b:38); these ratings equate South Africa with countries like Egypt, Mexico and Thailand, which also had foreign 
debt ratings of BBB- in mid-2002 (IMF, 2004a:48): 
I 1998 11999 I 2000 I 2001 I 2002 I 2003 I 2004 I 
I BB+ I BB+ I BBB- I BBB- I BBB- I BBB I BBB I 
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longest period of economic growth on record (Burgess and Harjes, 2005:360). This section aims to 
illustrate the effect of this policy adjustment on the flows of goods and capital into and out of South 
Africa - in other words, to assess the change in South Africa's economic connectivity to the rest of 
the world under ANC rule, a change summarised by the IMF as "After years of isolation, [South 
Africa's] economy has become much more open and increasingly well integrated with overseas mar-
kets" (Burgess and Harjes, 2005:360). 
5.2.1 Xmports 
After trade liberalisation, imports grew rapidly until 1997, after which year the growth slowed sub-
stantially, picking up again in 2003 (Gelb, 2005:390). 
I I 1998 1 1999 I 2000 1 2001 I 2002 1 2003 1 2004 1 
Imports of goods and services 32.8 30.2 33.1 30.9 32.2 42.9 57.7 
Imports of goods 27.2 24.5 27.4 25.7 26.9 35.0 48.4 
Imports of services 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.2 5.3 7.9 9.3 
, Table 5 .1: Composition of imports into South Africa, 1998 to 2004, in US$ billions 
(Source: IMF, 2003b:34, 2004b:36, 2005:37) 
1 11960 I 1965 I 1910 11975 I 1980 1 1985 I 1990 I 1995 1 2000 1 2004 1 
I Imports I 1.63 I 2.56 I 3.84 I 8.29 119.60 I 11.32 118.40 I 30.55 I 29.70 I 55.20 I 
Table 5.2: Imports into South Africa, 1960 to 2004, in US$ billions 
(Source:. WTO via http://www.dti.gov.za/) 
I 1 1990 I 1992 1 1994 1 1996 1 1997 1 1998 1 1999 1 2000 1 2001 I 2002 I 2003 1 2004 1 
I imports I 18.40 I 19.74 I 23.36 I 30.18 I 33.00 I 29.24 I 26.70 I 29.70 I 28.25 I 29.27 I 41.08 I 55.20 I 
Table 5.3: Imports into South Africa, 1990 to 2004, in US$ billions 
(Source: WTO via http://www.dti.gov.za/) 
5.2.2 Exports 
Exports have increased substantially since 1994, and the composition of exports has become increas-
ingly diversified in the same period (see Tables 5.4 and 5.5) (Butler, 2004:53; Gelb, 2005:390,396; 
Blumenfeld, 2006:429). The decline in the importance of mineral (primarily gold) exports14 and 
the rise in the importance of machinery and equipment is worth noting, although the growth rate of 
non-gold exports fell off after peaking in the mid- l 990s, with 2002 and 2003 recording shrinking 
non-gold export volumes - the average annual growth rate from 1994 to 2003 was just over 6 percent, 
an "unspectacular" performance that was in fact lower than the growth of overall world trade in the 
14Gold sales formed 15% of South Africa's GDP in 1980 but had dropped to less than 3% in 2000; the contribution of 
all minerals to GDP fell from 22% in 1980 to 6% in 2000 (Sparks, 2003:19,26). 
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same period (Blumenfeld, 2006:429). South Africa's share of world trade actually declined, "falling 
to 0.53 per cent between 1995 and 1999 and 0.44 per cent between 2000 and 2003" (Blumenfeld, 
2006:429). 
I 1998 I 1999 I 2000 I 2001 I 2002 I 2003 I 2004 I 
Exports of goods and services 34.3 33.7 36.6 35.5 36.3 45.9 56.6 
Exports of goods 29.l 28.6 31.7 30.9 31.7 38.4 48.3 
Nongold 24.4 24.6 27.9 27.5 27.5 33.9 43.2 
Gold 4.7 4.0 3.9 3.4 4.1 4.5 5.1 
Exports of services 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.6 4.7 7.5 8.3 
Table 5.4: Composition of South African exports, 1998 to 2004, in US$ billions 
(Source: IMF, 2003b:34, 2004b:36, 2005:37) 
I 1990 I 1995 I 2000 I 2002 I 
Agriculture 4.5 4.9 4.1 5.5 
Minerals 61.3 50.7 45.6 36.I 
Food, beverages 3.0 3.1 4.0 4.3 
Textiles and clothing 3.1 3.1 2.7 3.1 
, .Basic processed goods 21.9 28.l 27.4 29.7 
Machinery & equipment 5.9 8.5 14.7 19.3 
Other manufactured goods 0.1 l.6 l.5 2.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Table 5 .5: Percentage shares of merchandise exports, by sector, 1990 to 2002 
(Source: TIPS, 2003; cited in Gelb, 2005:396) 
I ,. I 1960 I 1965 I 1970 I 1975 I 1980 I 1985 I 1990 I 1995 I 2000 I 2004 I 
I Exports I l.98 I 2.55 I 3.34 I 8.79 I 25.53 I 16.29 I 23.55 I 27.85 I 29.98 I 45.93 I 
Table 5.6: Exports from South Africa, 1960 to 2004, in US$ billions 
(Source: WTO via http://www.dti.gov.za/) 
One example of South Africa's less-than-spectacular export performance since the demise of apartheid 
is the fruit sector, which has faced increased competition from Southern Hemisphere agricultural pro-
ducers like New Zealand and Chile, with China an emerging competitor - for example, South Africa 
and Chile both exported 178,000 metric tons of apples in 1980, but by 2000 Chile, with exports of 
415,000 metric tons, had pulled far ahead of South Africa, with a total of only 255,000 metric tons 
(Barrientos and Kritzinger, 2003:96). 
The export performance of the automotive industry, however, was remarkable. The government in-
troduced the motor industry development plan (MIDP) in 1995 - "Vehicle exports, almost measured 
in handfuls before the MIDP, were around 140 000 in 2005 and are set to reach 250 000 next year ... 
To differing degrees, all local vehicle manufacturers have been absorbed into their foreign parents' 
supply networks" ("Painful lessons in meeting demand", Financial Mail, 14 April 2006). (South 
Africa also imported nearly 209 000 cars in 2005, which accounted for half of all new-vehicle sales, 
resulting in a R28 billion trade deficit for the South African motor industry ("Import braking point", 
Financial Mail, 7 July 2006).) 
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1990 I 1992 1994 1996 I 1997 I 1998 I 1999 I 2000 I 2001 I 2002 I 2003 I 2004 I 
I Exports I 23.55 I 23.44 I 25.31 I 29.22 I 31.01 I 26.36 I 26.71 I 29.98 I 29.26 I 29.72 I 36.48 I 45.93 I 
Table 5.7: Exports from South Africa, 1990 to 2004, in US$ billions 
(Source: WTO via http://www.dti.gov.za/) 
5.2.3 Foireig1rn iltllvestme1rnt i1rn South Africa 
Foreign direct investment increased markedly after 1993, peaking at 2.5% of GDP in 1997, largely 
due to the partial privatisation of Telkom (IMF, 2003a:76). 
While total foreign investment into post-apartheid South Africa is similar to comparable emerging 
market countries, the split between fixed investment and portfolio investment has been unusually 
skewed in favour of portfolio investment - combined fixed and portfolio investment averaged 5% of 
GDP annually between 1994 and 2002, but the proportion of fixed investment was much smaller than 
that for comparable countries (Ahmed et al., 2005:3); the share of FOi in total capital inflows was 
only 30% for South Africa but 88% for the comparison countries15 between 1994 and 2002 (IMF, 
2004a:49). 
Foreign direct investment in South Africa has remained low when compared to other emerging market 
countries, net inflows averaging 1.5% of GDP during 1994 to 2002, a period in which a group of com-
parison countries averaged 3%; the average value falls to 0.7% if two large transactions are excluded, 
namely the partial privatisation of Telkom in 1997 and the purchase of De Beers by (London-listed) 
Anglo American in 2001 (IMF, 2004a:48). It is significant that the majority of the direct investment 
that did arrive has been used for mergers and acquisitions rather than new factories (Gelb, 2005:387; 
Butler, 2004:54; IMF, 2003a:78). 
The low value of foreign direct investment mirrors, however, the low level of investment by domestic 
business - private investment averaged just over 12% of GDP between 1994 and 2003 in comparison 
with over 13% in 1982 and 14% in 1988 (Gelb, 2005:385-387). Tony Erhenreich (2003:90) of Cosatu 
bemoaned the "unpatriotic capitalists" for causing "some of the problems in our economy", asking 
plainly, "if South African business people are not demonstrating confidence in the economy, how are 
South Africans going to get somebody else to think that theirs is an economy worth investing in?" 
The European Union has provided about 90% of the FOi between 1994 and 2002, with the UK alone 
accounting for 74% of the total; the rest was provided by the USA (6%) and Asian (3%) (IMF, 
2003a:77). 
Alexander (2002:165) claims that "more capital has fled from South Africa since 1994 than has come 
into it." As Bond (2005: 193) notes, South African foreign direct investment abroad exceeded incom-
ing FOi in 1997. 
15The set of 59 comparison countries included Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Botswana, Kenya, China, India, Thailand, 
Vietnam, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
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5.2.4 South African companies listing on foreign stock exchanges 
A noteworthy development has been the granting of permission for a small number of major South 
African corporations to move their primary listings offshore, allowing them to access foreign capital 
in overseas financial markets. Between 1997 and 2005, five large firms 16 moved their primary listings 
from the JSE to the London Stock Exchange (Southall, 2005:460-461). 
5.2.5 LoalI'lls from B:rettolI'll Woods ilI'llstitUJ1tllmns 
The World Bank offered policy advice and training to South Africa in the transitional period of 1990 to 
1994, and has continued to offer policy advice to the ANC government- this influence is discernible in 
the GEAR strategy. The World Bank Group has also offered financial and technical support, including 
a small number of loans (US$61 million of loans have been approved but not much more than US$26 
million had actually been disbursed by 2004) and grants (US$37.7 million by 2004) (IMF, 2004b:43). 
5.3 Attempts at refrnrming mudtiilateraR B.nstiitudioillls 
The ANC's 2002 National Conference at Stellenbosch adopted a preface to the Strategy and Tactics 
accepted at the previous conference in 1997; the updated document stated that "the standing of South 
Africa has been enhanced, at the core of the efforts of developing countries and Africa in particu-
lar to reverse the unequal power relations that define global politics and economics today" (ANC, 
2Q02d). Patrick Bond (2004:4-10) suggests that the ANC government, through its involvement in 
the multilateral institutions of global governance - the UN, WTO, World Bank and IMF - as well as 
various high-profile conferences and summits, has made some attempts at reforming the system of 
"global apartheid", although these reforms were "systematically frustrated" so that the net effect was 
that Mbeki helped to "preserve the overall premises of capitalist globalisation." Despite "Pretoria's 
increasingly active globe-trotting reformism" - and Mbeki "has emerged as an African statesman de-
termined to reshape the architecture of global political and economic governance in order to cater for 
the needs of Africa, the South and the global poor" (Daniel et al., 2005:xxvii) - the South African 
government was able to achieve little (Bond, 2004: 17). 
Alden and Vieira (2005) note that the "activism on the part of three middle-income developing coun-
tries in particular - South Africa, Brazil and India - has resulted in the creation of a 'trilateralist' 
diplomatic partnership, itself a reflection of broader transformations across the developing world in 
the wake of globalisation", with this partnership "actively challenging the position and assumptions 
of the leading states of the North." This partnership is expressed in the Brasilia Declaration (IBSA, 
2003), of which Ian Taylor (2005:19) notes, "Making neo-liberalism work for all is [the] central 
message." 
16Tue firms were Billiton, South African Breweries, Anglo American, Old Mutual and Dimension Data (Southall, 
2005:460). 
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5.4 The New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development 
The New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the "economic blueprint" 17 for 
the African Union (Butler, 2004: 159), launched in 2002, is the embodiment in policy of the "idea of 
an African Renaissance" - in which South African leadership is implied (Schoeman, 2003:359) - and 
an expression of the "defining concept of Mbeki's government" (Sachikonye, 2005:570). For Bond 
(2004:21), NEPAD is nothing less than an attempt to "relegitimise" the Washington Consensus of 
neo-liberal economics "across the [African] continent" that quickly degenerated into "farce" (Bond, 
2004:103). Bond (2004:104-105) highlights the extent to which the World Bank, IMF, "Northern" 
politicians and "major transnational corporate executives" were involved in drawing up and support-
ing NEPAD, while NEPAD was criticised by "virtually every major African civil society organisation, 
network and progressive personality." 
NEPAD's critics suggest that it is "merely GEAR writ large for the continent" (Daniel et al., 2005:xxxvii) 
(on the question of legitimacy, Kanbur (2003) notes that most of the heads of state who were involved 
in NEPAD's formation were democratically elected). The central premises ofNEPAD are that "deeper 
integration into the world economy will benefit the continent" and that the "enlightened proponents of 
NEPAD will discipline Africa's ubiquitous dictators" (Bond, 2004: 106-107). Alexander (2002: 152) 
claims that this means the South African government is making the mistake of "placing its faith in the 
international capitalist class rather than in the social movements of the common people." In short, 
"the fact that the ANC leadership, together with their allies in Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal 
and elsewhere have adopted the neoliberal economic orthodoxy of the Washington con-
sensus as the frame of reference for the promotion and implementation of NEPAD means 
nothing less than that it will benefit only the elites if it works at all. The vast majority of 
the urban and the rural poor will remain on the margins, desperately trying to eke out an 
existence in an alien and hostile world" (Alexander, 2003: 17) 
For Lesufi (2004:810), "at the heart of NEPAD is the continuation of the programme of the global 
and South African multinational corporations' expansive tendencies in an attempt to find solutions to 
the crisis of world capitalism ... the South African state serves to facilitate this penetration of African 
economies and markets by global and local multinational corporations." Neville Alexander (2003:14) 
holds that "the economic basis for President Mbeki's attempt to spearhead the revival of Africa exists 
in South Africa itself. The interests of the South African state and capital converge and coincide on 
this domain." The "emphasis that NEPAD places on promoting the private sector simply echoes the 
current dominance of the neo-liberal economic paradigm, as promoted by the IMF and the World 
Bank" (Loxley, 2003:122). 
17 Kanbur (2003) suggests that NEPAD's scope is continually widening - its proponents have become too ambitious; he 
argues for "a toning down of expectations and rhetoric." 
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5.5 Conclusion 
The ANC inherited in 1994 an economy that was largely isolated from global economic activity as a 
result of sanctions imposed on the apartheid government. In his first State of the Nation address to 
Parliament as President, Nelson Mandela (1994) announced that South Africa faced the "major chal-
lenge" of "re-entering the global economy", a process which the new government addressed compre-
hensively. This integration - which Sparks (2003: 18) describes as the transformation of South Africa 
"from an isolationist siege economy into a player in the new global marketplace"18 - resulted from 
the ideological triumph within the ANC of neo-liberal economic prescriptions and the consequent 
emphasis on export-led growth. Until the early 1990s, what little economic policy the ANC had was 
based on the nationalisation clauses of the Freedom Charter, a position quickly abandoned in favour 
of an embrace of what is usually described as "orthodox neo-liberal" or "Washington consensus" eco-
nomic policy, a shift manifest in the change from the RDP to GEAR. Latterly, the state has, in tacit 
acknowledgement of the failure of GEAR to deliver benefits to the poor, expounded the virtues of the 
developmental state, rhetoric which has been accompanied by a large state investment programme, 
emphasis on the state-owned enterprises, public works and attempts by the state to direct industrial 
policy. 
GEAR specifically pursued "openness to international trade and capital flows" as the means to stim-
ulate economic growth in South Africa. In particular, the government looked to foreign direct in-
vestment as an economic panacea; the ANC government's willingness to repay debt incurred by the 
apartheid regime was ascribed to the necessity of not upsetting international financiers. South Africa 
joined GATT (subsequently the WTO) and signed several bilateral trade deals. Import tariffs were 
substantially reduced. 
The overall effect was that South Africa's previously isolated economy rapidly became integrated 
with the global economy. By 2004, imports stood at triple their 1990 levels while exports had ap-
proximately doubled from their 1990 value - post-apartheid South Africa's export performance was 
not entirely disastrous but certainly far from spectacular. Foreign direct investment, however, was 
disappointingly scarce, both in absolute levels and in comparison with other developing countries. 
Most of the investment that did arrive was portfolio investment, and the small amounts of FDI went 
mainly into mergers and acquisitions of existing businesses rather than new ventures. The reticence 
of foreign investors is understandable given the low investment by South Africans themselves, with 
some analysts suggesting that the post-apartheid period saw a net capital outflow. 
The ANC government, in keeping with its populist oratory, did attempt to reform the multilateral in-
stitutions that govern, to some extent, the world economy. These efforts bore little fruit, and the ANC 
was roundly criticised at home for pandering to international capitalists. Similarly, the flighty rhetoric 
of the African Renaissance and the ambitious New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development 
had little by way of concrete achievement to show for themselves. 
18
"Since 1990 the country has moved from an inward-looking import substitution model toward an outward-looking 
export-led growth model" (Kahn and Blankley, 2006:275). 
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Chapter 6 
Analysing the ANC's policies on nationalism 
in South. Africa 
This chapter integrates the previous three chapters, which covered respectively the theory on the 
network society, identity and nationalism proposed by Manuel Castells in The Information Age, the 
A~rican National Congress' policies on fostering South African nationalism and the manner in which 
"'.~. 
ANC-in-govemment economic policy has integrated South Africa into the world economy. The chap-
ter aims to illuminate the prospects for the ANC's putative South African nationalism using Castells' 
theory, The exposition is laid out in two broad sections. Firstly, the consequences of the reversal of 
South Africa's economic isolation are considered. Secondly, Castells' interpretations of identity and 
nationalism are applied to the context of democratic South Africa and the implications for nation-
bui,lding elucidated. In principle, then, the chapter aims to form a prognosis for the ANC's intended 
South African nation using Castells' theoretical configurations (obviously there are other theories that 
could be used for such an analysis). 
Two topics are tackled in order to prepare the ground for the theoretical discussion described above. 
First, the current state of South African national feeling is briefly examined. Second, the degree to 
which contemporary South Africa resembles Castells' network society pattern is investigated. The 
following section deals with the first of these topics. 
6.1 Assessing the ANC government's success in fosteirll!rng a ''broader 
South Afirkmnism" 
This section evaluates the success of the ANC government's policies in instilling a "broader sense of 
South Africanness" amongst South Africa's 44-odd million1 citizens. 
1 This estimate of South Africa's population is quoted in Butler, 2004:30. 
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6.1.1 An increasing sense of being South African 
Post-apartheid South Africa has been presented with a number of narratives supporting the idea of 
a new nation: Desmond Tutu's "Rainbow Nation'', Nelson Mandela's "miracle" (1999) and "New 
Patriotism" (Chidester et al., 2003b:308) and Thabo Mbeki's "African Renaissance". The country 
has also seen several much-commented on symbolic2 attempts at creating "a new sense of unity", in-
cluding the acclaimed Constitution, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, then-President Nelson 
Mandela's donning of the Springbok rugby jersey in 1995, and the successful bid to host the 2010 
World Cup (Koelble, 2003: 162). As outlined in Chapter 4, ANC government policy has promoted the 
ideal of a united South African nation. 
The ANC (2005d) has itself stated that, while it would be a "wild claim" to "proclaim that the new, 
and long sought after, South African nation has emerged", "progress has been made towards non-
racialism, non-sexism and a common patriotism and nationhood"; the A Nation in the Making dis-
cussion document observed that "there is an improving sense of an overarching identity" (PCAS, 
2006:94); and President Mbeki (2003c) has noted that "our people are developing a strong sense of 
a common patriotism." Chidester et al. (2003b:295) conclude that "government policy has largely 
suc,ceeded in fostering a sense of being 'proudly South African"' - "South Africans are increasingly 
identifying with a broade.r .South African identity"; the authors point to research by the Human Sci-
. . . 
ences R,esearch Council (Roefs, 2002) which shows that, between 1998 and 2000, "a substantial, and 
growing, proportion of people 'strongly identified themselves' as South Africans." Roefs (2006:93) 
found that a "strong national identity is prevalent in South Africa." Alexander (2002:41) suggests a 
more nuanced view, with t.he "socio-economic integration of the black and white middle-class elites" 
producing a "superficially united, non-racial political class", an outcome he attributes to "economic 
necessity" and "massive propaganda." 
6.:L2 Yet tlhle SoUttlhl Afrkallll idlelllltity ll"emains "tlhlllllll" 
Despite the rise in the number of people identifying themselves as South African, the prevailing 
sense is that South Africanism lacks substance3 - the actual content of this identity is "superficial, 
perhaps even meaningless" (Chidester et al., 2003b:316), "very thin" (Chidester et al., 2003a: 17), 
and "no more than ornamental" (Alexander, 2002:82). The new, non-ethnic national identity, more a 
"matter of hope rather than accomplished fact" (O'Meara, 1997), has yet to "incorporate the cultural, 
linguistic, religious and other human resources of South African people" (Chidester et al., 2003a: 17). 
The "notion of a South African nation is tenuous at best" (Mare, 2005:502). 
As Alexander (2002:81) points out, "the people of South Africa do not constitute or participate in 
'one culture', however defined." The "illusion of coherence and unity ... dissipates at the first touch 
2Chidester et al. (2003b:307) strike a more cautious note: "However, as South African history has demonstrated, such 
symbols of nationalism [as national flags, anthems and sports teams] do not actually make a nation" while Mare (2003:36) 
describes such efforts as "shallow and symbolic." 
3Klandermans et al. (200la:l08) suggest that the ANC's attempt to forge a common identity has not been very suc-
cessful - "In the first years of democratic government in South Africa social identity seems to have diversified" (emphasis 
added). 
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of the bitter reality of racial, class and caste divisions" (Alexander, 2002: 107). "South Africans are 
not at the point where they can say with any degree of confidence that the there [sic] is substantive 
agreement amongst themselves about questions of language, culture and race" (Soudien, 2000:42). 
The strength of national identity amongst South Africans varies by race, with Africans displaying the 
strongest national identity and whites the weakest (Roefs, 2006:81). National identity is also "some-
what stronger amongst poorer Africans and coloured people than amongst the other class groups" 
(Roefs, 2006:82). The strength of identification with South Africa also varies by province, with West-
ern Cape residents most likely to display "sub-group affiliation, as opposed to national identity" and 
least likely to be "enthusiastic about being citizens of South Africa" (Grossberg et al., 2006:64). 
Grossberg et al. (2006:61), in analysing data from the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey, 
discern the fragmented nature of "what truly constitutes being a South African", with citizens holding 
views that "varied in relation to place of birth, citizenship, country of residence, language, religion, 
respect for the law, feelings of belonging and ancestry." In other words, "being South African" has 
no consistent meaning for South Africans. Notably, while being born in South Africa was regarded 
as essential to being South African by 92 percent of respondents, only 79 percent of respondents 
felt respect for the country's institutions and laws was an important element of being South African. 
Pr~ferences for cultural distinctiveness also varied strongly by province, with only 28 percent of 
Western Cape respondents agreeing that it would be better if "race/ethnic groups maintain distinct 
customs", in comparison to 71 percent of Free State and 65 percent of KwaZulu-Natal respondents 
(Grossberg et al., 2006:65). 
6.i.3 Citnzel!lls have mulltiplle llayeirs of idlel!lltity 
The ANC (1997b; 1997c; 1997d; 2005d) is unequivocal in its assertion that the supposed South 
African national identity should be the dominant one for citizens. The 2003 South African Social 
Attitudes Survey results reveal that whereas 64 percent of respondents were strongly attached to their 
city/town of birth, 62 percent were strongly attached to South Africa (Grossberg et al., 2006:62-63). 
In their analysis of identity in South Africa, Chidester et al. identify two important factors opposed 
to the ANC's programme4 , both of which suggest that national identity, while a convenient politi-
cal instrument for the ANC, might not be particularly important to the ordinary population. First, 
the increasing significance since 1989 of "new forms of 'post-national citizenship"' has "dissolved 
any necessary link between the rights of citizenship and loyalty to the nation-state" (Chidester et al., 
2003b:298), an idea captured by Nira Yuval-Davis in the phrase "multi-layered citizen" (Yuval-Davis 
(1999), cited in Chidester et al., 2003b:299-300). Second, in a conception echoing Castells' (1997:6) 
formulation of identity as a "process of construction of meaning", Chidester et al. (2003b:310) pro-
pose that 
40'Meara notes drily that "the history of the last two hundred years, even in South Africa, is littered with the failure 
of such [nationalist] projects to ignite any mass enthusiasm. The mere appearance of nationalist interpreters and their 
nationalist discourse does not nationalism make. Simply preaching at people is a notoriously inefficient way of getting 
them to change their behaviour, let alone their identity" (O'Meara, 1997). 
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"Identity, in other words, may be based on what matters most to people, founded on the 
matrix of cultural and creative occasions and performances that give meaning to individu-
als' lives. Political, ethnic, or national identities may not carry the same weight for many 
as their religious, sporting, cultural or even historical lives" (emphasis added). 
This point is borne out by data from the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey - when asked 
for the most important factor in their self-identification, nationality was the fifth-most popular choice 
for respondents of all races, ranking behind family or marital status, race or ethnic background, oc-
cupation and gender; nationality was the prime determinant of identity for only eight percent of those 
surveyed (Grossberg et al., 2006:66). The choice of primary factor of self-identification varies by 
racial group, with race being the most common selection for Africans and family being most common 
for whites and coloured people, while Indians and Asians identified most strongly with their occupa-
tion; a large percentage of coloured people identified themselves most strongly by their race/ethnicity 
and a large percentage of Africans identified themselves most strongly with their family (Grossberg 
et al., 2006:68). Roefs' (2006:83) analysis of the South African Social Attitudes Survey confirms this 
- "Race group identity was strongest amongst black Africans." Roefs (2006:85-87) further analysed 
th~. survey data to show that strong racial identities were correlated with strong national identities for 
coloured and African respondents but not for white and Indian/Asian respondents; over two-thirds 
of South Africans combined a strong language identity with a Strong national identity, with isiX-
hosa speakers being most likely and English speakers being least likely to have strong language and 
national identities (English speakers tend by far to be least likely to have a strong South African 
identity). 
Bornman (2006:398) observes that "certain groups in South Africa - and Afrikaans-speaking Whites, 
Indians and Shangaan/Tsonga- speaking African Blacks in particular - have a strong sense of their 
uniqueness and distinctiveness as a group." 
The subtleties inherent in the concept of identity are brought out in several discussions of the mani-
fold strands of identity in South Africa. Polzer (2004) shows how Shangaan-speaking refugees from 
Mozambique, who arrived in what was then the homeland of Gazankulu and is now the Bushbuckridge 
area of South Africa in the mid- l 980s, were able to assimilate themselves into the local Shangaan-
speaking population but were denied permission to settle by the Sotho homeland of Lebowa on ac-
count of their being Shangaan. The refugee's ability to assimilate into the local population was pre-
cisely because of their shared Shangaan language and culture, despite their different citizenship, i.e. 
not being South African (Polzer, 2004:5). 
Wilhelm (2006) describes how the Chinese "communities" in South Africa have different relation-
ships to the country depending on when they emigrated. The original wave of Chinese emigrants 
to South Africa arrived in the late nineteenth century, followed by Taiwanese in the late 1970s and 
1980s (many of the Taiwanese have subsequently left South Africa - Wilhelm (2006:365) suggests 
that "their South African citizenship was more about expedience than commitment"). Substantial 
numbers of their second- and third-generation descendants have themselves emigrated, so that "there 
are now Chinese South African communities in the US, Canada, Australia and, more recently, New 
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I Race (self-attribution) I % of population I 
African 76.7 
White 10.9 
Coloured 8.9 
Indian/ Asian 2.6 
Table 6.1: South Africa's population by race, 1996 
(Source: Butler, 2004:29) 
Zealand" (Wilhelm, 2006:351). When these Chinese South Africans "encounter other Chinese they 
feel less Chinese and more South African" (Wilhelm, 2006:354). Post-apartheid immigration from 
mainland China has led to tensions between the older Chinese communities in South Africa and the 
newcomers - the "new immigrants from the People's Republic of China have brought these issues of 
identity to the fore, with a marked schism between the two groups" (Wilhelm, 2006:354-355). 
6.:Il..41 Divisio1111 temlli1111g towairdls cilass lli1111es, aRtilnoungiln iradall dlivisio1111s ]persist 
As Anthony Butler (2004:30) points out, the Rainbow Nation metaphor "inadvertently highlights the 
degree to which the constituent colours of South Africa's rainbow have retained much of the 'apart-
ness' they acquired during the segregationist and apartheid eras." For Koelble (2003: 163), the "gulf 
between 'black' and 'white' in South Africa still appears to be cataclysmic." For example, Gauteng 
province still largely displays the residential segregation by race that characterised apartheid (Butler, 
2004:39). The AN C's (2005d) own assessment is that "Economic apartheid is well and alive." Moleke 
(2006:220) concludes that "the labour market is far from being deracialised." Roberts (2005:486-496) 
remarks that "Living standards have been shown to be closely associated with race, with poor Africans 
accounting for the overwhelming majority of the poor." Altman (2005:426) presents figures demon-
strating that unemployment is concentrated among African workers. 
While race remains highly correlated with socio-economic variables, the growing number of African 
citizens attaining middle-class status has seen democratic South Africa riven more and more by class 
rather than by racial divisions (Roberts, 2005:494-495; Erasmus, 2005: 11; Rumney, 2005:403; Gross-
berg et al., 2006:72; Alexander, 2002:67-72). As Habib et al. (2003 :20) put it, the "apex of the class 
structure" has been deracialised. 
6.1.5 E1111glisiln becomi1111g tilne 1111atio1111all Ra1111gunage 
South Africa has eleven official languages, with the most widely-spoken, isiZulu, serving as primary 
language for slightly more than twenty percent of the population (see Table 6.2). Despite being only 
the fifth-most widely-spoken primary language, English is assuming the role of the "de facto national 
language for South Africa's middle classes"5 thanks to "its status as a 'global language"' (Butler, 
5In her study of the (mainly young) clientele of an upscale shopping center in the Johannesburg suburb of Rosebank, 
Nkuna (2006:265-266) observes that English is "the main language" heard at the shopping center - nearly eighty percent 
of the people interviewed preferred English for conversing with friends, despite it being the home language of less than 
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I Primary household language j % of population j 
IsiZulu 22.9 
lsiXhosa 17.9 
Afrikaans 14.4 
Sepedi 9.2 
English 8.6 
Setswana 8.2 
Sesotho 7.7 
Xitsongi 4.4 
SiSwati 2.5 
Tshivenda 2.2 
IsiNdebele 1.5 
Other 0.6 
Table 6.2: South Africa's population by household language, 1996 
(Source: Butler, 2004:29) 
2004:35). There is "a trend towards English as the real and aspirational language of commercial and 
political discourse" (PCAS, 2006:97). Alexander (2002:92) warns, however, that a "policy of de.facto 
unilingualism", where English is used as the "only language of power" serves to sabotage democracy 
in South Africa. 
6.1.6 Increasing bias towards Africanism and away from n.on-raciaHsm 
Despite the ANC's long history of support for the principle of non-racialism, Filatova (1997) argues 
that "Africanism ... has [by 1997) gained momentum more than ever before both inside and outside the 
ranks of the ANC and its allies." Butler (2004:32-33) discerns that, since 1999, "a quasi-Africanist 
conception of history and of politics has become increasingly prevalent6 in the movement's leader-
ship, and the doctrine of non-racialism has been somewhat eroded." Habib et al. (2003:3-5) discern a 
perception that Mbeki has abandoned Mandela's emphasis on reconciliation in favour of "empow-
erment and narrow African nationalism", although they moderate their assessment by grounding 
Mbeki 's rhetoric in the need to overcome the racial divisions established during apartheid, while 
Mangcu (2003: 108) ascribes a "more radical Africanist approach to national politics" to Mbeki's 
presidency. Erasmus (2005:25-27) highlights the ANC's "appeals to race as a resource for political 
gain" and for deflecting criticism. Frederik van Zyl ("In Need of a Road Map", Financial Mail, 14 
July 2006) identifies the contradiction between the ANC's rhetoric of non-racialism and the policy 
of black economic empowerment which makes Africans "blacks of a special kind"; Van Zyl Slab-
forty percent of the sample group. Nkuna also noted that over ten percent of the African people surveyed "indicated 
English as their home language" rather than an indigenous language. 
6Filatova (1997) offers an explanation of the political appeal of African ism by arguing that "Africanism is a much more 
powerful card to play than 'rainbowism"', offering "better political potential to the ANC than non-racialism, whether 
based on class solidarity or on 'rainbow', all-inclusive nationhood." Chidester et al. (2003b:3 l 3) quote Premesh Lalu 
(2002:2,4) as identifying a common phenomenon in post-colonial countries where "ethnicist outlooks ... have invariably 
resulted in distinguishing between indigenous and non-indigenous cultures"; "The creation of post-colonial states with a 
strong national cultural identity has often thwarted cultural diversity." 
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bert asks of the government, "do you want us to be a nonracial democracy or a racially classified 
democracy?" 
If we accept Koelble's (2003: 162) contention that the "multi-racialism of the ANC - and its eclectic 
anti-apartheid coalition built around universal principles of non-racialism and opposition to discrim-
ination of any kind - may provide the party with an opportunity to help build a new sense of trust, 
solidarity and identity if it is able to provide reasons for South Africa's citizens to embrace their 
shared historical experience and provide a new shape that allows for transcendence" then the tum 
away from non-racialism towards Africanism has troubling undertones for the prospects of national 
unity in South Africa. (Notably, the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey indicated that slightly 
more than one-third of respondents felt a strong African identity (Grossberg et al., 2006:62-63).) 
6.1.7 A biriune i«lleJ111tity aJ111d tlhe pollitks oft' diffeireJ111ce 
Despite acknowledgement of the existence of a vague "broader South Africanism", commentary on 
collective South African identity emphasises that this identity is fragile: while it has the potential 
to become stronger, this tentative identification with the nation-state can easily be shattered if South 
African politics emphasises division instead of unity - as Koelble (2003:144}points out, "the persis-
tence of huge inequities will continue the politics of acrimony based on race and difference." Van 
Zyl Slabbert ( 1997, quoted in Chidester et al., 2003b:295-6) reinforces this contention, cautioning 
"Anybody who under-estimates the potential for racial and ethnic outbidding in South Africa, can 
budget generously for disillusionment in the nation-building industry." Alexander (2002:88) warns 
that "the crucial task of the political leadership, and of other elements of the ruling elite, is to ensure 
by democratic means that no intersection of economic interests and ethnic consciousness takes place." 
Mamdani (1998), after remarking on the presence in post-apartheid South Africa of an "ethnic cit-
izenship" which claims for itself the exclusive privileges according to the "indigenous" inhabitants 
of the land (ANC rhetoric and policy is replete with distinctions between the indigenous and the 
non-indigenous, between the oppressed and the colonialists, between the African and the European), 
presents the cautionary example of newly-decolonised Uganda, a country in which there "developed 
a clear breach between the language of rights and that of justice. In native ears, rights-talks [sic] 
increasingly sounded like a defence of settler privilege, and justice a language to articulate native 
grievance", a situation which provided the political opportunity for the "demagogue" ldi Amin to 
exploit the "wave of popular discontent" to gain power. 
Chidester et al. call attention to the finding that "Diversity, in and of itself, can create violent di-
vision more easily than it can enable mutual recognition, understanding and tolerance." (Chidester 
et al., 2003b:314, citing Chrisman (1996)), an argument which Koelble (2003:147-148) makes less 
forcefully, noting that "there are several racial, cultural, religious, ethnic and organisational forms of 
solidarity at work in South African society. None of them, however, lend themselves to the nation-
building project that is required to be able to transcend identity-based communities as they re-enforce 
the politics of difference." 
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6.2 Democratic South Africa as a network society 
The first two volumes of The Information Age present a comprehensive body of theory about eco-
nomic and social aspects of the network society. The Rise of the Network Society and The Power of 
Identity were first published in 1996 and 1997 respectively, shortly after the ANC assumed political 
power in South Africa in 1994. This section examines the extent to which South Africa - 12 years into 
ANC rule - exhibits the characteristics of the "network society" archetype, bearing in mind Castells' 
point that each society expresses the pattern of the network society according to its own history and 
institutions and culture 7 . 
6.2.1 The irnse of the n.etwoirlk society wrnl:nnn. Smnth Afirftca 
6.2.:D..1 Gnobal economic links 
Section 5.1 shows that the ANC-in-government has deliberately increased the degree to which South 
Africa's economy is linked to the world economy, an approach codified in the GEAR policy, a policy 
which Habib and Schultz-Herzenberg (2005:185) interpret as indicating that South Africa's "privi-
leged strata" have "captured" the government. Section 5.2 demonstrates that the policy has indeed 
been effective8 - Southall (2006a: 198) summarises the results as 
"no longer contained and protected by state-imposed barriers, domestic conglomerates 
have increasingly 'unbundled' and internationalised; international and domestic finance 
capital is increasingly dominant over manufacturing; shareholding is concentrated in the 
hands of institutional investors, whose fates are determined by managers who are less 
and less accountable to shareholders and even the law; employee share ownership partic-
ipation schemes are presently fashionable, yet there seems little guarantee that workers' 
share ownership will prove sustainable; few women are smashing through the 'glass ceil-
ing' and corporations remain overwhelmingly male territory; and the gap between the 
financial rewards to top management and their workforces is widening alarmingly in a 
country where the patterns of inequality are already deeply entrenched." 
As Carmody (2002:266) puts it, "While South African companies pressed to be able to globalise their 
activities, they are now also being shaped by globalisation, through direct competition with other 
TNCs, and through competition for financial capital." 
Amalgamation with the world economy has seriously affected industries that compete with imports. 
These - "particularly the ultra-labour intensive industries" - have been "hard-hit" (Nattrass, 2003: 150). 
7Peter Alexander (2006:38) argues that, for South Africa, "national dynamics were probably more significant than in 
most other countries in the recent past"; specifically in regards to the "emergence of new identities", "there is evidence of 
strong local characteristics as well as powerful global influences." 
8Castells (2000a: 122) himself observes that the South African economy is experiencing "rapid reincorporation into 
the global economy after several decades of relative isolation." Buhlungu and Webster (2006:252) point to the role of 
government policy: "The state has facilitated many of these processes of corporate and market restructuring through 
liberalising trade and capital markets, fiscal conservatism and restructuring state enterprises through privatisation." 
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One estimate attributed the loss of 65,000 jobs in the textile industry alone to competition with cheap 
Chinese imports ("New Pattern Wanted", Financial Mail, 30 June 2006); Bond (2005: 199) suggests 
that hundreds of thousands of jobs have been lost due to cheap imports; Carmody (2002:256) cites 
figures showing that "since 1996 when neo-liberal economic reforms were introduced more than a 
half a million jobs have been lost, in contrast to the 600,000 that were meant to be created"; Makgetla 
(2004:264) notes that the official unemployment rate rose from 16% in 1995 to over 30% in 2002. 
South African employers pursued competitiveness "in response to globalisation" by increasing the 
capital intensity of their operations, so manufacturing employment failed to rise in step with exports 
(Altman, 2003: 174,175). Meanwhile, American and European protectionism halted the expansion of 
agricultural employment (Altman, 2003: 174). 
6.2.1.2 Flexible enterprises 
Transnational ]production networks Buhlungu and Webster (2006:249-251) note that South African 
economy has become incorporated into the transnational production networks Castells identities as 
characteristic of the network society: 
tb "the most significant challenge facing the workplace has been the transition from a domestically-
oriented economy to a more globally integrated one. This has led to wide-ranging forms 
of corporate restructuring effectively integrating companies into more globalised cor-
porate and production structures... Domestic corporate restructuring is also proceeding 
rapidly, often intertwined with processes of internationalisation or increased international 
?,,, pressure in the domestic market... Overall, these trends tend to reduce the autonomy of 
South African companies - and of the state - whether with respect to workplace strategies 
or to national developmental goals such as domestic capital accumulation, job creation or 
product innovation." 
Flexible contracts replace permanent employment Broadly, "the imperatives of an increasingly 
global system of accumulation are profoundly changing employment relations" (Webster, 2005:65). 
"Meanwhile, the restructuring of work results in the emergence of three zones in the 
labour market [in South Africa]. Firstly, there is the core, which is occupied by skilled 
permanent workers who enjoy relatively high wages, benefits, good working conditions 
and job security. Secondly, there is the non-core zone occupied by semi-skilled and non-
skilled workers in precarious jobs who earn low wages, enjoy no benefits, work under 
poor conditions and have little or no job security. Finally, there is the periphery, which is 
occupied by those in the informal sector and the unemployed" (Buhlungu and Webster, 
2006:251). 
Barrientos and Kritzinger (2003:92) examine the experience of the fruit industry in South Africa as 
"an important example of an export sector that has undergone rapid transformation as a result of 
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globalisation in the past decade." They find "a changing pattern of employment in the sector and the 
increasing use of different forms of flexible labour" - the changing employment pattern refers to the 
replacement of permanent employment with contract labour. They suggest that integration into the 
global economy exposed the fruit industry to "two contradictory pressures": first, increased risk and 
price competition, which forces employers to reduce labour costs by pursuing flexible work practices; 
second, the demand for quality and employment standards necessitates a "pool of relatively skilled 
and stable workers" (2003:92). 
6.2.1.3 Increasing polarisation of the labour force 
"Liberalization has polarized the labor market" (Webster, 2005:67). As Alexander (2002:96) puts it, 
"the imperatives of globalisation are driving the rulers of South Africa in all sectors of our society in a 
very specific direction, that is, towards becoming a deeply divided society in which, as in all countries 
today, the divisions are determined by class." One consequence of this is the tendency toward polar-
isation of the workforce - manufacturing, in particular, became increasingly capital-intensive during 
the 1990s (Nattrass, 2003:146) - between the (skilled) employed and the (unskilled) unemployed 
(Nattrass, 2003:147,152; Altman, 2003:164; Buhlungu and Webster, 2006:251). "Real average re-
muneration rose as employment fell during the 1990s" (Nattrass, 2003:147). According to Ashwin 
Desai (2003: 17), "Over the last decade, there has been an increase in 'nonstandard' (temporary, ca-
sual, contract, part-time) forms of employment that heralds the ubiquity of a relatively unstable and 
nonunionized workforce." 
6.2.:n..4 The space of fiows · 
Urban centres joined together through space of flows The importance of the major urban centres 
- the four metropolitan centres are Gauteng, Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth-Uitenhague -
in post-apartheid South Africa is evinced by their being the destination of some three-quarters of all 
internal migration, with Gauteng - receiving 42 percent of the total - the most popular destination for 
internal migrants (Kok et al., 2003:35-36). This pattern is consistent with Castells' thesis of the space 
of flows: the metropolitan centres act as the local nodes of the space of flows and consequently are 
the hubs for economic activity, becoming magnets for migrants seeking work. 
Johannesburg "stands out as Sub-Saharan Africa's best candidate for a 'global city"', whereas Cape 
Town shows signs of "secondary world city status" (van der Merwe, 2004:43). Both Cape Town and 
Johannesburg appear in the "world city network" identified by Taylor et al. (2002). 
The homogenising effects of the world-wide elite culture are also apparent - the government discus-
sion document A Nation in the Making (PCAS, 2006:45-46) expressed alarm that the "the black and 
particularly African middle strata [of youth] are being acculturated into Euro- or American-centric 
credos as the primary frames of reference" with respect to "education, language and accents as well 
as concepts of civilisation", acknowledging that the "cosmopolitanism that is reflected in the adoption 
and adaptation of United States and European music, dress and lifestyles" by young South Africans 
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"does pose a general question of the impact of cultural globalisation on national identity." Rosen-
berg (2002) documents the influences of American music and styles of dress on young black South 
Africans. 
6.2.2 The consequences of being a network society 
The previous section makes it clear that post-apartheid South Africa, no longer economically isolated 
from the rest of the world, progressively resembles the archetype of the network society as delineated 
by Castells. This section evaluates whether Castells' predictions of the social consequences of this 
shift towards the network society are borne out in contemporary South Africa. 
6.2.2.:n. Declining civil society 
As noted in Section 3.2.1, Castells announces the contraction of civil societies as their power is 
absorbed into the space of flows. Here, his concept of civil society and legitimising identity rests on 
the existence of a unified nation-state, an entity which civil society serves to perpetuate (by lending 
legitimacy) as well as modify. This situation manifestly did not apply to apartheid-era South Africa 
- black South Africans were in effect denied citizenship and the National Party government was 
in return denied legitimacy - civil society, in the sense intended by Castells, did not really exist 
for much of the population, since many of the institutions which constitute Castells' definition of 
civil society were devoted to overthrowing the state rather than prolonging it9 - "Under apartheid, 
the adversarial-collaborative divide largely took a racial form with the bulk of white civil society 
establishing collegiate relations with the state, and the majority of black civil society adopting a 
conflictual mode of engagement" (Habib, 2003:228). So this peculiarity of South Africa's history 
means that civil society, as Castells uses the term, only come into existence since the establishment of 
a government representing the interests of all South Africans rather than the white minority, a change 
that Gumede (2005:274) refers to as the "normalisation of South African politics." 
Nevertheless, the question of the vitality of civil society in the democratic South Africa remains. 
Despite the "prominent role of civil society organizations10 in the struggle for democracy" (Butler, 
2004:111), the overall impression is one of weakness 11 - civil society organisations are in a "dismal 
9Emphasising the - frequently ignored - significance of external forces, Koelble (2003: 151) writes 
"Much of the debate about the 'new' South Africa, its political dispensation, Constitution and electoral 
system, has been founded on the [fallacious] assumption that the transformation was achieved internally . 
... As a consequence of these arguments, there is a sense that South Africa represents an anomaly on the 
African continent, that this is actually a country with a vibrant and strong civil society." 
10The United Democratic Front comprised "trade unions, community groups, churches and civics", a "broad alliance" 
arrayed against racial oppression (Gumede, 2005:273-274). The UDF was established in 1983, becoming the leading 
"resistance movement in the absence of the banned political organisations" (Nthambeleni, 2006:298), and was absorbed 
into the ANC in 1991 (Gumede, 2005:273-274). 
11 In the analysis of Klandermans et al. (2001b:133), however, "Civil society in the new South Africa is vibrant and 
viable." They (2001b:134) find that the churches remain the civil society organisations with the most popular participation, 
while political parties have experienced the largest decline. 
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state" (Buhlungu, 2003:200) - the result of a decline beginning when civil society was excluded from 
the negotiations establishing the transitional regime (Mare, 2003:27). 
The interest of ordinary citizens in politics has declined since the 1994 elections, a development 
that is "not particularly surprising" since, for many people "the 'struggle' is over" (Daniel et al., 
2006:25). As Khosa (2005:131) notes, "participation levels in political life and activities appear to 
be very low." The political party which stands as the official opposition party to the ANC is the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) which garnered twelve percent of votes in the 2004 national elections, far 
behind the ANC's sixty-nine percent (Naidu, 2006:52) - the DA is "ineffective" (Southall and Daniel, 
2005:34). Southall and Daniel (2005:37-40) draw attention to the decline of voter participation in 
national elections - well under sixty percent of the estimated number of eligible voters cast ballots in 
the 2004 elections; the total number of votes cast fell from that of the 1999 election, itself a substantial 
drop from the 1994 count. 
The South African National Civics12 Organisation (Sanco) is in a state of "weakness" (Freund, 
2006:310), a "patient in intensive care" (Gumede, 2005:273) which has failed "in finding a mean-
ingful position in post-apartheid South Africa"13 (Nthambeleni, 2006:306). 
The National Ec,onomic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), a "quasi-corporatist bargain-
ing forum", has been largely ignored by the major business and labour groups (Butler, 2004: 111 ). 
Buhlungu (2003:200) concludes that the trade unions are "weakening politically and organisation-
ally"; he attributes the difficulties the unions have faced in post-apartheid South Africa to "the changed 
political circumstances in the country as well as ... the insertion of South Africa into the modem global 
economy." The SACP and Cosatu have also lamented their own inability, despite their status as part-
ners of the ANC in the Tripartite Alliance, to influence government policy14• 
"Non-sectional associations, proclaiming universal goals or declaring that they act on behalf of hu-
manity as a whole, are weaker than their sectional cousins" as donors have been "less indulgent" in 
recent years (Butler, 2004: 114). Gouws (2006: 163-164) observes "diminishing gender activism in the 
democratic era." The independence of formal NGOs has been compromised by financial dependence 
on business and the state (Habib, 2003:234). 
Political campaigning has recently been revitalised by the formation of "Networks of community-
based mass movements" - which fall outside of Castells' definition of civil society -as explored in the 
next section (Butler, 2004:114). Examining trends in participation in civil society, Khosa (2005:131) 
finds that participation in political parties, civics, street committees, and youth and church organisa-
12Civic associations (civics) are "autonomous voluntary organisations", each local to a specific community, that "ad-
dress the local grievances that residents have with their conditions of daily living, and are located outside formal gov-
ernmental, party-political or developmental agency institutions" (Nthambeleni, 2006:297). Civics emerged as a feature 
of (African) township life in South Africa in the 1970s, becoming closely involved in the "fight for national liberation" 
through participation in the UDF in the 1980s (Nthambeleni, 2006:297-298). 
13Nthambeleni (2006:306) specifically points out that the end of apartheid deprived the civics of a common "identity" 
uniting them, with the result that SANCO fragmented as civics began "actively embracing local identities." 
14Webster and Buhlungu (2004:243) comment that "it would be premature to announce the marginalisation of [organ-
ised] labour in post- apartheid South Africa." The introduction of South Africa into the global economy, together with the 
"pressure on unions to identify with the goals of national development, as defined by the new political elite" has forced 
the trade unions to launch a number of "revitalisation initiatives" (2004:230,243). 
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tions has declined since 1994, although trade unions and cultural associations remain robust. 
The ANC dominates the political sphere in South Africa (Butler, 2004: 107; Southall, 2003:75; Southall 
and Daniel, 2005:34). The ANC: is the ruling party in the national government; runs all nine provin-
cial governments (Southall and Daniel, 2005:54); "controls all major15 and almost all minor mu-
nicipalities" (Freund, 2006:310); and leads a Tripartite Alliance comprising the largest trade union 
grouping and the SACP. 
The ANC's conception of itself as fulfilling a historic "mission ... demands conflation of the move-
ment with the state" and "argues for the collapse of civil society into the state" 16 (Mare, 2003:43); 
Buur (2005:253) comments on "how the state and the ANC have tried both to undo and capture those 
forms of organisation that played an important role in the struggle against apartheid." In this context, 
the ineffectiveness of the organs of civil society can be attributed as much to the South African politi-
cal situation, in which the ANC17 , laying claim to the legitimacy deriving from its struggle heritage18 
(Southall and Daniel, 2005:34; Alexander, 2002: 163), dominates the political scene, as to the local 
playing-out of a world-wide pattern of the progressive atrophy of civil society as a result of their in-
creasing powerlessness. Nonetheless, Habib and Schultz-Herzenberg (2005: 169) note that the ANC's 
"policy concessions in the past decade _have been largely to foreign investors and domestic capital 
(both black and white) ... This is because it has been able to take the citizenry's vote for granted ... 
This lack of substantive uncertainty has eroded the citizenry's leverage vis-a-vis state elites."19 
6.2.2.2 Resistance formed around communal identities 
The theoretical thrust of The Power of Identity is that resistance to the ravages of globalisation in each 
society becomes organised around communal identities, including "territorial identities" (see Section 
3.2.4) and social movements (see Section 3.2.5). In South Africa, campaigning against apartheid 
created a highly politicised populace, as activists "created nationwide networks of cross-class and 
anti-ethnic political organization" (Butler, 2004: 106). Social activism in the apartheid period centred 
on achieving political equality for all races, with other social causes - for example gender equality and 
environmentalism - being largely deprecated in favour of the struggle against apartheid (Kraak, 1998; 
15The ANC lost control of Cape Town in 2006. 
16Klandermans et al. (200lb:l33) observe that 
"After decades of mobilisation against the state, 'black civil society' became the state. Thousands of 
officials left black civil society organisations in order to move into government. The liberation movement 
literally took office" (emphasis in original). 
17For Johnson (2002:221), 
"The restructuring of state-society relations has emerged as a primary goal of the ANC government led 
by Thabo Mbeki. .. Indeed, during the transition the traditional boundaries between government and civil 
society became blurred as large cohorts of civil society activists moved into government, and powerful 
constituencies of civil society, such as the trade unions and civic associations forged formal alliances with 
the ANC ahead of the 1994 elections." 
18 As Sipho Seepe (2006:2) puts it, "each year the ANC craftily invokes the memory of struggle." 
19Steven Friedman (2005:758) comments that "there seems little need for the governing African National Congress 
(ANC) to account to the electorate since it is in no danger of losing an election in the foreseeable future." 
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Gouws, 2006:143). With the formal demise of apartheid in 1994, activists have vigorously pursued 
the previously subordinated objectives (Kraak, 1998; Robins, 2003:268). 
Since assuming power in 1994, the ANC government's policies20 on water supply, housing, land 
allocation, electrification and HIV I AIDS treatment have evoked protest, at times ferocious, from 
"community-based" and "issue-based" movements, usually characterised as "new social movements" 
and increasingly organised in network formations (Butler, 2004: 114). Habib (2003:236-237) iden-
tifies a "proliferation of informal, survivalist community-based organisations, networks and associ-
ations" and "a category of organisations that have been described by some studies as social move-
ments", both of which have "emerged in response to globalisation's neoliberal manifestation in South 
Africa." Examples of these latter movements are the Coalition Against Water Privatisation, the 
Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, the Anti-Privatisation Forum, community-based resistance in 
Alexandra, the (Western Cape) Anti-Eviction Campaign, the Concerned Citizens' Forum (later the 
Durban Social Forum), the Landless Peoples' Movement, the National Land Committee, the Land 
Access Movement of South Africa, the Water Crisis Committee, the Social Movements Indaba, the 
National Rural Network and the Treatment Action Campaign (Butler, 2004:114; Freund, 2006:320-
322; Bond, 2004; Gumede, 2005:273-289; Desai, 2003; Ballard et al., 2005). 
Recent years have also seen spontaneous local revolts21 in, amongst other areas, Tembisa, Tsakane, 
Viljoenskroon, Vrede, Memel, Warden, Hennenman and Ventersburg (Freund, 2006:320-322). Inter-
national conferences, in particular the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, witnessed 
"spectacular" protests (Freund, 2006:322). 
Social movements "are becoming increasingly important as an alternative to political parties in the 
process of mediation between citizens and the state" (Klandermans et al., 2001b:134 ). 
6.2.2.3 ])edining state power 
For Alexander (2002: 162), "Castells' description of the situation in which the state finds itself at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century tallies with the reality of the new South Africa" with "hardly 
any exception." This section examines the situation more closely. 
Globalisation of criminal activity Wilhelm (2006:363-364) records the involvement of "Chinese 
triad societies" in prostitution, smuggling of abalone, rhino horn and other protected species), dia-
mond smuggling, drug trafficking, human smuggling, illegal gambling, extortion, vehicle theft and 
illegal imports. The senior government official charged with policing crime, Charles Nqakula, has 
20 As Robins (2003:252) notes, 
"[Township] residents who cannot afford to pay for electricity and water services, and who embark upon 
rent boycotts, once the defining feature of the anti-apartheid struggle, are nowadays hounded and evicted 
from their homes. Anti-evictions movements are growing as increasing numbers of urban poor people find 
themselves targeted for evictions. These urban activists, as well as those belonging to the Landless People's 
Movement, have been identified by the state as a threat to good governance" . 
21 These protests were also partly against the dismal administration of these municipalities (Freund, 2006:322). 
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stated that "Crime has been globalised ... South Africans go elsewhere to commit crime and foreign-
ers come here" ("Violent Nation", Financial Mail, 7 July 2006). 
Expanding economic links reduce policy autonomy The socio-economic policies of the ANC 
government - most notably GEAR - have been strongly influenced by the so-called Washington con-
sensus (Koelble, 2003:152). 
"the mechanisms of the international financial regime make it increasingly difficult for a 
nation-state to direct, let alone control, its resources towards addressing the problems of 
domestic justice and redistribution that are key to democratic consolidation and success. 
The abstract violence heaped upon the people of South Africa ... is an endemic feature 
of the neo-liberal economic strategy loosely described as the Washington Consensus" 
(Koelble, 2003: 143). 
Supra-nationall institutions absorb some sovereignty Alexander (2002:162-163) views President 
Mbeki's concept of the African Renaissance, given institutional form in NEPAD, as an attempt by the 
South African government "to gain a better place for itself in the global pecking order" by putting 
together "regional and sub-regional cartells" - the "Mbeki administration, because of the choices made 
at the beginning of the 1990s, is doing exactly as Castells' theory predicts." 
Marginalised identities claim power from state government Descendants of the Khoisan, the 
indigenous population of the Western Cape, have been granted First Nation status by the UN Work-
ing Group on Indigenous Populations, and have been demanding "national recognition within South 
Africa, but not in a separate homeland", a form of "cultural nationalism" (Chidester et al., 2003b:306). 
The granting of certain powers to traditional leaders in rural areas through the 2003 Traditional Lead-
ership and Governance Framework Act in 2003 and the 2004 Communal Land Rights Bill can be 
viewed as consonant with Castells' description of the manner in which territorially-bound, regional 
identities - in this case the traditional leadership - carve for themselves a portion of autonomy from 
the central state's sovereignty. In other words, it is an example of the state ceding decision-making 
power to local authorities in exchange for continued legitimacy. 
6.3 Evahnatnng the prospects for a South Afrncan natnonaR ndena 
tity: appBying Castells' theory 
The ANC has clearly spelled out its intention to forge a united nation in South Africa and intends to 
use its position in government to realise this aim (although it remains vague as to the precise substance 
of South African nationhood). This section applies the theory derived from Castells' The Information 
Age, as summarised in Chapter 3, to the ANC's nationalism project. In simple terms, this section asks 
what Castells' theory mean for the ANC's ability to promote nationalist sentiment in South Africa. 
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6.3.1 Integration into the world economy 
The adoption of Washington Consensus economic policies, with the consequent integration of South 
Africa into the world economy, is crucial in regard to the potential for state-sponsored nationalism 
in South Africa. The ANC could have, on assuming power, turned South Africa's back to the world, 
economically speaking, but the government opted instead to welcome the world economy with open 
arms, going so far as to establish an International Investment Council in President Mbeki's first term. 
That the pattern of Castells' network society pattern is discernible in South Africa - as traced in 
Section 6.2 - is a ramification of this economic policy stance. 
6.3.1.1 A capitalist world 
For Castells, the global economy was, following the collapse of statism, solidly capitalist by the end 
of the twentieth century, with even China "shifting from statism to state-led capitalism and integra-
tion in global economic networks" (Castells, 2000b: 13). The pervasiveness of capitalism means that 
governments wanting to obtain the economic benefits of participation in the global economy must do 
so by conforming to the prevailing norms, failing which their countries would simply be ignored as 
investment and trading destinations unless they had particularly sought-after commodities to offer. 
The economic result of the ANC government's decision to open South Africa to the global economy 
is neatly captured in Southall's (2006a: 198) assertion that "since 1994, South African capitalism has 
become more rather than less like the contemporary capitalism of the Western world." The economic 
policy of the ANC - a marked reversal from its support for nationalisation in particular - itself suggests 
that Castells' description of the limited scope for governments to set their own economic course is 
unerring. The support of the ANC for capitalist economics has been a major source of frustration for 
its partners in the Tripartite Alliance over the last decade, but Castells suggests that the ANC has no 
other option as long as it continues to pursue export-led growth. 
6.3.1.2 Economic polarisation 
Several features of the global economy affect the labour force in South Africa. First, the transition 
from industrialism to informationalism; second, the effect of the flexible employment practices in-
creasingly adopted by firms; third, the impact of trade on employment. All of these factors engender 
rising polarisation in the local workforce. 
The contemporary world economy is not only capitalist, it is also, in Castells' view, informationalist 
- productivity and competitiveness of firms depend on their ability to work with information, and 
information technology is "the critical ingredient of the process of work" (Castells, 2000b:259). This 
shift away from industrialism, in the context of capitalist restructuring, demands mainly educated, 
skilled workers and drastically reduces the demand for low-skilled workers, leading to the "bifurcation 
of work patterns and polarization of labour" (Castells, 2000b:266). 
80 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
The flexible employment practices increasingly embraced by companies, who retain a core labour 
force while expanding and reducing the size of their "disposable" labour force according to market 
conditions, further exaggerate polarisation in the labour force, since it is the low-skilled workers 
who are worst affected as permanent employment is least available in those kinds of jobs which are 
increasingly automated out of existence or subcontracted to cheaper locations. 
Castells (2000b:251-255) observes that workers feel the effects of international economic links chiefly 
through the effects of increased competition resulting from expanding trade and through the "interpen-
etration of networks of production and management", including multi-national corporations, across 
borders. 
These trends, in general, suggest a poor prognosis for South Africa's workforce. Unemployment is 
high, especially among Africans; the number of unemployed workers increased dramatically between 
1990 and 2002 as the unemployment rate doubled (2006:251). The labour force has strong racial 
divisions between skilled workers and semi-skilled or unskilled workers (Moleke, 2006:204), and 
Castells' analysis implies little hope of secure employment for those without skills22 . Africans still 
receive lower-quality education than white citizens (Chisholm, 2005:217; Reddy, 2006:399; Moleke, 
2006:216), with the majority of schools remaining exclusively African (Chisholm, 2005:217). 
The significance of the continued high levels of unemployment and low levels of job security lies in 
the social effects: the restructuring of the workplace displaces "confrontation, antagonism and disor-
der into the family, the household and the community", precipitating a "broader social crisis whose 
symptoms are the breakdown of social solidarity" (Buhlungu and Webster, 2006:265). Alexander 
(2002:88), Chidester et al. (2003b:295-6) and Koelble (2003:144) all warn of the potential for the 
politicians to exploit the racial dimensions of inequalities in wealth with extremely deleterious con-
sequences for national unity, as does Castells (2000a: 126) himself. 
6.3.:D...3 Circumscrin>tiorn of state power 
That state control is increasingly "bypassed" is an important element of Castells' (1997:243) thesis 
on the contemporary world (see Section 3.3). If we accept Castells' view, this loss of sovereignty 
naturally reduces the South African government's ability to achieve its policy goals23 . In economic 
terms, the government's priority is clearly removing racial inequality and eliminating poverty, an aim 
which stands in opposition to the economic restructuring occasioned by integration into the world 
economy (Ehrenreich, 2003:84; Koelble, 2003: 144, 148; Chidester et al., 2003b:297) - the demands 
of economic competitiveness and the narrow focus of potential investors on cost shrink government's 
leeway to provide social welfare (hence Castells' (1997:252-254) prediction of the demise of the 
European welfare state). 
22 Buhlungu and Webster (2006:253-254), in their longitudinal analysis of the membership of Cosatu since 1994, high-
light the "decline of the unskilled stratum and the growth of the semi-skilled and skilled strata" as companies retrenched 
unskilled workers, a trend which stands in agreement with Castells' analysis. 
23 Carmody (2002:261) argues that the ANC government's attempt to forge a "compromise between globalisation and 
social democracy ... is being undermined as the state is increasingly characterised by embedded or institutionalised depen-
dence on global forces.'' 
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The significance of the circumscription of state power is in its suggestion that government, if it holds 
with neo-liberal economic policies, will not be able to reduce rampant unemployment and poverty 
amongst South Africans, which means that the racial inequalities in wealth will persist24 , together 
with the opportunity for discord they offer. 
Referring to Castells' argument about the decline of state power, Zegeye (2004:868-869) suggests 
that 
"In any project aimed at building a new nation largely through changing the identity of 
its citizens, such as the one embarked upon in South Africa, such a loss of power can be 
potentially devastating as it impinges upon cultural and political institutions' capacity to 
initiate and lead the changes needed." 
6.3.1.4 Cultural effects of the space of flows 
South African elites are not immune to the "cosmopolitan" culture shared by elites worldwide (see 
Section 3.1.2.5), as a visit to the expensive shopping malls of Cape Town, Durban or Johannesburg 
will attest. The implication of the international culture - a cosmopolitan identity un-rooted in a specific 
society - is that South African members of the elite will tend to conform to the globally uniform elite 
culture rather than to the South Africanism espoused by the ANC, membership of this elite meaning 
cultural disconnection from a supposed shared South African culture25 . This obviously reduces the 
prospects for a cohesive, meaningful, South African identity being adopted by the local constituents 
of the cosmopolitan elite. The conclusion of Grossberg et al. (2006:62-63) that South Africans with 
"higher income, higher education and higher employment status" tended to feel less national pride 
than other other South Africans does not seem surprising since these are precisely the people who 
constitute the elite. 
24Habib and Schultz-Herzenberg (2005: 185) suggest that there is a "contradiction in [the South African government's] 
policy ensemble .. . while South Africa's trade, industrial, monetary and fiscal policy is what it is, it will work against the 
social expenditure side of the Budget... There is therefore a contradiction at the heart of South Africa's policy programme." 
25 Chidester et al. (2003b:312-313), citing Baeker (2000), point to the South African government's fear of South 
African cultural products being swamped by cultural imports, mainly from the USA and Europe - this fear is manifest 
in, for example, the Presidency's report on A Nation in the Making (PCAS, 2006:45). Nkuna (2006:267-270), surveying 
the youthful shoppers at an expensive Rosebank mall, described their preference for international clothing brands and 
US music. Joel Netshitenzhe (2001 :79) acknowledges that the "extra-national centripetal tendencies of globalisation" 
encourage South Africans to identify with a global culture. 
While none of the authors in Senses of Culture: South African Culture Studies (Nuttall and Michael, 2000) are directly 
concerned with global influences on South African popular culture, several of the essays touch on the issue obliquely, 
illustrating some of the ways in which South Africans absorb and use international popular culture artefacts and concepts: 
writing on "hair politics", Zimitri Erasmus (2000:391) observes that South Africans attitude to "African" hairstyles "can be 
understood as a process signifying a re-making and revalorization of Africanness through the borrowing and localization of 
Afrocentric black American images and ideas .. . These transnational cultural borrowings and recreations suggest local uses 
of and for the global"; the uniquely South African genre of "contemporary black dance-music", kwaito, "is an evolution 
of ... South African disco [music], with elements of American hip-hop, European house music, and other international 
sounds thrown in" (Stephens, 2000:256); Sandra Klopper (2000: 180-181) notes that Western Cape graffiti artists drew 
inspiration from "American hip-hop culture" - noting that seeking to "express opposition to the apartheid government by 
turning to America for inspiration" is hardly a new development, she gives the example of "1950s Sophiatown, where 
'cosmopolitan' aesthetic forms were used to focus and articulate local expressions of resistance." 
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The effect of this tendency is made worse by the significant rural population of South Africa and 
the racial differences in proportion of urban population - in 1996, the proportion of the coloured 
population living in urban rather than rural areas was around eighty percent, with the proportion of 
whites and Indians/Asians significantly higher (almost all Indians and Asians lived in urban areas), 
while the proportion of Africans living in urban areas was approximately forty percent, itself less 
than the proportion for the population as a whole at around fifty percent (Kok et al., 2003:34) and a 
continuation of the situation under apartheid (Mare, 2003:30). In other words, the rural population is 
mainly African while the cities and towns have mixed populations, so an increasing cultural distance26 
between urban areas and rural areas - bearing in mind also Castells concept of urban areas linked into 
the space of flows being disconnected from their surrounding regions - is liable to stoke rather than 
damp racial tensions, or at least be susceptible to exploitation for such political purposes. 
6.3.2 Reactiollll agaillllst illlltegiratllollll nllllto Une wodd ecollllomy 
Castells claims that the common factor among the various forms of resistance against the effects of 
economic and cultural globalisation is that they are all formed around shared identity. Two forms of 
these resistance identities are especially worthy of comment in relation to contemporary South Africa. 
6.3.2.1 Cultural nationalism 
Cultural - rather than primarily political - assertions of national identity (see Section 3.2.3) seem, 
at first glance, to have no relevance in South Africa, a country which Castells considers to have no 
nations. However, the cultural material exists for potential attempts at the mobilisation of ethnic 
groups as nations. Some attempts have already been made, although the two strongest candidates, the 
Afrikaner nationalism of those seeking a Volksstaat and the Inkatha Freedom Party's Zulu nationalism 
have failed to ignite mass support (Chidester et al., 2003b:296,305-306; Gouws, 2003:53; Southall 
and Daniel, 2005:51-54; Alexander, 2002:155,161; Butler, 2004:112; Naidu, 2006:50; Piper, 2002). 
6.3.2.2 New social movements 
The proliferation of new social movements in post-apartheid South Africa has been frequently re-
marked upon (see Section 6.2.2.2). In Castells' view, these movements are each configured around 
a specific identity - Soweto resident, HIV/AIDS patient or landless South African for example. Yet, 
as Castells points out, these identity-based movements have sharply defined boundaries, their divi-
siveness implying that they are not suitable material for a South African national identity. Indeed, 
the more these identities become meaningful to South African citizens, the less adherents of these 
movements are likely to be susceptible to the ANC's invocations of national unity27 . 
26Zegeye (2004:868-870) notes the "cultural deprivation" among the black youth of Mamelodi township, which he 
attributes to the apartheid government's deliberate policy of providing poor education for Africans. 
27 Peter Alexander (2006:59) concludes that 
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6.3.3 Identity and nationalism 
The previous section has considered the impact of South Africa's entry into the world economy - as 
described by Castells - on the prospects for nation-building. This section contemplates the ANC's 
nationalism project in the light of Castells' schemas of identity and nationalism. 
6.3.3.1 Identity: legitimising and resistance 
Castells' views on what identity is are similar to those of the ANC: identity is a socially constructed 
phenomenon, made from cultural artefacts, and Castells allows the possibility of persons having mul-
tiple identities, with one being primary. However, Castells' distinction between categories of identity, 
specifically those of legitimising identity and resistance identity, bears a less-than-sunny forecast for 
South African nationalism. Legitimising identity, linked to the sovereignty of the nation-state within 
its territory, loses relevance as global networks usurp authority, with the dialectic consequence of a 
surge of localised resistance identities. The symbolic significance of the state is thus reduced. 
6.3.3.2 Nationalism 
Castells specifically disavows the necessity of any link between nationhood and citizenship ( 1997 :51 ): 
states can exist that contain no nations or several nations, with South Africa being a state without a 
nation. The most important ingredients for bonding a nation-in-the-making together are a common 
language and shared experience, neither of which assertions bodes well for a South African nation-
alism. South Africa has eleven official languages, not one of which is the primary language for even 
a quarter of her citizens (see Table 6.2) and ANC policy, in the name of cultural diversity, maintains 
state support for all eleven languages28 . The various cleavages of South African society - between 
wealthy and poor, urban and rural, white and black, educated and uneducated, modernised and tra-
ditional - ensure that, at present, all South Africans cannot be said to share anything like the same 
experience. Castells (2000a: 111) notes the "lack of a national basis for these new [post-colonial] 
African nation-states, a basis that in other latitudes was usually made up of shared geography, history 
and culture", an observation surely applicable to South Africa. 
Despite the growing clamour of Africanism within the ANC, Castells proposes that race - i.e. African-
ness in the case of South Africa - is not a viable binding agent for fabricating a collective identity29 . 
"The likely trend, however, is probably towards a weakening and fracturing of South African national 
identity. This is a consequence of both axes of globalisation: the vertical dimension increasing inequal-
ities and reducing common experience, and the horizontal dimension expanding opportunities for shared 
understanding with people in other countries." 
28 Neville Alexander (Alexander, 2002:82) suggests that the future of the various languages of South Africa, in particular 
Afrikaans, is potentially seriously divisive, "the most explosive issue on the terrain of South African politics", an opening 
for the creation of ethnic separation that could shatter the fragile country. 
29Sparks (2003:45) quotes a Soweto resident as complaining that 
"Our best and brightest [Africans] are all running away from Soweto. The very people who are leaving are 
the people with the money and the know-how that Soweto needs. They are cowards driving their BMWs 
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Castells writes that nations are given life through "cultural constructs and political projects", which, 
on a superficial reading, is favourable towards the ANC's state-driven nationalism project. Yet, na-
tionalism is constructed with participation by both elites and masses - without the involvement of 
the latter, the identity will fail to take hold. A government cannot form a nation by proclamation, as 
Castells' example of the USSR evinces. Castells' argument that the state cannot "construct national 
identity by itself" has "the most portentous implications for the promotion of national unity in post-
apartheid South Africa. If it is correct, it may well leave us stranded with a rainbow in our eyes but 
without the pot of gold in the form of the (non-racial) 'nation"' (Alexander, 2002:90-91). 
6.4 Crnrncll1U1snol!1l 
While the emergence of a South African national identity is occasionally proclaimed, a more nuanced 
view takes several qualifications into account. First, social and economic integration between racial 
groups applies only to the wealthy and middle-classes and not to the poor. Second, this South African 
identity is incoherent and lacks substance - it is an "illusion" in Neville Alexander's words. Third, 
the importance and meaning of South African national identity varies according to race. Fourth, 
citizens have a host of identities, with national identity being by no means the most important source 
of meaning. Fifth, as racial divisions become less firm, class divisions are becoming increasingly 
significant. 
Other noteworthy aspects of contemporary South African society are the position of English as the 
de facto national language (the most widely-spoken primary language, isiZulu, is spoken as home 
language by less than twenty-five percent of South Africans), the rising volume of the rhetoric of 
Africanism and the according weakening of support for non-racialism, and the continued strong po-
tential for the exploitation of racial and ethnic disparities for political ends. 
Under the ANC government, South Africa has joined the global economy and, consequently, the 
characteristics of Castells' network society archetype are now discernible in South Africa. Global 
economic links have affected many industries; local companies have adapted to intense foreign com-
petition by adopting flexible employment practices, South African firms have become drawn into 
transnational production networks, and the labour force is becoming polarised by division between 
the skilled and the (increasingly unemployed) unskilled. Civil society has declined in importance, in 
accordance with Castells prognosis for legitimising identity. The post-apartheid years have seen the 
proliferation of resistance against the effects of integration into the world economic system by social 
movements, formed around specific identities. The ANC has found its autonomy in government to be 
somewhat limited by global forces, given that the policy aims are set by the local elite. In short, the 
experience of democratic South Africa since 1994 bears out Castells' theory on the network society 
and identity. 
Taken as a means of predicting the future, Castells' theory make for, in general, pessimistic predic-
home to the suburbs while the people suffer." 
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tions for the ANC's project of fashioning a South African nationalism (unclear as the contours of that 
nationalism may be). According to Castells' theoretical framework, South Africa's integration into 
the world economy has decisive implications. First, the country has no choice but to remain a capi-
talist country as long as it is linked into the global economy. Second, economic polarisation will tend 
to increase, suggesting that large-scale unemployment and associated poverty - both social maladies 
concentrated amongst Africans who lack skills as a consequence of apartheid-era education policies 
- will persist. Third, the government will have limited capacity to ameliorate these social ills. Fourth, 
the (multi-racial) elite will be absorbed into the unified, cosmopolitan culture of the space of flows; 
this elite will be mainly urban, culturally disconnected from the rural population. Fifth, identity-
based social movements will be the principal form of resistance against the effects of integration with 
the global economy; these resistance identities tend to undermine the ANC's aim of making a South 
African identity the primary identity for South Africans. 
Castells' theory on identity and nationalism hold little good news for the ANC's desire to shape 
a "broader South Africanism." The reduction in state authority means that the state is simply less 
relevant as a source of meaning - legitimising identity is on the wane, and resistance identities are the 
main precipitators of collective solidarity. Further, citizenship is not to be equated with nationality, 
which is precisely the equation the ANC is attempting. Castells specifically emphasises the necessity 
of a shared language for national cohesion, a condition which is not present in present-day South 
Africa, which has eleven official languages. Castells' second necessary binding ingredient, shared 
experience, is also not obtained in South Africa, a country in which a variety of social cleavages 
are discernible. Castells also undermines the Africanists' position - race is not a viable element for 
constructing national identity. 
In sum, then, the implications of South Africa's incorporation into the world economy - namely, the 
imprint of the network society pattern on the country - tend to subvert the ANC government's stated 
aims of cultivating a strongly-felt South African national identity, and Castells' conceptualisations of 
identity and nationalism also suggest that, considered theoretically, attempts by the state to promote 
a united South African identity are unlikely to succeed under contemporary conditions. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
The intention of this thesis has been to use the theory of Manuel Castells' The Information Age to 
examine the tensions between the ANC's programme of promoting a South African nationalism and 
the social consequences of the ANC government's policy of closely integrating South Africa into the 
global economy. 
The rriain thrusts of the arguments presented in this thesis are fourfold. First, the ANC is rhetori-
cally committed to building a "united; non-racial, non-sexist and democratic" South African nation, 
although the rhetoric is rather vague - beyond generalities, the rhetoric has not found sufficient ap-
plication in policy for the precise intention of the ANC to be discerned. The ANC's stance in regard 
to South African nationalism, which resembles more a syncretistic amalgam than a coherent con-
ceptualisation, bears the imprints of the variety of ideas which have enjoyed influence in the ANC's 
near-century-long history, in particular African nationalism (albeit an African nationalism that is gen-
erally not racially defined, although the elimination of race (i.e. indigeneity) as a criterion leaves 
the definition of "Africanness" itself unclear), non-racialism, and the notions of the National Demo-
cratic Revolution and Colonialism of a Special Type, imported from the South African Communist 
Party. The stated ambition of the ANC is for the South African population to embrace a shared, South 
African identity as a primary source of meaning. While there was evidence of a widespread feeling of 
South Africanness, this is superficial and not itself uniform, with South African society still evincing 
divisions along racial and (increasingly) class lines. 
Second, the ANC's economic policy since assuming office has unequivocally directed South Africa at 
reversing apartheid South Africa's sanctions-imposed economic isolation from the rest of the world 
by pursuing full integration with the global economy, a policy most clearly expressed in GEAR, with 
its emphasis on growth through exports and concessions aimed at attracting foreign capital to finance 
employment-generating economic activity. This policy was shown to be highly effective - at least in 
terms of increasing international economic links if not growth or employment - as discerned in the 
rise in trade and (disappointingly, largely portfolio investment) capital flows since 1994. 
Third, the effects of this coupling of South Africa to the world economy on South African society 
were to push South Africa towards exemplifying the pattern of the network society, as described by 
Castells. The trend towards South Africa assuming the form of the network society can be most 
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clearly discerned in developments in the economy and employment - especially in those industries 
facing foreign competition - and in the rise of social movements as a means of political mobilisation; 
the trajectory of civil society is less clear, with the decline of traditional civil society as predicted by 
Castells attributable also to particular South African factors, especially the social distortions imposed 
by apartheid and the dominance of the ANC as a political institution. The much-bewailed about-tum 
of the ANC with respect to economic policy, manifested by the supercession of the RDP by GEAR, 
can itself be taken as confirming Castells' claims of limited government autonomy. 
Fourth and finally, the consequences of South Africa increasingly conforming to the archetype of 
the network society tend to undermine the ANC government's nation-building programme, according 
to Castells' formulation at least. The exposure of South African firms to international competition 
polarises the labour force between the skilled and the unskilled, leading to rising under- and unem-
ployment and thereby increasing poverty, especially amongst black Africans, who were deliberately 
denied the quality of education provided to white South Africans under apartheid; the state, acting 
more on behalf of capital than its own citizens, is unable to assist the impoverished and simultane-
ously satisfy the demands of capital for fiscal restraint. The better-off citizens have the opportunity 
to participate in the cosmopolitan, worldwide culture of Castells' space of flows, which reduces the 
importance of being specifically South African for the "elite." Those who are left behind by - dis-
connected from - the networks of money and culture fight back, but this resistance again reduces 
the importance of South Africanness in favour of other, more particular and more sharply defined 
identities. In general terms, Castells' conceptualisation of identity predicts the decline of symbolic 
significance of the state for its citizens, while his presentation of nationalism emphasises the neces-
sity of a common language and shared experience for national unity, neither of which condition is 
manifest in present-day South Africa with its eleven official languages and stark divisions between 
race, class and urban/rural areas. 
In sum, then, application of Castells' ideas indicates that, provided the ANC government remains 
committed to maintaining South Africa's economic ties with the rest of the world, the government is 
unlikely to make much progress in establishing a meaningful and widely-held "broader South African-
ism." The importance of this putative inability, however, is itself unclear - a South African national 
identity may not be necessary, and the general trend across the developed world - as argued by Bau-
man and Vinen - is for the decline of state identity as significant. The crucial factor for South Africa's 
political stability and cohesion, however, is whether ethnic identities will be exploited for political 
purposes - it is in this possibility, repeatedly played out in post-colonial Africa, that the danger of 
violent fragmentation lies. 
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Appendix A 
The ANC, the tripartite alliance, the National 
Democratic Revolution andl Colonialism of a 
Special Type 
Aal The African Nationall Congress 
A.:Il.J. SmntB:n African Native Natftomnll Congress estabRisB:ned to end .traciall cllis-
crimi1rnation 
The South African Native National Congress was founded at Bloemfontein in January of 1912, with 
the founding leaders being "more moderate and conservative" (Gumede, 2005:1-2). The Congress' 
constitution mandated a "Pan African Association" 1, with the organisation aiming to unite2 the vari-
ous African tribal groups to form a single political front aimed at "the removal of racial discrimina-
tion" (Gumede, 2005:1-2). 
A.1.2 Afll"kanism sllowlly becomes 1rnon-racialism 
The 1940 national conference of the ANC "marked an important ideological turning point", as the 
organisation "resolved to formulate a comprehensive race relations policy", eschewing racial discrim-
ination and - taking the principle of equal opportunity to its logical conclusion - pursuing "African 
dominance in the political and economic life of South Africa"; the Congress also decided to extend 
its membership to the (black African) masses (Gumede, 2005:13). 
Chief Albert Luthuli, elected as president of the ANC in 1952, led the ANC into "embracing a much 
broader non-racist approach" (Gumede, 2005:20). The ANC adopted the Freedom Charter in 1956 
1 
"Beginning with the ANC in 1912, the creation of a national, rather than an ethnic or tribal consciousness, became a 
key rallying cry of virtually every liberation movement in Africa" (Slovo, 1988). 
2
"At its founding conference in 1912, the ANC issued a clarion call for African unity under the Slogan, We Are One 
People" (Slovo, 1988). 
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(Suttner, 2005), drawn up a year earlier by the Congress of the People at Kliptown. The Congress 
of the People included representatives from the ANC, South African Indian Congress, South African 
Congress of Trade Unions3, the South African Communist Party4 , the Coloured People's Organisa-
tion and the Congress of Democrats (Gumede, 2005:20; Sparks, 2003:171). The Freedom Charter 
advocated that the "rights of the people shall be the same, regardless of race5 , colour or sex", en-
dorsing the termination of racial discrimination in South African society (Congress of the People, 
1958). 
ANC membership "was officially opened to all races" at the 1969 conference at Morogoro, Tanzania 
(Gumede, 2005 :24) - "non-racialism was a relatively late development in the history of the ANC, and 
it only came into full bloom in the late 1970s and 1980s" (Mangcu, 2003: 110). 
A.1.3 A lhtistoiry o[ nclleollogkall tell'llSilollllS 
Ideological tension is exhibited throughout the ANC's history, a consequence of the movement being, 
in its own words, a "broad church", "home to a variety of progressive ideological currents nationalist 
[sic], Africanist, socialist and of a variety of different classes and strata, all united behind a com-
mon commitment to national democratic transformation" (ANC, 1997a) - thus "the Congress has an 
extended history of internal factionalism, detachment from mass political organization, and political 
conservatism" (Butler, 2004: 108). "The ANC had never been an ideologically homogeneous organi-
sation. From its inception in 1912 ... it has been an alliance of disparate elements drawn together for 
the common purpose of fighting racial oppression" (Sparks, 2003: 176). "Ideological diversity has also 
been marked, with many deeply religious activists co-operating with equally numerous communists 
and traditionalists" (Butler, 2004: 109). 
The left-leaning and the more conservative elements of the ANC have battled each other for control 
of the ANC since as early as the 1927 national conference, when the leftist wing won control, with 
Josiah T Gumede, a militant communist, elected as president general and Eddie J Khaile, a mem-
ber of the Communist Party of South Africa's6 Central Committee, elected as secretary general; the 
conservatives regained control in 1930 (Gumede, 2005:10). 
The 1949 conference saw another significant shift, with the radical Youth League7 and the leftist 
wing successfully opposing the conservatives - Walter Sisulu was elected as secretary general and 
3The South African Congress of Trade Unions, the forerunner of Cosatu, was the first non-racial trade union in South 
Africa (Gumede, 2005:20). 
4The SACP had been banned in 1950 (Sparks, 2003:171). 
5The Freedom Charter's guarantee of equal status for all racial groups led the Africanist wing of the ANC to split off 
in 1959, forming the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), after failing to wrest control of the ANC from the "leftist multiracial 
leadership" (Gumede, 2005:21-22; Sparks, 2003:353; Butler, 2004:108). 
6The then-banned Communist Party of South Africa "resuscitated itself" as the South African Communist Party in 
1953, although it only publicly announced its "underground" existence in the early 1960s (the African Communist - a 
"Forum for Marxist-Leninist Thought in Africa'', first published in 1959 - did not initially declare itself as the SACP 
organ it was) (SACP, 2006:9-10). 
7
"Pan-Africanism, as developed in South Africa, was therefore closely allied to the new radicalism within Congress 
which was highlighted by the emergence of the CYL in 1943-4" (Walshe, 1970:332). 
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Nelson Mandela joined the National Executive Committee (Gumede, 2005: 18). The ANC now sought 
majority rule in South Africa (Gumede, 2005: 18). 
During the years in which the ANC was in exile8, beginning in the early 1960s, the South African 
Communist Party exerted considerable influence within the ANC (Gumede, 2005:24). As Suttner 
(2005) puts it, "elements of ANC history, which are nowadays not spoken of in polite circles, indicate 
that during the period of exile, the 1950s, and inside the country in the 1980s, socialist doctrine 
enjoyed widespread support." "Communism was especially influential in the development of the 
ANC" (Butler, 2004: 109). Alexander (2002:48) demurs: 
"beyond rhetoric, it [the SACP] had very little real influence on the macro-economic con-
ceptions and philosophical orientation of the popular leadership of the ANC ... Although 
the ANC was, and is, a multi-class organisation, there is no doubt that for most of its 
existence as an organisation, its dominant, indeed hegemonic, ethos was represented by 
the interests of the upward-striving black middle class." 
ColloilllnaHRsm of a Special Type i ~ 
The theory of "Colonialism of a Special Type" is explained in the 1962 programme of t~e SACP, 
,.,; 
and was influenced by the "Native Republic" thesis of 1928 (Filatova, 1997:49; Alexander, 2002:37; 
SACP, 2006). The central claim of the theory of Colonialism of a Special Type, disting9ishing it 
. /I; 
from ordinary colonialism, is that "both the colonisers and the colonised shared one countryf9 (ANC, 
1997b,d). ~ 
The theory of Colonialism of a Special Type originated within the South African Communist Party 
but was adopted by the ANC at the Morogoro conference in 1969 (Filatova, 1997:49). 
While Alexander (2002:38) suggests that the theory has been consigned to the "dust heap of South 
African history", the concept still surfaces in ANC policy documents, including the Strategy and 
Tactics adopted in 1997 and validated in 2002. 
Ao3 The Nationall Democratic Revolution 
The concept of the "National Democratic Revolution" is predicated on the thesis of Colonialism of a 
Special Type (Filatova, 1997:49). The basic principle of the National Democratic Revolution is that 
a socialist society10 in South Africa can best be achieved through two stages of revolution 11 . The 
8The ANC was banned under the Unlawful Organisations Bill of April 1960 (Gumede, 2005:23). 
9
"The CST [colonialism of a special type] thesis correctly describes the reality that, in the post-1910 period, the 
substance of the colonial status of the blacks has remained intact, even though its form may have altered" (Slovo, 1988). 
10 According to Slovo (1988), the "South African Communist Party, in its 1984 constitution, declares that its aim is 
to lead the working class towards the strategic goal of establishing a socialist republic 'and the more immediate aim of 
winning the objectives of the national democratic revolution which is inseparably linked to it'." 
11 
"The shortest route to socialism in our country is via a democratic state" (Slovo, 1988). 
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"content of the first stage is 'the national liberation 12 of the African people"' (Filatova, 1997:49), 
in other words the "creation of a national democratic society" (ANC, 2002b ). The second stage of 
the NDR, supported only by the socialist13 ele,ments in the tripartite alliance14 , is the transition to 
socialism (ANC, 2002b ). 
The NDR was also adopted by the ANC at the 1969 Morogoro conference (Filatova, 1997:49). "The 
concept of the national democratic revolution guided the ANC and its allies through the political 
negotiations of the early 1990s" (Macozoma, 2003). The NDR provides the shared theoretical under-
standing which underpins the Tripartite Alliance (Southall, 2003:75): the report of the 2002 Alliance 
Summit (ANC, 2002b) recorded that "All components of the Alliance agree that the primary task of 
the current period is the implementation of the NDR. This common objective is the strategic political 
and ideological foundation of the Alliance." The "dreary phraseology" of the NDR has enjoyed - and 
still enjoys - ideological hegemony within the Alliance despite it being "a device which has lost all 
relevance in the post-Cold War era" (Southall, 2003:75). 
However, the ANC has effectively halted the NDR at the first stage, abandoning the second stage 
of socialism in favour of transformation, i.e. in favour of promoting empowerment and employment 
equity (Mare, 2003:37). Thus, the 2005 National General Council of the ANC, taking note of the 
progress made in consolidating democracy and the continued electoral support for the ANC, insisted· 
that the NDR was entering a "new phase, in which the the opportunities for accelerated transformation 
are greatly improved" (ANC, 2005b). The NGC reaffirmed that the "black working class and the rural 
masses remain the primary motive forces of the NDR", yet drew attention to the "significant black 
middle strata"15 (ANC, 2005b). For Southall (2003:56), this is "ANC-speak" that "attempts to justify 
the party's embrace of capitalism." 
12
"national liberation is ... a short-term class imperative for the working people" (Slovo, 1988). 
13The ANC (l 997b) proclaims that the National Democratic Revolution does not aim towards the "creation of a socialist 
or communist society." For Alexander (2002:48), "the SACP's theory of a 'two-stage' so-called socialist revolution 
in effect abdicated the leadership of the 'first' stage of 'national democratic revolution' to the nationalist, that is, pro-
democracy and pro-capitalist, forces in the alliance." 
14Southall (2005:459) suggests that 
"with the changed balance of global forces brought about by the implosion of state socialism in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, and the need for the ANC-in-government to adapt to the post-1990 neo-liberal 
environment internationally, the interpretation of the NDR has been shifted in a much more conservative 
direction. Hence, instead of tilting the economy towards socialism, the NDR is now seen as: (i) legitimating 
the 'historic role' of the party in leading South Africa; (ii) validating the need for an interventionist state 
within the context of a mixed economy (iii) encouraging the existence, expansion, wealth and function of a 
black bourgeoisie; (iv) endorsing the need for close co-operation with capitalists of the old order some (at 
least) of whose 'objective' interests (for instance, in political stability) coincide with those of the liberation 
movement; and (v) quietly emphasising the role in 'transformation' of party elements which control the 
state, alongside the 'patriotic' bourgeoisie, at the expense of the working class and its allies" (emphasis 
added). 
15 In a prescient piece of commentary, Slovo (1988), turning to the struggle to set the direction of post-apartheid society, 
noted that "It is obvious that the black middle and upper classes who take part in a broad liberation alliance will jostle for 
hegemony and attempt to represent their interests as the interests of all Africans." 
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A.4 The Tripartite Alliance 
The ANC and the South African Communist Party (originally the Communist Party of South Africa) 
have a history of political cooperation stretching back as far as the 1930s (ANC, 2001b). Although 
leading elements in the ANC opposed cooperation with the CPSA during the 1940s, the "launch 
of the ANC's 1952 Defiance Campaign marked a qualitative improvement in the relations between 
communist activists and the rest of the liberation movement" (SACP, 2006:9). During exile, the ANC, 
SACP and SACTU, Cosatu's precursor, operated together16 as the National Democratic Alliance in 
pursuit of democratic rule in South Africa. 
The Tripartite Alliance was officially formed in May 1990, at a joint meeting of the ANC, SACP and 
Cosatu (the ANC and SACP had been unbanned in February of that year) (ANC, 1995). The ANC 
is the dominant member of the Alliance17 . Despite long-standing tensions18 between its partners, 
the Alliance has lasted till the time of writing in June 2006, by when the SACP and Cosatu were 
openly questioning the Alliance's future - the SACP Central Committee released a discussion docu-
ment proposing the SACP consider contesting elections on its own (SACP, 2006:31); Cosatu issued 
a document, Possibilities for Fundamental Social Change, that mooted leaving the Alliance ("The 
future of Cosatu", Mail & Guardian, June 23 to 29 2006); and Cosatu accused President Mbeki's . 
presidency of tending towards a "dictatorship" ("Mbeki's plan of action", Mail & Guardian, June 2 
to 8 2006). 
16The closeness of the Alliance can be gauged by the adoption of the ANC of SACP theories such as Colonialism of a 
Special Type and the National Democratic Revolution (SACP, 2006:5-7). 
17
"The ANC is the unifying embodiment of the collective of organised forces that seek to resolve the national contra-
dictions within South African society. It is, for this reason, the leader of the NDR, and leader of the Tripartite Alliance" 
(ANC, 2002b). 
18The Central Committee of the SACP posits that the "leading cadre" of the movement had in fact experienced a 
"significant rupture" in "strategic and tactical perspectives" as early as I 990, when the Tripartite Alliance was constituted 
- this "rupture" ending the "former unity between the ANC and SACP" (SACP, 2006:7). Habib et al. (Habib et al., 
2003:3-4) note that the tensions within the Alliance date from the Mandela presidency. 
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